Trade liberalisation between the EU and the Mercosur countries : An economic assessment for the case of beef by Junker, Franziska Julia
Institut für Lebensmittel- und Ressourcenökonomik der
Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität zu Bonn
_____________________________________________________________________________
Trade liberalisation between the EU and the 
Mercosur countries:
An economic assessment for the case of beef
I n a u g u r a l - D i s s e r t a t i o n
zur
Erlangung des Grades
Doktor der Agrarwissenschaften
(Dr.agr.)
der
Hohen Landwirtschaftlichen Fakultät
der
Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität
zu Bonn
vorgelegt im
September 2009
von
Franziska Julia Junker
aus 
Gießen an der Lahn
Referent: Prof. Dr. Thomas Heckelei
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Monika Hartmann
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 17.12.2009
Erscheinungsjahr: 2010
DANKSAGUNG
Mein Dank gilt Prof. Dr. Thomas Heckelei für das in mich gesetzte Vertrauen und 
für die aktive Unterstützung meiner Forschungsarbeit auch über meine Tätigkeit 
am Institut für Lebensmittel- und Ressourcenökonomik hinaus. Weiterhin danke 
ich Frau Prof. Dr. Monika Hartmann für die Übernahme des Koreferats. 
Zur Entstehung dieser Arbeit haben maßgeblich auch die Projektpartner des 
EU-Mercopol Projekts sowie verschiedene Interviewpartner beigetragen, deren 
fachlichen Beitrag und persönlichen Einsatz ich an dieser Stelle hervorheben 
möchte. 
Des Weiteren möchte ich meinen Kollegen und Kolleginnen, zuerst am Institut 
für Lebensmittel- und Ressourcenökonomik und später der OECD für ihre Geduld 
und Gesprächsbereitschaft über fachliche Fragen hinaus danken.
Abstract
Trade liberalisation between the EU and the Mercosur countries: An eco-
nomic assessment for the case of beef
Franziska Julia Junker
The Mercosur countries (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Venezuela) 
are the most important source of beef imports for the European Union (EU). 
Despite the reductions of tariffs in the multilateral context, the EU´s tariff on 
beef is especially high. Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay however enjoy 
preferential access to the European beef market through multilateral and bilateral 
tariff rate quotas (TRQs). These TRQs are overfilled, giving rise to quota rents 
whose distribution is a priori unknown. 
In the year 2005, the EU and the Mercosur countries exchanged their respec-
tive negotiation proposals. The Mercosur countries requested a significantly in-
creased access to the beef markets of the EU. The EU responded with a less ambi-
tious proposal. Both proposals have in common that expansion of the existing 
bilateral TRQs is envisaged. In addition, reductions of the in-quota tariffs are 
stipulated. The two proposals differ in the extent of both the TRQ expansions as 
well as the tariff reductions. 
For almost any policy change, there are winners as well as losers. 
The objective of this study is to provide an economic assessment of different 
options of beef trade liberalisation between the EU and the Mercosur countries.
Three problems of analysis arise in this context. One is the low level of prod-
uct aggregation on which the TRQs are defined. The second difficulty is the dis-
tribution of the quota rents both on international as well as on national level, 
which can have important consequences for the distribution of welfare. The third 
inconvenience is related to the non-continuous reaction of the domestic price to 
imports that needs to be included in any model that seeks to represent TRQs as 
accurately as possible. 
To provide an answer to the abovementioned research question, a partial equi-
librium model operating at a very low degree of product aggregation was set up. 
Technically, the model is formulated as a mixed complementarity problem 
(MCP), which has the advantage of endogenously representing the quota rent.
From a consultation of experts from the beef producing and exporting indus-
try, insight into the market structure, the administration of the TRQs and the im-
plications for the allocation of the rents was gained.
It was found that the rents arising from the bilateral TRQs remain fully in the 
exporting country, whereas those from the multilateral schemes are captured by 
importers in the EU. The impact on trade is limited in the scenario based on the 
proposal made by the EU, and more pronounced in the one made by the Mercosur 
countries. The latter leads to de facto free trade for Argentina and Uruguay. It was 
found that the quota rents and their distribution are decisive for the welfare effect 
in some countries and for some economic agents, i.e. an alternative distribution of 
the quota rents would lead to a different welfare effect. 
Kurzfassung 
Handelsliberalisierung zwischen der EU und den Staaten des Mercosur: 
Eine ökonomische Bewertung für den Fall von Rindfleisch
Franziska Julia Junker
Die Staaten des Mercosur (Argentinien, Brasilien, Uruguay, Paraguay und Vene-
zuela) sind die wichtigste Quelle für Rindfleischeinfuhren in die Europäische 
Union (EU). 
Die Zölle, die die EU auf Einfuhren von Rindfleisch erhebt, sind trotz des Ab-
baus von Handelsschranken im multilateralen Kontext noch immer hoch. Argen-
tinien, Brasilien, Uruguay und Paraguay verfügen über präferenziellen Marktzu-
gang im Rahmen von bilateralen und multilateralen Zollquoten (TRQs). Die 
TRQs sind überliefert und Quotenrenten entstehen, deren Verteilung zunächst 
unbekannt ist. 
Im Jahr 2005 haben die beiden Staatengruppen Verhandlungsvorschläge prä-
sentiert. Die Mercosur Staaten forderten deutlich verbesserten Zugang zu den 
Rindfleischmärkten der EU, der Vorschlag der EU war weniger weitreichend. 
Beiden Vorschlägen ist gemein, dass sie eine Ausdehnung der bestehenden TRQs 
zusammen mit einer Senkung des präferenziellen Zollsatzes vorsehen. Sie unter-
scheiden sich im Ausmaß der vorgeschlagenen Quotenausdehnung und Zollsen-
kung. 
Bei wohl fast jeder Politikänderung gibt es Gewinner und Verlierer. Das Ziel 
dieser Arbeit ist eine ökonomische Analyse verschiedener Optionen für die Libe-
ralisierung des Rindfleischhandels zwischen der EU und den Staaten des 
Mercosur. 
Drei Herausforderungen stellen sich in diesem Zusammenhang. Eine besteht in 
der sehr spezifischen Definition der Produkte, die unter den Quoten importiert 
werden können. Die zweite ist die zunächst unbekannte Verteilung der Quoten-
renten, die die Wohlfahrtswirkung aber entscheidend mit beeinflussen kann. Das 
dritte Problem ist die Darstellung der stellenweise nicht stetigen Reaktion des 
Preises eines importierten Guts auf die Menge.
Um dem ersten Problem zu begegnen, wurde ein partielles Gleichgewichtsmo-
dell entwickelt, dessen Produktdeckung speziell auf die oben genannte For-
schungsfrage angepasst ist. Die TRQs wurden über einen Mixed 
Complementarity Problem (MCP) – Ansatz dargestellt. Dieser erlaubt die endo-
gene Abbildung der Quotenrenten. Zusätzlich wurde eine Befragung von Exper-
ten aus dem landwirtschaftlichen Sektor und der verarbeitenden Industrie durch-
geführt, aus der Informationen über die Administration der Quoten, die herr-
schenden Marktstrukturen sowie der daraus resultierenden Verteilung der Quoten-
renten gewonnen wurden. 
Es hat sich gezeigt, dass die Quotenrenten, die mit den bilateralen Quoten in 
Zusammenhang stehen, vollständig im exportierenden Land verbleiben. Die, die 
im Rahmen der multilateralen Zollquoten entstehen, fallen dagegen vollständig 
den Importeuren in der EU zu. Die Simulationsergebnisse legen nahe, dass die 
Auswirkungen des EU Vorschlags auf die Handelströme nur gering sind. Würde 
eine Einigung dagegen auf Basis des Mercosur Vorschlags erzielt, ist mit einem 
deutlich stärkeren Anstieg der Importe zu rechnen. Es zeigt sich, dass die Quoten-
renten und ihre Verteilung für manche Länder und für manche ökonomischen 
Agenten entscheidend für die Gesamtwohlfahrtseffekte sind, d.h. eine alternative 
Verteilung der Renten würde zu anderen Wohlfahrtseffekten führen.Es hat sich 
gezeigt, dass die Quotenrenten, die mit den bilateralen Quoten in Zusammenhang 
stehen, vollständig im exportierenden Land verbleiben. Die, die im Rahmen der 
multilateralen Zollquoten entstehen, fallen dagegen vollständig den Importeuren 
in der EU zu. Die Simulationsergebnisse legen nah, dass die Auswirkungen des 
EU Vorschlags auf die Handelströme nur gering sind. Würde eine Einigung dage-
gen auf Basis des Mercosur Vorschlags erzielt, ist mit einem deutlich stärkeren 
Anstieg der Importe zu rechnen. Es zeigt sich, dass die Quotenrenten und ihre 
Verteilung für manche Länder und für manche ökonomischen Agenten entschei-
dend für die Gesamtwohlfahrtseffekte sind, d.h. eine alternative Verteilung der 
Renten würde zu anderen Wohlfahrtseffekten führen.
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11 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The Mercado Commún del Sur (Mercosur), the common market of the south, was 
created in 1991 with the treaty of Assunción between Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay 
and Paraguay, Venezuela joined the group at a later point in time. Shortly after the 
creation of the Mercosur, the European Union (EU) and the South American 
country group intensified the political dialogue. One of the goals of the intensified 
political cooperation is the creation of a free trade area between the two country 
groups. 
The EU and the Mercosur countries are both important players on international 
markets. In 2007, the EU exported a total of 1,239.8 billion Euros, of which 5.9 
percent are attributable to agricultural trade (COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES, 2006). The Mercosur´s export value in 2007 was with 231.7 bil-
lion Euro significantly lower than the EU´s, but the share covered by exports of 
agricultural goods is with over 25 percent more important than in the case of the 
EU (FAO (n.d.), UNITED NATIONS (n.d.)).
Both country blocks are important trading partners for each other. In 2007, the 
EU imported a total of 48 billion Euros of goods from the Mercosur countries, of 
which over 40 percent originate from trade with agricultural products. Agricul-
tural imports from the Mercosur countries account for over 20 percent of the total 
import value of agricultural products of the EU (COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES, 2008). In value terms, soybeans are the most important product, 
dominated by exports from Brazil. Soybeans are followed by beef1, with the larg-
est share again originating from Brazil. Fruits, nearly entirely from Argentina and 
Brazil, are another product that generated significant benefits for the Mercosur 
countries. In quantitative terms, the EU is an important export destination of cere-
als and here predominantly corn from the Mercosur countries (EUROSTAT, n.d.a).
There is considerable imbalance in the trade balances between the two country 
blocks: The value of merchandise exports from the EU to the Mercosur countries 
was only 32.1 billion Euros in 2007, so the trade balance is clearly negative. Of 
the total value of the EU´s exports to the Mercosur countries in 2007, less than 1.3 
billion Euros or 4 percent were agricultural exports. Within the agricultural ex-
ports, by far the most important commodity in value terms are dairy products, 
followed by sugar and meat. An important sector to the EU in terms of exports is 
services, with an export value of almost 8 billion Euros in 2006 (COMMISSION OF 
1 “Beef” includes fresh, chilled or frozen meat of bovine animals (code 020110, 020120, 020130, 
020210, 020220, 020230 of the combined nomenclature). 
2THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2008). Though in bilateral trade, exports of manu-
factured goods and services from the EU to the Mercosur countries are more im-
portant than agricultural goods, in the export package of the EU to the world, 
exports to the Mercosur account with 3 percent only for a relatively small share.
These figures indicate that there is strong demand for agricultural products 
from the Mercosur countries in the EU, while the Mercosur countries play only a 
minor role as an export market for agricultural products from the EU. Hence, for 
agricultural goods, this study will be focused on trade flows from the South 
American country group to the EU. 
In 2005, the EU and the Mercosur presented their respective proposals for re-
ducing trade barriers. For some agricultural commodities, creation or expansion of 
existing tariff rate quotas (TRQs) and tariff reductions were put forward. For 
other agricultural goods, the reduction or abolition of import duties were pro-
posed. 
Soybeans, the most important commodity in the EU´s imports from the Mer-
cosur, face zero tariff from the European Union (WTO, n.d.a), and trade liberali-
sation will therefore only have an indirect effect on trade flows of soybeans. For 
this reason, soybeans will not be considered in more detail. 
Beef is the second most important commodity in the EU´s import package 
from the Mercosur countries, and the Mercosur countries are among the most 
important beef exporters in the world. For most Mercosur countries, part of this 
trade takes place under preferential schemes that the EU granted mostly in re-
sponse to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
(URAA). Most Mercosur countries fully use these trade preferences. Furthermore, 
beef production in the EU still enjoys a relatively high degree of protection and 
public support. An expected pronounced negative effect on the beef sector in the 
EU is likely to act as an impediment to an understanding between the trade part-
ners. This makes it an interesting and relevant case for applied agricultural trade 
policy analysis. 
Fruits, that range third in the list of agricultural goods imported by the EU 
from the South American country group, are excluded from further analysis be-
cause of their minor importance to the agricultural markets of the EU as a whole. 
Imports of cereals are not further considered because they consist almost exclu-
sively of imports of corn, and the existing trade preferences where not fully util-
ised in the past, indicating limited importance of further trade liberalisation.
For these reasons, this study is focused on beef. Non-agricultural goods and 
services are not further considered as their inclusion would go beyond the scope 
of this study.
As for almost any political change, there will be groups experiencing eco-
nomic losses, whereas others can be expected to benefit from the new political 
environment. The aim of this study is to assess the economic consequences of a 
3potential agreement between the EU and the Mercosur countries for the beef sec-
tor in a quantitative manner. 
As indicated above, beef imports of the EU from the Mercosur countries take 
place mainly under preferential trading schemes, and the EU grants these prefer-
ences through TRQs. Three main problems of TRQs in quantitative policy analy-
sis can be identified. The first one is related to limited availability of information 
or the limited ability to fully exploit it. It is often the case that only very narrowly 
defined commodities benefit from the preferential tariff. In the worst case, the 
definition of the product is so specific that it can not be differentiated from other 
products in the available trade statistics. It may also be the case that the necessary 
information is available, but the model is designed at a higher product aggregation 
level. If this is the case, in many applications the trade preference is given to the 
aggregate commodity (see for example DROGUÉ et al. (2005), WEISSLEDER et al.
(2008)), thereby systematically over- or underestimating the impact of trade liber-
alisation. 
The second difficulty results from the quota rent that arises when imports are 
at the quota level or exceed it. Its amount and its distribution are factors that can 
crucially influence the impact of the policy change on both trade flows and on the 
welfare effects. It will be seen that in some cases, the distribution of the rent can 
actually determine whether a country benefits or not from a free trade agreement 
including TRQ expansion. Once the amount and the allocation between countries 
are determined, another question that arises is which actor inside the country 
benefits. TRQs are sometimes seen as a development instrument (see for example 
MATTHEWS et al. (2002)), and the allocation of the quota rent within the country 
may give insight on the effectiveness of TRQs as a development instrument. The 
questions of rent allocation between countries and inside the chain are closely 
related to the administration of the licences to import or to export and therefore 
have to be analysed on a case-to-case basis. This is probably one of the reasons 
why theses questions have been widely ignored in both large and small scale 
quantitative works.
The third inconvenience is related to the behaviour of the tariff and modelling 
techniques. Problems arise from the non-continuous reaction of domestic prices to 
imports that needs to be included into any model that seeks to represent TRQs as 
accurately as possible. 
The study presented hereinafter adds to the existing research in the following 
ways: 
− First, it provides a detailed assessment of possible trade liberalisation 
scenarios for the case of beef, employing a simulation model working 
at low level of product aggregation. 
4− Second, it gives insight into the distribution of the quota rents on in-
ternational level as well as inside the production chain for the case of 
beef trade between the EU and the Mercosur countries. 
− Thirdly, on the methodological side, it illustrates how bilateral trade 
can be represented through a Takayama-Judge model operating at a 
low level of product aggregation.
1.2 Methodological approach
To address the research question outlined above, a dual approach was taken. On 
the one hand, a partial equilibrium model was set up to assess different options for 
trade liberalisation in a quantitative manner. On the other hand, a consultation of 
experts was carried out to shed more light on the issue of the distribution of quota 
rents. 
To best represent the trade relations between the EU and the Mercosur coun-
tries, this study employs a bilateral trade model. This class of models supplies 
information on not only both imports and exports of a region, but also on source 
and direction of the shipment, that is the trade flows between each possible pair of 
countries and thus goes further than the net-trade models that are based on the 
orthodox trade theories founded on the Ricardo-model and the Hecker-Ohlin-
model (for an overview of international trade theories see GANDOLFO (1998)).
There are two main approaches for modelling bilateral trade flows: So-called 
Takayama-Judge models, which will here be more correctly referred to as Enke-
Samuelson-Takayama-Judge (ESTJ)-models, and Armington models. 
ESTJ-models were developed by ENKE (1951), SAMUELSON (1952) and 
TAKAYAMA et al. (1964), and render the equilibrium prices and trade flows of 
spatially separated markets, including the possibility of arbitraging behaviour 
(ANANIA et al., 1991). 
Armington models are the main competitor of the ESTJ-models. Paul S. Arm-
ington developed an approach for modelling bilateral trade flows based on a the-
ory of demand that distinguishes products by origin, that is, products are no 
longer homogenous (ARMINGTON, 1969). The Armington-Approach is under-
pinned by the theory of consumer’s preference of differentiated goods, either in 
terms of varying over time, exhibiting “love of variety” or having a “most pre-
ferred good”. Consumers show a different willingness to pay for the same com-
modity depending on its place of production, hence prices do not necessarily 
equalise across countries. 
There are several deficiencies of the Armington approach in applied agricul-
tural trade modelling. One is the fact that changes induced through shocks will 
always take place only in relation to the existing market share, hence a country 
5with a small share in an import market can not significantly expand its exports 
unless the elasticities of substitution are arbitrarily set to high values. Another 
weakness is the fact that a zero trade flow can not become non-zero in the simula-
tion. This can be overcome by setting trade flows in the initial situation to an arbi-
trary small value, but this is fairly unattractive as the value chosen lacks empirical 
validation and at the same time influences the modelling results considerably. 
Unpublished work carried at the Institute for Food and Resource Economics of 
the University of Bonn suggests overcoming this problem by introducing a com-
mitment parameter into the CES utility function (see WITZKE et al. (2005)).
However, as in the context of this study, a low level of product aggregation 
was required anyhow, the Armington approach was ruled out, and the model 
specified as a Takayama-Judge model at a low level of product aggregation.
1.3 Structure of the study
As mentioned, beef trade between the two country groups in the focus of this 
study takes predominantly place under TRQs. In order to set the ground for the 
further analysis, the study starts off with a thorough discussion of the economic 
theory of TRQs, their administration and related aspects of rent distribution.
In the following, a detailed description of the trade policies and patterns of 
beef trade between the EU and the Mercosur countries is given. This comprises 
imports of the EU from the Mercosur countries, as well as an analysis of the utili-
sation of the existing trade preferences granted by the EU to the South American 
states. 
Chapter 4 relates these theoretical aspects to the reality of TRQ administration 
and rent distribution for imports of beef under the different preferential schemes 
of the EU from the Mercosur countries.
After that, the design of the model developed for this specific research ques-
tion is described. The description includes basic features like the covered country 
and commodity space, but also comprises more detailed information on model 
specification and data issues.
Against this background, results of the quantitative scenario analysis are pre-
sented. These include the development of trade flows along with a welfare as-
sessment for the different groups involved. In the latter, special attention is paid to 
the role and the distribution of the arising quota rents. The deterministic simula-
tions are complemented with an analysis of the sensitivity of the model outcomes 
to the parameter values. 
The final chapter provides a summary and discusses the limitations of the 
work. Finally, conclusions from the analysis are drawn.
62 Economics of Tariff Rate Quotas 
TRQs are a policy instrument which has attracted a lot of attention from research-
ers in agricultural economics in recent years. In the Uruguay Agreement on Agri-
culture (URAA) it was agreed to transform all non-tariff barriers into tariffs. This 
partially resulted in prohibitive tariffs, which stood in contrast to the commitment 
to maintain all market access existing prior to the URAA, a clause called “current 
access” (IATRC, 2001). In detail, members were required to preserve the market 
access opportunities in place in the period from 1986 to 1988. In cases where this 
was challenged by the high tariffs resulting from the tarification process, TRQs 
were used to assure that the historic levels of trade were conserved (WTO, n.d.b).
If the market access in the base period had been less than 5 percent of domes-
tic consumption of the respective product, a second provision denominated 
“minimum access” gave further rise to the use of TRQs. It implied that all mem-
ber countries of the World Trade Organisation were to open a minimum market 
access of 5 percent of domestic consumption on a most-favoured-nation (MFN) 
basis. As in the case of the current access opportunities, TRQs have been used to 
reach the minimum access opportunities (WTO, n.d.b).
This boost in the use of TRQs has called upon many researchers to dedicate 
themselves to the analysis of economic aspects of TRQs. The aim of this chapter 
is to give an overview of the existing economic theory underlying TRQs. 
2.1 Definition 
As its name says, a tariff rate quota consists of both tariffs and quotas. An import 
level qtrq is fixed up to which a relatively low first-tier tariff t1 is charged on all 
products for which the quota is defined. Once imports exceed this fixed level, the 
second-tier tariff t2 > t1 is charged. Unless the second-tier tariff is prohibitive, 
TRQs differ from a regular import quota as imports can occur at a level higher 
than the quota by paying the higher second-tier tariff t2 (BOUGHNER et al., 2000). 
There can be more than two tiers in the tariffs and quota levels. However, to the 
author’s knowledge this is neither foreseen in the WTO rules, nor are there any 
examples for this known from agricultural trade between non-WTO member 
countries. The irrelevance and probable non-existence of TRQs with more than 
two tariffs is further supported by the fact that economic literature on the econom-
ics of TRQs is limited to two-tier tariff rate quotas, typically consisting of two 
tariffs and consequently one quota level.
Apart from the general definition of TRQs given above, there are different 
specifications of TRQs. A TRQ can be open to all exporting countries or import 
7quantities can be reserved for a specific country or a limited group of exporting 
countries. In the first case, each country has the same right to export under the 
first-tier tariff until the quota level is reached. In the second case, a specific coun-
try or country group has exclusive access to the importing country’s market at the 
low tariff. This criteria is referred to as “bilateral” versus “multilateral”, “allo-
cated” versus “non-allocated”, “country specific” versus “non country specific”, 
or “preferential” TRQ. Another distinction refers to legal aspects of the TRQ. 
Some TRQs are notified to the WTO, but importing countries can, in addition to 
their minimum requirements in terms of minimum access or current access, open 
autonomous, i.e. un-notified import quotas. These can be preferential or multilat-
eral (WTO, n.d.b). 
The term TRQ will here be used to denominate a two-tier tariff-rate quota. The 
term quota will be used synonymously. The case of more than two tiers is empiri-
cally not relevant and therefore omitted. 
2.2 Basic Economics of TRQs 
As already mentioned, TRQs are composed of three elements: 
− A low first-tier tariff,
− the import quota which determines the import level from which on the 
second-tier tariff will be charged, 
− the higher second-tier tariff. 
For any quota, only one of the three elements will directly determine quantities 
and prices and thereby the market equilibrium (MÖNNICH, 2003a). This character-
istic will be illustrated in this section. 
In the academic literature, two different ways of depicting the economic ef-
fects of TRQs can be found: Some authors represent it by a kinked excess demand 
curve (see, for example, BOUGHNER et al. (2000), DE GORTER et al. (1999)), while 
others prefer to depict it by a kinked excess supply curve (see SKULLY (2001), 
MÖNNICH (2003b)). Here, the basic mechanism and the three possible regimes of 
a tariff-rate import quota will be explained with the effect of the policy measure 
incorporated into the excess supply curve. 
Binding Quota
The case of a binding quota, i.e. when the quota itself is the element determining 
the market equilibrium, is illustrated in Figure 1 for the import market of both a 
small importing country and a large importing country. The excess supply curve 
ES has a positive slope in the case of a large importing country indicated by su-
8perscript lc, and is totally elastic for a small importing country, indicated by the 
superscript sc. 
The respective excess supply curve is shifted upwards by the amount of the 
tariff2. It becomes clear from Figure 1 that for an import quantity smaller q0
trq the 
supply curve is shifted upward by the lower in-quota tariff t1. Once imports exceed 
q0
trq, the higher second-tier tariff is applied, causing a more pronounced upward 
shift of the supply function and introducing a totally inelastic section of (t2-t1) at 
q0
trq into the excess supply function. The effective excess supply curves including 
the tariff are depicted by the bold solid lines. 
Figure 1 Binding quota
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Source: Own representation
The question which element is effective for the respective tariff-rate import 
quota depends on where the excess demand curve ED intersects ES. In Figure 1, 
ED intersects the ES curve in its inelastic section, this being true for both assump-
tions on the size of the importing country. The equilibrium level of imports for the 
large country M*lc as well as for the small country M*sc is exactly at the quota 
level, that is q0
trq. The resulting market prices p*sc and p*lc are identical for both 
countries. 
2 For easier understandability, a specific tariff is assumed, which results merely in a parallel upward 
shift of the respective supply function. An ad-valorem tariff would result in a pivot of the respective 
supply function. 
9In this situation, the domestic price in the importing country is higher than the 
import price plus the first-tier tariff. This is so because of the quantitative restric-
tions placed on imports. The difference between the import price and the domestic 
price multiplied with the imported quantity is an economic benefit called the 
quota rent. In Figure 1 it is represented by the two shaded rectangular areas, the 
upper part for the case of the large importing country, both shaded areas for the 
illustrated small importing country. 
This case, in which the quota itself is the instrument determining the amount 
of imports and the domestic price is referred to as “(import) quota regime” 
(BOUGHNER et al., 2000), (IATRC, 2001), or “binding quota” (MÖNNICH, 2003a) 
in the academic literature. 
Quota under-fill
A different situation arises when the quota level is extended as it is shown in Fig-
ure 2. Now, ED intersects ES to the left of the new quota level q1
trq under both 
assumptions on the size of the country. 
Figure 2 Quota under-fill
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Source: Own representation
For the large importing country the equilibrium amount of imports is M*lc at 
the price p*lc, for the small importing country market equilibrium is reached at 
M*sc and p*sc. Evidently, this is a situation in which the quota itself has no influ-
ence on the market equilibrium: The policy instrument determining import quanti-
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ties and prices is first-tier tariff alone, a setting in which the second-tier tariff and 
the quota are redundant. No quota rents arise. This situation is referred to as 
“binding in-quota tariff” (MÖNNICH, 2003a), “in-quota tariff-regime” (IATRC, 
2001), “t1 regime” (DE GORTER et al., 1999) or “quota under-fill”. 
Quota overfill
Of the three policy instruments representing the tariff rate quota, not only the 
first-tier tariff or the quota itself can be effective, but also t2, given that it is not 
prohibitively high. This case is illustrated in Figure 3, in which the quota level 
q2
trq is reduced such that the ES curve intersects ED to the right of q2
trq. The equi-
librium for the large country is M*lc, the corresponding market clearing price is 
p*lc. For the small country, imports are at M*sc and the domestic market price is 
p*sc. Clearly, this is a situation in which the level of imports exceeds the quota 
and t2 is the instrument defining prices and quantities. In this case as opposed to 
quota-under fill, quota rents can be observed even though the quota is not binding. 
This is due to the fact that all imports up to the quota level are only charged t1, but 
are sold at the higher price including the second-tier tariff. In Figure 3, the quota 
rents for the small country case are depicted by the shaded area, the quota rents in 
the large country case by the hatched area. 
In the academic literature, this situation is referred to as “second-tier tariff re-
gime” (BOUGHNER et al., 2000), “out-of-quota tariff regime”, “binding out-of-
quota tariff” (MÖNNICH, 2003a) or “quota overfill”. 
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Figure 3 Quota overfill
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The conditions for the three tariff rate quota regimes to be effective are sum-
marized in Figure 43. It can be seen that if there was only the in-quota tariff t1, the 
importing country would purchase the commodity in question up to an amount of 
M*max. If on the other hand, only the second-tier tariff t2 was in place, the equilib-
rium amount of imports would be M*min. Consequently, if the quota lies to the 
right of M*max like q2
trq, quota under-fill will occur since the equilibrium is to the 
left of the quota. If on the other hand the quota lies to the left of M*min as for ex-
ample q1
trq, an amount greater than the quota will be imported, because even in-
cluding the second-tier tariff, the equilibrium amount of imports lies to the right 
of the quota level q1
trq. In other words, the quota itself will only then be the bind-
ing instrument, when it lies between M*min and M*max as for example q0
trq.
3 For the ease of representation, only the case of a large importing country and, again, a specific 
tariff is represented. 
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Figure 4 TRQ regimes
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Source: Own representation, based on IATRC (2001)
It should be mentioned that the quota size is not the only variable determining 
which of the three policy parameters of the TRQ is effective. Situations in which 
the excess supply or excess demand curves shift such that a different TRQ regime 
as in the initial situation is in place can be imagined easily. 
The reasoning described in this section can be attributed to several authors, 
e.g. SKULLY (1999), BOUGHNER et al. (2000) and MÖNNICH (2003b). 
The Concept of the Tariff Equivalent 
For further analysis of the economic effects of TRQs, the concept of the tariff 
equivalent te of a quota shall be introduced here. If the quota is the binding in-
strument, the tariff equivalent is the absolute or percentage difference between the 
domestic price and the import price. The tariff equivalent can then be calculated 
according to the two formulas below.
(1) impimpde pppt /)( −=
for an ad-valorem tariff, and 
(2) )( impde ppt −=
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for specific tariffs (DE GORTER et al., 1999). In case of first- or second-tier tariff 
regimes, the tariff equivalent of the (non-binding) quota is the vertical difference 
between the excess supply curve without tariff ES0 and the excess demand curve 
at the quota level. This can be seen in Figure 4, where te0, te1 and te2 are shown for 
the three different quota sizes. It can be seen that an expansion or a cut of the 
quota level changes its tariff equivalent, an expansion leading to a reduction of te, 
a cut in the quota level to an increase of te. 
Depending on which parameter of the TRQ is binding, the following can be 
stated on the relation between te, t1 and t2 along the lines of DE GORTER et al.
(1999): 
Table 1 Tariff equivalent and TRQ regime
imports and quota quantity tariff equivalent effective element
qtrq ≤ M*min te ≥ t2 t2
M*min ≤ qtrq ≤ M*max t1 < te < t2 qtrq
qtrq ≥ M*max te ≤ t1 t1
Source: Own representation, based on DE GORTER et al. (1999)
2.3 Welfare and distributional effects of liberalising TRQs
The question which of the three parameters constituting a TRQ should be liberal-
ised in order to provide more traded quantity and maximum overall welfare gains 
is easy to answer: The one that is effective. But the overall welfare gains are usu-
ally not the prime interest of the negotiating parties and stakeholders, they are 
rather interested in maximizing welfare gains for themselves. 
To see who loses and who benefits from liberalisation of elements of TRQs, 
the distribution of the welfare gains and losses between the trading partners is 
treated here. It is assumed that the exporting country is a net-exporting country, 
and that the importing country is a net-importing country. This is not a serious 
constraint in this context, as the EU has become a net-importer of beef in 2004 
(OECD, n.d.a), and the Mercosur countries treated here are net-exporters of this 
commodity. This assumption implies that the increase in producer surplus will 
always exceed the losses of consumer surplus in the exporting country. For the 
importing country, the opposite is true: Gains of consumer surplus will always 
outweigh the losses incurred by the producing sector. 
Quota expansion
Expansion of a non-binding quota. In cases in which the quota is not binding, 
either t1 or t2 must be effective. If t1 is binding, a quota increase will bring no 
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change at all, the market equilibrium as well as the distribution of welfare remain 
identical. 
On the other hand, if t2 is binding, quota expansion will not affect prices or 
traded quantity, but it will reduce the tariff revenue from the second-tier tariff and 
increase the quota rent. Going back to Figure 4, and assuming that the quota level 
is q1
trq in the initial situation and it is expanded to M*min, which is the maximum 
quota size with a still binding t2. Then the state incurs a loss of tariff-revenue by (-
b-d-g-k-o). This income is transformed into quota rent, increasing it from 
(a+c+f+j+n) before the quota expansion by (b+d+g+k+o). Thus, enlarging a 
quota when t2 is binding represents a mere redistribution of income from the state 
to the owner of the quota. Whereas the exporting country will never incur any loss 
but might even benefit if the rent accrues to it, the effect for the importing country 
is neutral if it gains the rent, but potentially negative if it is not able to capture the 
rent. 
Expansion of a binding quota. The maximum welfare effect from expanding a 
binding quota (te<t2) can be gained by expanding it to a point from which on it is 
not binding anymore, that is, when te<t1 or, equivalently, the quota level lies to the 
right of M*max. 
In Figure 4, the maximum welfare effects for expanding a binding quota can 
be shown by shifting the quota level from q0
trq to M*max, causing domestic prices 
to fall and import prices to rise. The importing country has a net benefit of con-
sumer and producer surplus to the extent of area (+f+g+h+i), the exporting coun-
try to the extent of area (w+x+y+z). The state budget of the importing country 
will benefit from the quota expansion, its income from t1 rises by the tariff times 
additional imports, that is area (+m+v)4. As already described, consumers in the 
exporting country and producers in the importing country experience losses, but 
these losses are always offset by the welfare increase of consumers in the 
net-importing country and producers in the net-exporting countries. 
This case is somewhat more complex for the quota rent. The expansion from 
q0
trq to M*max (or to its right) represents a case where the quota rent, which was 
area (f+g+h+j+k+l) before the policy change, vanishes, clearly harming the 
owner of the quota. But if the quota level was for example at (or very close to) 
M*min to start with and is then expanded to qo
trq, it is undetermined whether the 
owner of the quota gains or looses from the quota expansion: While area (-a-c-b-
d-n-o) is a loss of quota rent, (+h+l) are gained. Whether quota expansion is fa-
vourable for the owner of the quota is contingent on the extent of the quota ex-
pansion and the price elasticity of the excess demand curve. All that can be said is 
that if the quota rent decreases and the importing country was the owner of the 
4 Actually, the effect on the state budget is +(j+k+l+m+v) +(-w-x-y), but area (-w-x-y) has the same 
value as (j+k+l), the two cancel each other out and merely (m+v) are left. 
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rent, this loss has to be compensated by increases of consumer surplus and state 
revenue, whereas an increase of the quota rent would contribute to the compensa-
tion of losses of producer surplus. If on the other hand the exporting country was 
the owner of the quota rent and it decreases, it is no longer certain that the export-
ing country would benefit from quota expansion. In contrast, an increase of the 
quota rent would underline the exporting countries interest in a quota expansion.
Second-tier tariff reduction
Non-binding second-tier tariff reduction. If the first-tier tariff or the quota is bind-
ing, a reduction of the second-tier tariff will not trigger any changes neither to the 
market equilibrium nor to the welfare distribution. 
Binding second-tier tariff reduction. The case of a binding t2 can be seen in Figure 
4, e.g. for q1
trq . The most extreme case for a second-tier tariff reduction would be 
to reduce it to the level of t1. Not surprisingly the overall welfare effect of the t2
reduction is positive as imports increase from M*min to M*max, import prices in-
crease and domestic prices decrease from pmax to pmin. The importing country has a 
net gain of area (a+b+c+d+e+f+g+h+i) resulting from changes in consumer and 
producer surplus, exporters benefit from increased export quantities and prices by 
area ???????????????. The importing country incurs a loss of tariff revenue 
from t2 by area (-b-d-g-w-x-?-??, but at the same time gains tariff revenue from t1
by area (n+j)+(l+m+p+u+v). The quota rent, which was (a+c+f+j+n) in the 
initial situation, is reduced to zero, part of it being transformed into consumer 
surplus (a+c+f). 
For the importing country, it is undetermined whether it will gain or loose 
from the policy change. It depends on whether the losses of tariff revenue from 
the abolition of t2 will be outweighed by the gains from t1 times the additional 
imported quantity. If the importing country was the owner of the rent in the initial 
circumstances, its loss has to be compensated as well by gains in consumer sur-
plus in order to have a net welfare gain. 
The situation is clear for the exporting country if it was not the owner of the 
quota rent prior to the policy change: It will obviously benefit from the second-
tier tariff reduction. If the quota rent was accruing to the exporting country, the 
gain of producer surplus must outweigh the loss of the quota rent and consumer 
surplus in order to ensure a beneficial effect on the exporting country. 
First-tier tariff reduction
Non-binding first-tier tariff reduction. In a situation in which the quota or t2 is 
binding, reducing the first-tier tariff will not change the market equilibrium. What 
will in fact be altered is the distribution of welfare. In both cases, reducing t1 will 
16
reduce the tariff revenue generated to the importing country and increase the 
quota rent by the same amount (not shown in Figure 4). 
As for the expansion of a non-binding quota, this policy change would imply a 
shift of income from the state to the owner of the quota rent. The importing coun-
try might loose if it is not able to capture the increased rent, whereas the exporting 
country will either benefit if the rent accrues to it or remain unaffected. 
Binding first-tier tariff reduction. If on the other hand the first-tier tariff is in fact 
the binding instrument, its complete abolition will always bring welfare gains to 
both trading partners. The amount and distribution of the welfare gains are equal 
to the ones of every simple tariff reduction and are therefore not described here. 
2.4 Quota administration methods
With the agreements of URAA and TRQs coming into force, countries also had to 
find answers to the question how to allot the rights to trade under the preferential 
duty among importers. Seven categories of principal administration methods can 
be distinguished as shown in Box 1. 
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Box 1 Quota administration methods and additional conditions
Quota administration methods
Applied tariffs: The quota part of the TRQ is not applied; the products concerned 
enter the territory at the in-quota tariff rate in unlimited quantities. 
First-Come, First-served: Shares are not allocated; imports are allowed to enter at 
the in-quota tariff until the quota quantity is reached. Then, the second-tier tariff 
applies to any further shipment.
Licence on demand: Licences are issued as a function of quantities demanded. 
When the licence requests exceed the available quantity, they are often reduced 
pro rata. 
Auctioning: Licences are sold through a competitive bid system.
Historical allocation: The licences are distributed in relation to historic transac-
tions. 
State trading entities: The rights to trade under the preferential levy are trans-
ferred to state trading entities.
Producer groups or associations: Producer groups or associations are granted the 
right to control for imports under the preferential tariff rate.
Additional conditions
Domestic purchase requirement: To import under the TRQ and to obtain the 
lower duty rate, purchase of domestic production of the product to be imported is 
required. 
Limits on shares per allocation: A condition limiting the quantity of the share of 
the TRQ that can be assigned to each importer or shipment
Export certificates: This condition requires that an export certificate, a certificate 
of origin or authenticity is issued by the exporting country.
Past trading performance: Similar to the allocation based on historic imports, this 
additional condition limits eligibility to established importers. This requirement can 
be combined with any of the administration methods outlined above.
Source: De Gorter et al. (2004), p. 99.
An importing country can require that the import licences, distributed to im-
porters through any administration method, need to be matched with an export 
certificate handed out by the exporting countries´ authorities. Export certificates 
are particularly interesting for the exporting countries: They provide economic 
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agents in the exporting country with information on the duty that is going to be 
charged on their product. 
For a thorough discussion of the economics of TRQ administration methods 
see SKULLY (1999) and IATRC (2001). 
2.5 Who captures the rent? Factors affecting rent distribution and 
dissipation
In the discussion of welfare effects of liberalisation of elements of TRQs in sec-
tion 2.3, the final distribution of welfare could not always be determined in a pre-
cise way because a general statement on which of the trading partners gains the 
rent could not be made. On top, the circumstances can be such that the rent is not 
generated at all. To gain further insight into these issues, the determinants of the 
rent distribution will be briefly discussed in the following, along with possible 
factors contributing to its dissipation.
Rent distribution 
The distribution of rents can be considered basically at two levels: First, at the 
international level, that is between countries, or second at national level, that is 
between the different groups of economic agents. At any level, the distribution of 
rents depends on to whom of the trading partners import or export rights are as-
signed to. This is because, as BOUGHNER et al. (2000) point out, holding the rights 
to trade is a necessary, though not sufficient condition for holding the right to the 
rent. Market and bargaining power are factors that are likely to be critical for the 
rent distribution and go beyond the allocation of formal rights to trade. 
BOUGHNER et al. (2000) distinguish three scenarios with different outcomes for 
the distribution of the rents:
In the first case, only rights to import are issued (no rights to export are as-
signed), and actors on the exporting side are perfectly competitive and have no 
market power. In these conditions, the rents accrue to the importing side. 
The authors analyse a second setting in which no right to import is allocated to 
perfectly competitive economic actors on the importing side, and export licences 
are issued and/or agents on the exporting side have market power. According to 
the authors, these are circumstances that lead the appropriation of the rent by the 
exporting side, which can be explained by the fact that importers have no negotia-
tion power over the importing side.
In the third case, the authors assume that rights to import are allocated on the 
importing side, and that export licences are issued on the exporting side. In these 
circumstances the importing and the exporting side have equal formal rights. The 
authors point out that this does not imply an equal distribution of the rent, as the 
economic agents in the importing and/or exporting country may have market 
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power and may be able to negotiate over the available rents (BOUGHNER et al., 
2000). In the extreme, this could lead to full appropriation of the rent on only one 
side.
It should be born in mind that this discussion is based on the idea that import-
ing and exporting companies are domestic to their respective country. One could 
think of an exporting company to open branches in the importing country and 
conduct both import and export, preventing domestic firms in the importing coun-
tries from participation in the business or vice-versa, changing the distribution of 
the rent on international level. 
Parallel to the international level, holding the right to trade does not mean that 
the economic rent is not further distributed within the country. One could think of 
constellations that force the entities that receive the rights to export or to import to 
share the quota rents with other economic actors that are not directly involved into 
international trade. If for example the commodity in question was scarce, the pro-
ducers of this commodity, provided they had the knowledge that their produce is 
intended for exportation under a preferential tariff, could bargain for part of the 
quota rent when selling their product to the entities engaged in trade. Similarly, 
vertical integration could lead to sharing of the rent between actors directly in-
volved in trade and others.
Rent dissipation
In the comparative-static analysis carried out earlier in this chapter, it has been 
implicitly assumed that markets are perfectly competitive on the supply as well as 
on the demand side and that there are no transaction costs. Only under these cir-
cumstances, one can assume that rents are created5 to the full extent. In the fol-
lowing, various factors will be considered that contribute to the partial or com-
plete dissipation of rents.
Rent dissipation due to inefficient quota allocation. Relaxing the assumption on 
competitive markets, parts or the entire rent can be dissipated due to inefficient 
resource allocation. Two mechanisms can be distinguished through which a TRQ 
can affect market efficiency in a negative way. The first stage is the one at which 
the rights to export or import are assigned. This can be illustrated by means of 
Figure 5. When the quota rights6 are assigned to the lowest cost producer, the 
domestic price would be at pd with import occurring up to qtrq, a quota rent of area 
(c+d) and tariff-revenue from t1 of the shaded area f. If in turn the quota rights are 
5 Rent creation is here understood as the emergence of the economic rent due to the quantitative 
restriction, not as process of the political economy where stakeholders lobby for policy measures 
that provide them with an economic rent (FLOWERS, 1987).
6 It is assumed that the economic setting is such that the quota is binding. 
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assigned to the highest cost producer, importers have no other choice than to pur-
chase from him paying price pd. The rent is completely dissipated (BOUGHNER et 
al., 2000)7. The result is complete dissipation of the rent, quota under fill and 
additional deadweight losses (see BOUGHNER et al. (2000)). All quota administra-
tion methods that discriminate against certain suppliers like the one based on his-
torical shares or state trading entities are prone to this effect (IATRC, 2001).
Figure 5 Losses of efficiency in the presence of TRQs
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Even if no export rights are allocated and exporters compete against each oth-
ers, inefficiencies can arise. In cases in which a binding quota is in place, the 
higher domestic price enables higher cost producers that would otherwise have 
shut down to stay in business and crowd low-cost suppliers out. Obviously, the 
higher the potential rent is, the higher the risk of inefficient producers entering the 
market (SKULLY, 1999). 
Rent dissipation due to rent seeking activities. Other than through inefficient allo-
cation of quota rights, the quota rent may be dissipated due to rent seeking activi-
ties. CHAU et al. (2003) distinguish two strands of economic literature in this con-
text. One is the rent-seeking literature focused on the economic agents´ activities 
to obtain a share or the entire rent, leading to inefficient resource allocation and 
investment. The second one relates to what the authors reference as the waiting in 
7 There is an additional deadweight loss due to the inefficient resource allocation as the high cost 
suppliers have a cost of production of area (h+i+j+k) compared to (l+m) for the low cost producers.
Additionally, t1 will be charged on all imports, reducing the imported quantity to Mt1 creating an 
even more inefficient market outcome (BOUGHNER ET AL., 2000). 
21
line literature, where rents are dissipated through waiting costs as a consequence 
of the rush to the border under a first-come-first-serve quota allocation mecha-
nism. Other authors associate increased storage cost with this quota administra-
tion mechanism, as traders may want to minimise the risk of arriving late and 
paying the full duty. Also, if the quota shares are allocated based on historic per-
formance, resources may be wasted by trying to increase market shares for strate-
gic reasons (IATRC, 2001). FLOWERS (1987) challenges this hypothesis of eco-
nomic waste through rent seeking activities and describes a number of settings 
and examples under which dissipation of the rent may not occur or only to a lim-
ited extent. However, they relate mainly to non-trade and non-agricultural issues, 
so this discussion shall not be further developed here. 
2.6 Conclusions of the chapter
TRQs are constituted through three elements: An in-quota tariff, the quota quan-
tity, and an over-quota tariff. 
Only one element can be effective at a time. Which element of the three is ef-
fective depends on the level of imports. When imports are at or over the quota 
level, a quota rent arises.
Liberalizing different elements of the TRQ has different trade and welfare im-
plications, hinging on the level of imports in relation to the quota quantity before 
and after the policy change. 
In some cases, the welfare impact for the involved regions can not be deter-
mined without knowledge of the distribution of the quota rent. This distribution is 
a priori unknown. 
TRQs can be administrated through different mechanisms. Holding the right to 
trade (through import or export licences) does not automatically imply capturing 
the rent when unequally distributed market power exists. Specific constellations 
on the domestic market can also contribute to reallocation of the rent beyond the 
formal distribution of rights.
The presence of TRQs can also influence the market outcome indirectly and 
further add to the inefficiencies arising from the quantitative restrictions. Depend-
ing on the administration methods, the degree of competitiveness of the agent 
provided the rights to trade may lead to dissipation of the rents. Rent seeking ac-
tivities or waiting costs can underline this undesired effect.
In the next chapter, a detailed description of the different TRQs for beef as 
well as their utilisation is given. 
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3 Beef trade and trade policies between the EU and the Mercosur 
Countries – the current situation 
The EU grants trade preferences to third countries within different agreements. 
One of them is the Generalised System of Preferences (GSP), which grants tariff 
reductions to developing countries. All Mercosur countries are beneficiaries of the 
GSP, but for beef they have been graduated from the preferences.
Another framework under which the EU has bound tariff reductions is the 
WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA). Within this framework, the Mercosur 
countries benefit from bilateral trade preferences for beef in the form of TRQs. 
These preferences are not granted to the Mercosur countries as a group, but to the 
individual member states. In addition to the bilaterally agreed market access for 
beef, there are multilateral TRQs, from which the Mercosur countries benefit as 
well. In the following, a description of the bilateral trade preferences between the 
EU and the Mercosur countries for beef will be given. The analysis will be ex-
panded to the multilateral TRQs. Furthermore, an assessment of the utilisation of 
the TRQs will be presented.
3.1 Current trade preferences for beef
The EU opened a bilateral TRQ for fresh or chilled high-quality beef, the so-
called “Hilton” quota of 58,100 tonnes, to which ten meat exporting countries 
have access. From the Mercosur countries, Argentina benefits from 28,000 ton-
nes, Brazil from 5,000 tonnes, Uruguay from 6,300 tonnes and Paraguay from 
1,000 tonnes8. This TRQ is not only defined on 8-digit level of the European 
Combined Nomenclature (CN), but additional requirements need to be fulfilled in 
order to qualify for imports under this trade regime. These requirements vary 
from country to country, but they have in common that the meat imported must be 
high quality beef, the latter referring to the production techniques as well as to 
characteristics of the slaughtered animal:
8 The quantity for Paraguay is not granted in the AoA, but was introduced in 2002/2003 as an 
autonomous quota. For the other Mercosur countries, the quantities mentioned here are those laid 
down in the commitments of the URAA. In certain years, the individual quantities had been in-
creased as for example the quota for Argentina, that in 2002/2003 was increased by 10,000 tonnes 
(COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2002).
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− The slaughter animals must be exclusively pasture-grazed.
− The live weight of the slaughter animals must not exceed a certain 
threshold9
and/or
− the age of the slaughter animals must be within a certain range10.
A detailed description is laid down in COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES (1997). 
Several tariff lines can potentially qualify for the quota, hence no single out-
of-quota rate can be identified. But as shown in Table 2, they vary only slightly in 
the specific part of the composed tariff that is either 3,034 or 3,041 Euro per 
tonne. The AVE of the over-quota tariff lies between approximately 68 and 86 
percent, depending on the exporting country. The preferential rate lies with 20 
percent significantly below the AVE, revealing a notable preferential margin.
9 For Argentina and Uruguay, this threshold is 460 kg live weight (COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITIES, 1997).
10 For Argentina, the slaughter animals must be aged between 22 and 24 months, for Brazil between 
20 and 24 months (COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 1997).
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Table 2 Preferential trading schemes for beef
quota quantities 
(tonnes) MFN rate AVE of MFN rate 
1) preferential rate AVE of pref-erential rate
High quality beef quota
Argentina* 28,000
12.8% + 3,034-3,041 
EUR/tonne
76%
20% 20%
Brazil** 5,000
86%
Paraguay*** 1,000 2)
Uruguay** 6,300
68%
GATT frozen beef quota
World**** 53,000 12.8% + 1,414-3,041 
EUR/tonne
112% 20% 20%
Frozen beef for processing
World***** 50,700 12.8% + 1,414-3,041 EUR/tonne 116%
20 % (A)
20 %+994.5-2,138.4 
EUR/tonne (B)
20% (A)
90%(B) 
* For 020130 and 02061095 of the combined nomenclature
** For 020130, 02023090, 02062991and 02061095 of the combined nomenclature
*** For 020130 and 02023090 of the combined nomenclature
**** For 020210 00, 02022010, 02022030, 02022050, 02022090, 02023010, 02023050, 020230 
90 and  02062991 of the combined nomenclature
***** For 02022030, 02023010, 02023050, 02023090, 02062991 of the combined nomenclature
1) Calculated based on the average import unit values 2004-2006 and simple averages of the 
different tariffs. For high quality beef, only fresh beef was considered
2) No AVE was computed because in recent years no imports of fresh beef from Paraguay 
took place
(A) A-quota of TRQ for frozen beef for processing
(B) B-quota of TRQ for frozen beef for processing
Source: Own compilation based on COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIE, (1997), COMMISSION OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (2002), EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (2004), EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (2005), WTO, 
(n.d.a), EUROSTAT ( n.d.a).
In addition to the bilateral access to European beef markets, the Mercosur 
countries benefit from the multilaterally improved market access.
First, there is the so called “GATT frozen beef quota”. This quota is also a re-
sult from the URAA, and is not allocated to specific exporting countries. Its total 
quantity is 53,000 tonnes. Products that qualify for this TRQ are frozen bovine 
meat11 and thick or thin skirt12 (COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 
2005). The out-of-quota tariff naturally varies as several tariff lines are affected, 
having in common an ad-valorem rate of 12.8 percent. The specific component of 
the MFN tariff varies between 1,414 Euro per tonne and 3,041 Euro per tonne 
respectively (WTO, n.d.a). As Table 2 shows, this translates into an AVE of 112 
percent. The preferential rate with 20% lies significantly lower. 
11 This corresponds to the tariff line 0202 of the combined nomenclature.
12 This corresponds to the tariff line 02062991 of the combined nomenclature
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There is a second multilateral TRQ for frozen beef that is intended for process-
ing in the EU. The total quota quantity is of 50,700 tonnes of frozen beef13. In 
order to qualify for imports under this quota, the frozen beef must be intended for 
processing in the EU into certain products. These processed products are differen-
tiated into so-called A- and B-products14. The total quota quantity is open to 
40,000 tonnes of frozen beef intended for processing into A-products and 
10,000 tonnes intended for processing to B-products (COMMISSION OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2005a).
There is an ad-valorem rate of 20 percent for beef intended for processing into 
both product categories, and an additional specific duty of 994.5 to 2,138.4 Euro 
per tonne is charged on beef to be processed into B-products (COMMISSION OF 
THE EUROPEAN UNION, n.d.a). As shown in Table 2, the AVE of the composed 
tariff is 116%, and the preferential rate is 20 percent for meat that is intended for 
processing into A-products, and 90 percent for meat that is to be processed into 
B-products. 
A summary of the different tariff lines and the different beef TRQs is given in 
Figure 6. 
13 corresponding to the tariff lines 02022030, 02023010, 02023050, 02023090 and 02062991 of the 
combined nomenclature. 
14 A-products are defined as products corresponding to the CN codes 160210, 16025031, 16025039, 
16025080 (“other prepared or preserved meat, meat offal or blood”) of the combined nomenclature
with additional requirements as pure beef meat. B-products are other processed meat products (e.g. 
salted meat) laid down in COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION (1999). 
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Figure 6 Tariff lines eligible for different TRQs
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3.2 Utilisation of current preferences
As discussed above, trade preferences for the Mercosur countries are granted 
through TRQs. For an assessment of the effect of liberalisation of the different 
elements of TRQs it is crucial to know which regime is in force in the reference 
situation. Thus, the utilisation of different TRQs by the Mercosur countries is in 
the focus of interest in this section. 
The quantities of imports under the preferential tariff allocated to the Mercosur 
countries differ from country to country and different tariff lines potentially qual-
ify for imports under the quota. Hence, the fill rates have to be analyzed on a 
country by country base.
Several problems arise when the attempt is made to determine the fill rates of 
the TRQs for beef. One is the fact that some TRQs are defined on a more detailed 
level then the 8-digit level of the combined nomenclature, which is the most de-
tailed level at which trade flows are available. The second problem is that, as can 
be seen in Figure 6, for most of the Mercosur countries, there is considerable 
overlap between the high quality beef quota and the two multilateral TRQs in the 
tariff lines concerned, so it is not possible to distinguish under which quota the 
imports enter the EU. 
Bilateral quotas
As mentioned before, Argentina has a quota of 28,000 tonnes of high quality beef 
allocated15. Imports of beef that potentially qualifies for imports under the high 
15 The autonomous increase in 2002/2003 is not taken into account here. 
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quality beef TRQ are depicted in Figure 7. No unambiguous pattern can be identi-
fied regarding the fill rate of the quota. In most years, the imported quantities 
exceeded the quota by far. Only in the two marketing years in the beginning of the 
period considered here, shipments of beef eligible for the high quality beef TRQ 
from Argentina to the European Union stayed behind the conceded quantities. 
This is explained by the occurrence of Foot and Mouth Disease (FMD) in Argen-
tina (OIE, n.d.), which triggered import bans by many trading partners. It is worth 
mentioning that even though imports of two tariff lines can potentially enter the 
EU under the preferential duty, only imports of one of them, that is fresh or 
chilled meat (corresponding to tariff line 02013000) took place in noteworthy 
scope. As no other quota is open to beef of these tariff lines, all imports can be 
assigned to be entering the EU under bilateral high quality beef quota allocated to 
Argentina or at full levy. 
Figure 7 EU imports of beef eligible for the high quality beef TRQ from Argen-
tina
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For Brazil, the quota is open to 5,000 tonnes of high quality beef. Imports of 
the respective beef categories are shown in Figure 8. Here the data suggest that 
there is substantial quota overfill in all the marketing years included in the analy-
sis, and that the over-quota imports increased over time. However it should be 
kept in mind that the distinction could be made only at 8-digit level, and therefore 
the overfill could be overestimated. A further complication in the case of Brazil is 
that some of the tariff lines that qualify for the bilateral high quality beef quota 
also qualify for one of the two multilateral beef TRQs. This is true for frozen beef 
and edible offal (these correspond to 02023090 and 02062991 of the combined 
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nomenclature). However, even if only the tariff lines that have exclusive access to 
the bilateral TRQ are taken into account, that is fresh and chilled bovine meat and 
fresh thick or thin skirt (these correspond to 020130000 and 02061095 of the 
combined nomenclature) the quota is clearly overfilled in the time period consid-
ered here. 
Figure 8 EU imports of beef eligible for the high quality beef TRQ from Brazil
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To Uruguay, a quota of 6,300 tonnes of high quality beef is allocated. In Fig-
ure 9, the imports of products qualifying for imports under the quota are pre-
sented. The same problem arises as in the case of Brazil: A considerable share of 
imports of beef meat corresponds to a tariff line that also qualifies for imports 
under a multilateral TRQ. This concerns mainly imports of frozen boneless beef 
(these correspond to 02023090 of the combined nomenclature), as imports other 
than fresh or frozen boneless meat (02062991 and 02061095 of the combined 
nomenclature) were virtually absent. Even under the assumption that all those 
imports that qualify for the multilateral regime do in fact enter the EU under that 
multilateral regime, Uruguay has increasingly exported beef to the EU at full levy. 
If alternatively one supposes that all imports that potentially qualify for both quo-
tas do in fact enter under the bilateral quota and not under the multilateral one, the 
degree of over-fill is even more pronounced. 
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Figure 9 EU imports of beef eligible for the high quality beef TRQ from Uruguay
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The last Mercosur country, Paraguay, has no quota quantities allocated by the 
URAA schedule. However, from the marketing year 2002/2003 on, the European 
Commission opened an autonomous quota of 1,000 tonnes for fresh (02013000 of 
the combined nomenclature) and frozen beef (02023090 of the combined nomen-
clature) from Paraguay (COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2002). 
In Figure 10, the imported quantities of beef potentially qualifying for this quota 
are shown. In most years, only very limited imports are observed, and the quota 
quantity is such that it was not filled in most of the years, even if the imports of 
frozen beef, that can also enter under the multilateral regimes, are counted in. If 
additionally it is assumed that the frozen beef is imported under the multilateral 
TRQ, the bilateral TRQ is always under-filled and the regime in place is that of a 
pure tariff. 
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Figure 10 EU imports of beef eligible for the high quality beef TRQ from Para-
guay
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Multilateral Beef Quotas
As explained above, there is considerable overlap in the product coverage of the 
two multilateral tariff rate quotas and the bilateral high quality beef quotas: The 
quota for frozen beef (“GATT frozen beef quota”) includes all the tariff lines that 
qualify for import under the tariff rate quota for frozen beef intended for process-
ing, and four additional tariff lines. Further complication is caused by the fact that 
some of the beef products that belong to the frozen beef quota can enter under the 
bilateral TRQs for high quality beef as well. 
Because of the overlap of the two multilateral TRQs, analyzing their fill rates 
separately does not seem appropriate as it would most likely result in interpreting 
the quota as overfilled where in reality part of the commodities enter the Euro-
pean Union under another tariff rate quota. Lacking better information, here the 
two multilateral beef quotas are treated as one. 
Still the problem remains that for Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay frozen beef 
can enter under the bilateral high quality beef quota, too. As had been shown pre-
viously, frozen beef accounts for relatively large shares of beef introduced from 
Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay into the EU. 
For these reasons, two different fill rates of the TRQ have been calculated and 
are shown in Figure 11. One (“all”) that includes all imports of the tariff lines 
covered by the TRQs for frozen beef, and a second one (“excl.”) from which the 
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quantities that can enter under the bilateral TRQs of Brazil and Uruguay have 
been subtracted16.
Figure 11 EU imports of frozen beef
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It becomes clear from Figure 11 that for the period of 2000 to 2007, the fill 
rate of the import quotas for frozen beef might be overestimated if one does not 
take the fact into account that part of the imports that qualify for the frozen beef 
quota might enter the EU markets under a different trade regime. In any case, as 
the bilateral quotas for high quality beef are over-filled, too, it can be stated that 
small quantities of frozen beef enter the European Union at full tariff. 
For the remainder of this study, it is assumed that frozen beef is not imported 
under the TRQs for high quality beef, but only under the multilateral schemes or 
at full levy. Paraguay is not further considered due to its limited importance with 
regards to beef exports to the EU. 
3.3 The state of the negotiations 
The EU-Mercosur relationship is based on the “EU-Mercosur Interregional 
Framework Cooperation Agreement” that was signed in 1995. It is based on three 
pillars: political dialogue, cooperation and trade issues. Negotiations started in 
16 For Paraguay this was not done as only licences for 40 tonnes of high quality beef where re-
quested in 2002/2003 and it has not used its quota for high quality beef since the marketing year 
2003/2004 (VERBAND DER FLEISCHWIRTSCHAFT E. V., 2004), (VERBAND DER FLEISCHWIRTSCHAFT E.
V., 2005).
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1999, and by now 18 negotiation rounds have been carried out, the last one in 
2008 (COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2006), (COMMISSION OF 
THE EUROPEAN UNION, n.d.b). 
Surprisingly little information is available on the current state of the negotia-
tions concerning the agricultural sector. The latest available information dates 
back to 2005 (USDA (2005) and personal communication with the European 
Commission). The EU´s proposal classifies agricultural products into three cate-
gories: annex one, two and three. For each category, different options for liberali-
sation are foreseen. For the products in annex one, full liberalisation within 10 
years was proposed. For annex two products, 50 percent tariff reduction in import 
tariffs over 10 years is offered. In annex three the politically sensitive products of 
the EU are listed, which include, among others, beef. For these products the EU 
offers to open new TRQs or to expand existing ones with the in-quota tariff at a 
level of 50 percent of the lowest in-quota duty rate bound in the WTO (USDA, 
2005).
The Mercosur countries requested further reaching TRQ expansion and the 
elimination of the duty within the quota. More detail on the negotiation proposals 
concerning beef is presented in section 6.1.
3.4 Conclusions of the chapter
For beef, the Mercosur countries benefit from preferential market access to the 
EU´s agricultural markets through three trading schemes:
First, there is an allocated TRQ for high quality beef. Secondly, there is a mul-
tilateral TRQ for frozen beef. Thirdly, there is another multilateral TRQ open for 
frozen beef that is intended for processing in the EU.
The degree of utilisation of the current trade preferences is in most cases diffi-
cult to ascertain. However, it can be stated that with the exception of Paraguay, all 
Mercosur countries have introduced more fresh beef meat into the European Un-
ion than allocated to them by their quota, regardless the high import tax to pay. 
It can equally be stated that small quantities of frozen beef enter the European 
Union at full tariff, too, though it is unclear in which countries these quantities 
originate.
Negotiations of a free trade agreement started in 1999, and have so far not 
come to any conclusion. The EU´s latest offer includes expansion or creation of 
TRQs for politically sensitive products, among which high quality beef is found. 
The Mercosur countries´ proposal contained more far reaching tariff reductions 
and quota expansions.
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4 Administration of the TRQs between the EU and the Mercosur coun-
tries and the distribution of the rents
In the following, the administrative procedures applied to beef trade between the 
EU and the Mercosur countries will be analysed. Furthermore, information on the 
market structure will be given where this influences the distribution of the rents in 
a different way than a competitive market structure would do. Part of the informa-
tion presented in this chapter was obtained from expert interviews that were car-
ried out in the Mercosur countries in winter 2006, and in the European Union over 
the period from 2006 to 2009. Over 20 representatives from the meat processing 
industry, farmers´ associations and government institutions were consulted to 
investigate if quota rents exist. If so, further questions were to what extent the 
rents arise, how they are distributed and what the factors are that led to that out-
come.
4.1 Bilateral TRQ for high quality beef
General aspects of administration
For the bilateral TRQs for high quality beef, the European Union has chosen to 
administer the importing side and the exporting side through import and export 
licences, respectively. An overview over the administrational procedure is given 
in Figure 12: On the exporting side, the actors involved in the business have to 
apply for the right to export under the preferential scheme at administrational 
bodies in the respective country. Once they have the right to export a certain 
quantity under the preferential tariff, for each shipment they wish to export they 
have to request a specific document which is called certificate of authenticity. On 
the importing side, traders can directly apply for an import licence. Both the im-
port licence and the certificate of authenticity are needed in order to benefit from 
the in-quota tariff. 
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Figure 12 Administration of TRQs for high quality beef 
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The way the rights to export and to import are allocated will be described in 
the following. 
Rationing the importing side
The right to import is given to importing firms in the European Union, and the 
licences are issued by administrational bodies within the European Union. A de-
tailed description of the rules to be followed is given in COMMISSION OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES (1997) and can be summarised as follows: 
− The import licences are allocated on a monthly basis. The quantity that 
is made available per month corresponds to one twelfth of the total 
quantity defined in the legislation plus the quantity remaining from the 
preceding months (Article 3). The import licences are valid for 3 
months. 
− In order to obtain an import licence, the applicant has to prove that he 
has been active in beef trade for at least 12 months. The amount re-
quested in each licence can not exceed the quantity that is available for 
that month (Article 4).
− Each applicant can only hand in one application. If the total amount of 
licences requested exceeds the total quantity available for that month, 
then all the requests are cut by the same percentage. If the quantity 
available is not exhausted, the remaining quantities are transferred to 
the next month (Article 5). 
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− At the time the import licence is requested, it is not necessary to pre-
sent the certificate of authenticity, so that theoretically one could apply 
for an import licence and later not fulfil it. In order to prevent from 
this, a licence security of 120 Euro per tonne has to be lodged when 
applying for the licence (Article 12).
In practice, importers request the licence usually only when they have already 
purchased the commodity in order not to loose the security.
Rationing the exporting side
The EU has transferred the responsibility to ration the exporting side to the ex-
porting countries. The authorities in the exporting countries allocate the rights to 
export and issue the certificate of authenticity. The purpose of the latter certificate 
is two-fold. On the one hand, it states that the product to be exported fulfils the 
quality requirements; on the other hand it will not be issued without the exporting 
firm holding a share of the TRQ, thereby restricting exports under the TRQ. 
The distribution of the right to export is country specific.
Argentina. Argentina has chosen to administer the right to export under the TRQ 
for high quality beef by assigning shares to various actors on a yearly basis. In the 
history of the TRQ for high quality beef, Argentina has amended the system con-
stantly. An overview of the historical development can be found in BONANSEA et 
al. (2006). 
The recent legislation is laid down in SECRETARÍA DE AGRICULTURA (2004) 
of the Secretary for Agriculture, Livestock Fisheries and Food (Secretaría de 
Agricultura, Ganadería, Pesca y Alimentos). The rules applied for assigning the 
quota are the following:
− Of the total quota quantity, 7 percent are assigned to cattle producers 
in cooperation with exporting slaughter houses (Article 5a).
− Another 7 percent is distributed between the provinces that have 
slaughterhouses approved for exportation to the European Union. Be-
tween the provinces, the share is determined by the share of cattle in 
the total herd. The resulting quantity is then distributed equally be-
tween the slaughterhouses approved by the EU. However, there is a 
cap on this distribution mechanism saying that no slaughterhouse is al-
lowed to increment its share in the quota via the mechanism described 
above by more than 200 tonnes (Article 5b). 
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− From the remaining 86 percent of the total quota quantity, new coming 
companies are assigned 100 tonnes or 200 tonnes for Cycle I17 estab-
lishments or Cycle II establishments respectively (Article 10).
− After the abovementioned three positions have been subtracted, 75 
percent of the remaining quantity is distributed between companies in 
accordance with their share in the free on board (FOB) export value of 
both fresh and frozen meat18 to any part of the world (Article 5I).
− The remaining quantities are also distributed in function of past per-
formance measured in the total FOB export value of various meat 
products19 to any part of the world, again excluding the cuts that can 
be exported under the TRQ for high quality beef. The difference be-
tween this and the preceding one is the product coverage that is taken 
into account in order to calculate the share assigned to the respective 
company (Article 5II).
A schematic overview of the criteria for the distribution of the right to export 
from Argentina is given in Figure 13.
Figure 13 Distribution of the right to export in Argentina
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In short, a part of the total quota quantity is reserved to cooperation projects 
between farmers and slaughterhouses, whereas the largest share goes to slaugh-
17 Cycle I establishments comprise processing from live animal to carcass, Cycle II establishments 
from carcass to all further processing steps. 
18 The cuts integrated in the high quality beef TRQ are excluded.
19 These include both raw and processed meat products
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terhouses depending mostly on their past performance, partially taking into ac-
count the regional distribution of the slaughterhouses. 
Some additional requirements have to be fulfilled. First, the animal whose 
meat is going to be exported has to be registered in the national traceability sys-
tem. Secondly, the slaughterhouse has to be approved by the EU and by local 
authorities as the Servicio Nacional de Sanindad y Calidad Agroalimentaria 
(SENASA) or the Oficina Nacional de Control Comercial Agropecuario (ONCCA) 
(SECRETARÍA DE AGRICULTURA, 2004). 
Moreover, the animals for exports to the EU have to be collected directly at the 
farm, and are not allowed to be purchased through the large cattle market of 
Liniers. In the slaughterhouse, they have to be kept strictly separated from cattle 
for the domestic market. 
In the slaughterhouse, SENASA controls for the quality requirements. If these 
are fulfilled, the certificate of authenticity is issued by ONCCA. The amount of 
certificates issued is reported to Brussels on a weekly basis. 
Brazil. Brazil has chosen to administer the right to export only between exporting 
companies20, and not to producers or any other elements of the chain. The proce-
dure how the quota is administered is laid down in MINISTÉRIO DO 
DESENVOLVIMENTO INDÚSTRIA E COMÉRCIO EXTERIOR (2006). The distribution 
of the quota is summarised in the following:
− The distribution of the right to export is made year wise, and starts 
with the manifestation of interest of the approved exporting firms up 
to seven days after the beginning of the quota year on 1 of July (Chap-
ter 2, a)). 
− The total amount of 5,000 tonnes for exportation is split up into two 
parts. 4,700 tonnes are distributed at the beginning of the quota year, 
after the manifestation of interest has taken place. Each participant has 
the right to a fixed quota of 24 tonnes and a variable part of the export 
quota that corresponds to his share in total exports of in natura beef 
into the EU in the year preceding the actual quota year. 
− The remaining 300 tonnes are distributed to newcomers during the 
second semester of the quota year, again up to a maximum of 24 ton-
nes to each firm (Chapter 2, Paragraph 3a, 4, 5, 6). In the case that a 
company does not use its share of the tariff-rate quota by the end of 
April of the respective year, its share goes back to the Ministry of Ag-
20 These can be deboning facilities, slaughterhouses or pure trading companies. 
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riculture and will be redistributed to newcomers (Chapter 2, Para-
graph 9a). 
As in the case of Argentina, requirements regarding sanitary standards have to 
be fulfilled. Following this legislation, firms applying for exports under the TRQs
for high quality beef have to be approved as being able to export beef “in natura”
by the Departamento Nacional de Inspecçao de Productos de Origem Animal 
(DIPOA) and by the EU (MINISTÉRIO DO DESENVOLVIMENTO INDÚSTRIA E
COMÉRCIO EXTERIOR, 2006).
The system is monitored through a registration system, the Registro des Ex-
portação. In Brazil, every product to be exported to any part of the world must be 
notified to this system, which monitors the legal correctness of fiscal matters21. 
This achieved, the licence to export under the high quality TRQ is issued. 
In the case of Brazil, the certificate of authenticity is issued by the veterinary 
inspections service of the abovementioned DIPOA at the time of slaughtering the 
animal. According to expert opinions the bureaucratic requirements attached to 
exports under the TRQ do not impose a noteworthy additional cost, as inspection 
of the carcass is needed for exports to Europe irrespective of the quota system, 
and registration to the Registro des Exportação as well. 
Uruguay. For Uruguay, a detailed description of the rules for the distribution of 
the quota can be found in JUNTA DEL INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE CARNES (2003). It 
can be summarised as follows:
− Cycle I and Cycle II establishments as well as pure trading companies 
can apply for a share of the quota (Paragraph I, 3°). Additionally, “in-
novative projects” can apply for a share of the quota (Paragraph V, 
12°). The distribution of the right to export is made on an annual basis.
− For Cycle I and Cycle II establishments and for exporting companies, 
the distribution of the quota is made based on past performance. To 
this end, a weighted average of the export value of fresh beef22 to 
whatever export destination over the last three years is calculated. Ex-
ports in the year immediately before the current year are given a 
weight of 50 percent, and 40 percent and 10 percent are given to the 
second last and the last year respectively (Paragraph II, 9°). 
− For companies that apply for the quota for the first time, the quota is 
distributed on past performance of exports of fresh beef, too. In this 
case, in the first year the quantity that would be assigned to this com-
21 This service is free of charge and no export taxes are levied on meat products. 
22 „Carnes Chicas“ are exempted from this calculation (Paragraph III, 9°). 
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pany by applying the past performance criterion is multiplied by 1.5, 
in the second year of participation in the quota system by 1.25. From 
the third year on, no coefficient will be applied to the past exports 
(Paragraph IV, 11°). 
− Up to 6 percent of the total quantity or 378 tonnes can be distributed to 
so-called innovative projects that the Junta del Instituto Nacional de 
Carnes wants to promote. For each of these projects, there is a ceiling 
of 2 percent or 126 tonnes (Paragraph V, 12°). 
Distribution of the rents
As outlined in Chapter 2, the distribution of the rents depends crucially on 
whether licences to export or to import (or both) are assigned to firms or other 
actors in the chain. However, it was also seen that owning rights to export is not 
always sufficient for obtaining the rents.
In the case of the trade relations between the EU and the Mercosur countries, 
both the exporting side and the importing side are issued licences and therefore 
afforded bargaining power. Whether or not this leads to sharing of the rents and 
how the rents are distributed within the country will be analyzed in the following. 
Argentina. In Argentina, the by far largest part of the quota is distributed among 
slaughterhouses. Hence, an overview over the number of slaughterhouses and 
their degree of organisation is needed to understand the distribution of market 
power. 
For Argentina, there are 97 establishments approved for meat exports to the 
European Union belonging to 81 companies (SENASA, 2006). This number has 
to be understood as a maximum number, as not all of the establishments approved 
for the EU actually engage in trade with fresh meat under the quota for high qual-
ity beef. The largest organisation at the time of investigation was the Argentine 
Beef Consortium (ABC). According to the organisation, 80 percent to 90 percent 
of the export value of beef is covered by its members. 
As the exporting side is administered by certificates of authenticity, the ex-
porter is perfectly informed on the tariff that the importer23 has to pay when ship-
ping the commodity into the EU. It has been stated by exporters that a different 
price is charged to the importer, depending on the fact whether the cuts are ex-
ported under the TRQ or not. In practice, the price on the EU market is estimated 
by market research and past experience. Correcting for transportation costs, this is 
the price charged for beef accompanied by a certificate of authenticity. From this 
23 Meat from Argentina is usually sold FOB, i.e. the import tariffs are paid by the importer.
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price, the exporter derives a (lower) price for the same cut without the certificate 
of authenticity, mainly by subtracting the tariff differential. 
In other words, the whole tariff difference and therefore the rent is captured by 
exporters, a fact on which all experts in the sector agreed upon. 
The question arises why the importers are not able to capture a share of the 
rent given the fact that the certificate of authenticity has to be matched with an 
import licence, theoretically affording both sides with equal bargaining power. 
Evidence suggests that this is not the case. Several factors are likely to contribute 
to this outcome. One of them lies in the administration of the quota rents. The 
rights to export are distributed on an annual basis, and once this distribution is 
made, no new firms can enter the market. In contrast, on the importing side, the 
licences are distributed on a monthly basis, have a limited validity and a security 
has to be lodged. In other words, market entry on the European side is easy and 
importers run the risk of loosing the security if no transaction is made24. 
In addition, imports under the high quality beef TRQ add to the past perform-
ance that is required for imports of frozen beef where the importers, as will be 
seen later, capture the rent. This could further intensify the competition between 
importers. 
The next question of interest is who in the production chain inside Argentina 
captures the rent. As seen earlier, structures can be thought of that do no not allow 
e.g. the slaughterhouses to keep all of the extra profit, but force them to pass some 
of the profits to producers. This could for example be the case if the animals that 
qualify for the high quality beef quota where not easily available on the market, or 
cooperative market structures would prevail. This is not the case. The experts 
interviewed unanimously stated that farmers do not know whether the meat pro-
duced from their animals is exported or not, and if exported, they do not know 
whether under a preferential scheme or not. As animals that comply with the re-
quirements for the high quality beef quota are regularly available, producers are 
not able to capture a share of the rent when the licence is given to a slaughter-
house.
A different situation arises when a share of the quota is assigned to coopera-
tions between farmers and packing houses. In this case, the licences are given to 
the farmers´ organisations which then capture the rent and distribute them to their 
members. However, the administrational effort in order to be assigned a share of 
the TRQ for these cooperations is significant, and the marketing cost is usually 
higher than for a slaughterhouse with established market relations. Thus it is 
likely that part of the rent is lost due to rent-seeking activities. 
24 Importers have stated to apply for the import licence only after they have in fact purchased the 
meat, to avoid the risk of loosing the security. This indicates that beef accompanied by a certificate 
of authenticity is scarce and importers compete between each others.
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Brazil. The number of establishment approved for meat exports to the EU varies, 
but at the time of research 63 slaughterhouses belonging to 30 companies were 
approved for exports to the EU (MINISTÉRIO DA AGRICULTURA, PECÚARIA E 
ABASTECIMENTO, n.d.). The number of companies that are actually engaged in 
trade with the high quality beef quota have been stated to be only 4. In other 
words, exports of meat from Brazil can be seen as highly concentrated in only a 
few meat processing companies. This is true not only for trade with the EU, but 
also holds true for the sector in general: Experts stated that in the year 2004, the 
two largest companies accounted for 40 percent of the total Brazilian meat ex-
ports, 5 companies for 80 percent, and 98 percent of external trade is realised by 
only 18 meat processing companies.
Regarding the organisational aspects of the meat processing sector, it can be 
said that meat exports are highly organised: The meat processing sector involved 
in international trade is to a large extent organised in the Associação Brasileira 
das Indústrias de Carnes (ABIEC), whose members account for 95 percent of 
Brazilian exports to the EU, according to own statement. 
As in the case of Argentina, the exporter is perfectly aware of whether his 
product is exported within the TRQ or at full tariff. Similarly, it has been unani-
mously stated by various experts that the rent is entirely captured by exporters. As 
in case of Argentina, high quality beef is sold at two different prices, an in-quota 
price and an over-quota price. As for Argentina, these prices are determined by 
the exporters by observing the market price and then discounting freight and the 
different tariff rates. The factors leading to the appropriation of the rent by the 
exporting side are the same as for Argentina: A limited validity of the import li-
cence along with the needed security in an environment characterised by easy 
market entry for European importers and, once the distribution of rights on the 
exporting side is made, limited competition for exporting entities as well as possi-
bly some strategic interests.
Cattle producers, slaughterhouses and other experts from the sector stated that, 
as in Argentina, the rents are not shared between actors in the production chain. 
From the side of the slaughterhouses, at the moment of buying cattle it is not de-
termined whether it goes to exportation or into the domestic market. As animals
that are for exportation have to be certified by the SISBOV traceability system, a 
producer selling a SISBOV certified animal might suspect that its meat is in-
tended for exportation. However, he will not know whether parts of it are going to 
be exported within quota, and since the farm sector can be characterised as a 
competitive market, he can not negotiate a price premium.
The other possibility of passing benefits downward in the chain is vertical in-
tegration or cooperative structures. These structures play only a very limited role 
in Brazil; according to experts´ opinion nearly the entire production is marketed 
on a spot-market basis. 
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Uruguay. In Uruguay, there are 17 slaughterhouses approved for exports to the 
EU (INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE CARNES, n.d.a). Exporting companies can legally 
apply for a share of the high quality TRQ, too, but it has been stated that in fact 
none is currently involved into the business. 
The beef exporting sector in Uruguay is characterised by a very low degree of 
organisation. Membership in the Instituto Nacionál de Carnes (INAC) is manda-
tory for all slaughterhouses, but apart from that there are no noteworthy industrial 
organisations. 
Despite the fact that the organisational degree within the meat exporting sector 
is low, the exporting side is said to capture the rent entirely. This indicates that as 
in Argentina and Brazil, Uruguayan beef exporters can exercise negotiating power 
over the importing side for the reasons already mentioned.
Regarding the distribution of the rents between the actors in the chain, the 
same findings hold true as for Argentina and Brazil: The relation between the 
members of the chain is competitive, i.e. the actor holding the share of the TRQ, 
that is almost exclusively the slaughterhouse, captures the rent. Vertical integra-
tion or cooperative structures do not play a role in the Uruguayan meat producing 
sector. Only in the cases where the right to export is granted to projects involving
producers, the latter can be expected to gain a share of the rent. This was, how-
ever, not relevant at the time of research. 
4.2 Multilateral TRQs
GATT frozen beef TRQ
For the GATT frozen beef TRQ, there is no administration of the exporting side. 
The control of the quantities imported takes place exclusively in the EU. Only 
importers based in the EU can apply for a share of the frozen beef TRQ based on 
their total imports of fresh and frozen beef as well as edible offal of bovine ani-
mals25 in the year previous to the current marketing year (COMMISSION OF THE 
EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2004). 
No export licences are needed to match the import licence, therefore exporters 
have no information on the tariff that is going to be charged on their commodity. 
Hence, the rent is captured entirely by importers in the European Union. 
25 These product correspond to chapters 0201, 0202, 0206 7095 and 0206 2991 of the combined 
nomenclature.
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Frozen beef for processing
For the administration of this TRQ, the same holds true as for the GATT frozen 
beef TRQ: There is no administration of the exporting side. Inside the EU, import 
rights are allocated to meat processing establishments which will then be issued 
an import licence. There is no past performance criterion for this TRQ, meat 
processing companies can apply for as many import rights as they wish. If there 
are more applications then quota quantity, the quantities will be cut by a certain 
percentage (COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 2005). 
No export licences are needed and therefore the importers are able to capture 
the rents accruing from this TRQ. 
4.3 Conclusions of the chapter
From the analysis carried out above, a couple of things can be concluded concern-
ing the existence and the distribution of the quota rents in the case of the EU and 
the Mercosur countries. 
Thanks to the way the quotas are administrated and to the prevailing market 
structure, in all three countries the rent from the quota for high quality beef is 
entirely captured by the exporting country. It has been stated unanimously by 
experts from the sector that exporters adapt prices depending on whether the ex-
port takes place at full tariff or at the preferential tariff. 
From the expert interviews it has become clear that there is no significant ad-
ministrational cost attached to exports under the TRQ for high quality beef, hence 
the quota rent is approximately the tariff difference. However, for the share of the 
TRQ that is assigned to producers in Argentina, it can be suspected that part of 
the rent is dissipated due to the administrational effort necessary to obtain a share 
of the TRQ.
It has become clear that in Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay internal market 
structures are such that the rents stay with the actor that receives the licence to 
export. Issues as market power within the chain, vertical integration, cooperative 
structures or other factors that would force to share the rent within the chain do 
not play a role in these Latin American countries. 
The picture is different for the multilateral TRQs: Here no export licences are 
needed in order to benefit from the tariff reduction. Exporters have no information 
on the tariff that is going to be paid on their commodity, hence the importers cap-
ture the rent.
An assessment of the welfare implications of reductions of trade barriers be-
tween the EU and the Mercosur countries is the purpose of this study. Different 
approaches are at hand for the analysis of such trade liberalisation scenarios. The 
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model developed for the purpose of this study is described in the following chap-
ter. 
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5 The Model 
The aim of this chapter is to provide information on the model that was set up 
specifically for the analysis of the EU´s and the Mercosur´s proposals with re-
gards to liberalisation of beef trade. 
This chapter starts off with a stylised description of the problem to model. 
Then, the model’s general features are discussed along the lines of the preceding 
chapter. The model´s scope in terms of the covered country and commodity space 
is presented along with the disaggregation of the economic actors. The description 
of the behavioural functions is framed by a discussion of their desirable character-
istics. After that, other relevant model equations are presented, followed by a 
description of the model calibration process. The chapter concludes with a de-
scription of data sources and processing. 
5.1 The problem to model
The relations to be modelled between production, processing and trade policies of 
beef of different qualities are rather complex. A schematic overview of these rela-
tions is given in Figure 14. 
The requirements for the high quality beef quota relate not only to special cuts, 
but also to certain methods of production. Thus, the decision of producing an 
animal that will supply high quality beef is already taken on farm level. However, 
as only special cuts qualify as high quality beef, with each animal of high quality 
slaughtered there will also be a certain percentage of beef meat of other quality. 
This special characteristic of beef production represents a Leontief technology.
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Figure 14 The problem to model
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High Quality Beef
Freezer
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TRQ
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Slaughterhouse Other Beef
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GATT Frozen
Beef TRQ
Frozen Beef 
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Processing
Source: Own representation
The resulting two types of fresh beef can be frozen and thus be converted into 
frozen beef. 
Finally, there are three different trade regimes in place through which beef 
from the Mercosur countries can enter the EU: 
− First, the bilateral TRQ for high quality beef. As described in Chapter 
3, for some of the Mercosur countries, the high quality beef quota is 
open for frozen beef, too. 
− Second, the multilateral TRQs for frozen beef for both direct con-
sumption and for processing. 
− Third, the MFN regime for all other types of beef. 
Of course, all types of beef can be consumed domestically or exported to other 
destinations than the EU too, but this is not depicted in Figure 14 for simplicity. 
Most of these relations are captured by the model. Only the possibility of 
freezing high quality beef for importation under the high quality TRQ (indicated 
through dashed arrows) has been abstracted from. For Argentina this reflects the
current legal situation (recall Figure 6), but Brazil and Uruguay could in fact 
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choose to freeze high quality cuts and export it either under their TRQ for high 
quality beef or under the multilateral scheme for meat for processing. The main 
reason for not taking this possibility into account in the model is that the quality 
of frozen beef is not distinguished in the available data. Sector experts also stated 
limited importance of imports of frozen high quality meat. For the reasons ex-
plained in Section 3.2, the two multilateral TRQs for frozen beef are treated as 
one.
5.2 General features of the model
The model set up for this study belongs to the class of partial equilibrium models. 
This means that not the whole economy is represented, but only a specific sector. 
Another way of tackling the question would have been the formulation of a gen-
eral equilibrium model. General equilibrium models cover the whole economy. 
They are best applied when the shock that is going to be analysed is likely to im-
pact on several sectors of the economy. The downside of such a comprehensive 
framework is the necessary loss of detail in product and policy representation. 
A partial equilibrium approach on the other hand allows for the representation 
of the sector or even the product chain in question at considerable detail, but 
comes at the cost of insight of the effect of shocks on the overall economy. For 
the question of liberalisation of the high quality TRQs, a detailed representation 
of products and policies was needed. Hence, a partial equilibrium model was the 
tool chosen. 
The model is formulated as a spatial price equilibrium model (SPE). A SPE 
renders prices, trade flows as well as quantities produced and demanded that sat-
isfy the equilibrium condition that prices in the importing country are equal to the 
price in the exporting country plus the transport cost (NAGURNEY, 2002). The 
concept is based on the work of ENKE (1951), SAMUELSON (1952) and
TAKAYAMA et al. (1964), and the models are sometimes referred to as Enke-
Samuelson-Takayama-Judge (ESTJ) models. 
For this model, a Mixed Complementary Problem (MCP) formulation was 
chosen. It is particularly attractive in circumstances where TRQs and quota rents 
are relevant as it allows for an accurate endogenous representation of the quota 
rent including the characteristic regime switches. This approach is based on the 
Kuhn-Tucker-Conditions and makes use of what is known as complementary 
slackness (CHIANG, 1984, p. 722 f.). Examples of models in which this option for 
modelling TRQs is applied are GTAP, the World Agricultural Trade Simulation 
Model (WATSIM) (KUHN, 2003) and the model developed by VAN DER 
MENSBRUGGHE et al. (2003). An alternative way of modelling the quota rent 
endegenously is to employ a sigmoid function like in the CAPRI model (BRITZ, 
2005). This approach has proven to be a possibility to obtain feasible results and 
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has the advantage of smoothing out some undesired behaviour26, but it only ap-
proximates the regime switch and the amount of quota rent and requires parame-
ters whose values are hard to base empirically, and was thus not further consid-
ered here.
The model belongs to the class of bilateral trade models, i.e. other than in a net 
trade approach where a country can only be a net seller or buyer of a good (VAN 
TONGEREN et al., 2001), trade flows are differentiated by source and origin. Bilat-
eral trade flows are modelled indirectly through a highly disaggregated commod-
ity specification: Meat is not only characterised by its quality and processing 
stage, but also by its origin. Beef produced in Argentina is seen as a different 
product as beef produced in Europe, and imports and exports of the seemingly 
same commodity are therefore possible. Another option to achieve this would 
have been to recur to the so-called Armington approach that departs from the idea 
that products are differentiated by origin and consumers show a different willing-
ness to pay for the same commodity depending on its place of production 
(ARMINGTON, 1969).The Armington-approach is wide spread, but suffers from 
some well-knows deficiencies. There is work underway to overcome some of 
these shortcomings (WITZKE et al., 2005), but in light of the relative small country 
and commodity space, modelling bilateral trade through a high level of product 
aggregation was more straightforward for the purpose of this study. 
5.3 Country coverage
As the model aims at specifically analyzing trade between the EU and the Merco-
sur countries, four countries and a “Rest-of-World” aggregate are included: 
26 Using a sigmoid function has the advantage that the switch from one tariff to the other does not 
take place strictly at the point the quota is over-filled, which can be appealing as statistical errors 
can potentially lead to misinterpretation of the fill rate. In the modelling context, a falsely reported 
slight quota over-fill would overestimate the competitiveness of the exporting country. This be-
comes important when doing simulations including trade liberalisation, because a higher tariff and 
thus a higher price in the importing country overestimates the “real” willingness to pay that is re-
flected in the demand function This problem would be smoothed out by the sigmoid function, be-
cause for example in the case of a slight overfill of the TRQ, not the full over-quota tariff would be 
charged, but a tariff in between the in- and the over-quota tariff.
49
− European Union 
− Argentina 
− Brazil 
− Uruguay 
− Rest-of -World.
Paraguay is not included, neither is Venezuela which has become full member of 
the Mercosur in 2006. This is justified by the fact that they do not play a signifi-
cant role in beef trade. 
5.4 Product coverage
To best reflect the relationships represented in Figure 14, two categories of cattle 
are distinguished in the model. From these animals, three different kinds of meat 
are produced. A compound type of meat was introduced in a reduced form to 
better reflect substitution effects in consumption. This leads to a total of six prod-
uct categories.
− high quality cattle
− other cattle 
− fresh beef of high quality
− other fresh beef
− frozen beef 
− other meat.
Each of these product categories is additionally typified by the country of ori-
gin. This renders a total of 30 products in the model. 
5.5 Actors
As discussed in Section 2.5, the allocation of the rent is not only of interest on the 
international level, but also on the national level. For a thorough welfare analysis, 
four actors have to be distinguished in the model: 
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− farmers 
− slaughterhouses 
− freezers 
− consumers.
The distinction between slaughterhouses and freezers is somewhat artificial: In 
reality, chilling and freezing certainly takes place in the slaughterhouse itself. The 
reason behind the distinction here is that it eases explicit modelling of processing 
fresh to frozen beef depending on profit margins. 
5.6 Criteria for the selection of functional forms
A large number of functional forms to reflect human behaviour in a partial equi-
librium model can be thought of. Before describing the ones used here, some cri-
teria for the selection of functional forms are discussed here. These are consis-
tency with the assumed economic behaviour, flexibility and other aspects.
Consistency with assumed economic behaviour 
Following LAU (1986), theoretical consistency means that the functional form 
chosen must be capable to reflect the theoretical properties that are required for 
modelling the particular economic relationship. For the actors in this model, profit 
or utility maximizing behaviour is assumed. That is, farmers, slaughterhouses and 
freezers maximise profit under a set of constraints, and consumers maximise the 
utility from purchases of different goods subject to a budget constraint (see for 
example VARIAN (1984). The properties that the respective functions must exhibit 
in order to reflect this behaviour will briefly be discussed in the following. 
Supply. If profit-maximising behaviour is assumed, producers choose input and 
output quantities that maximise their profit. In other words, under this assump-
tion, the supply function gives the optimal choice of output as a function of input 
and output prices as a solution of the profit maximisation problem. The profit 
function from which the supply function is derived then has to fulfil certain crite-
ria:
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− It must be non-decreasing in output prices and non-increasing in input 
prices
− It must be homogenous of degree one in output and input prices
− It must be convex in output and input prices
− It must be continuous in output and input prices
(VARIAN, 1984, p. 46). 
The supply function can be derived from the profit function via Hotelling´s 
Lemma (CHIANG, 2005, p. 430). Then, the Hessian matrix contains the second 
derivatives of the profit function w.r.t. own and cross output prices, and must be 
positive semidefinite for the supply function to have the desired curvature. 
In short, there are two main requirements for the supply function to reflect the 
assumed profit maximising behaviour:
− Homogeneity of degree zero in all prices
− A positive semidefinite Hessian of the profit function. 
As will be seen later, these two conditions will be either implied through the
functional form chosen or through the choice of the parameter values.
Demand. Analogously to the profit maximisation problem underlying the supply 
function, here the consumers´ demand function is derived from a utility maximi-
sation problem: Consumers maximise their utility from the purchase of goods 
under the budget constraint. Unlike in the case of supply and the profit function, 
some assumptions on the preferences of the consumer have to be made in order to 
characterise the utility function. These assumptions on the preferences include 
completeness, reflexivity, transitivity, continuity, monotonicity, convexity and 
local non-satiation (VARIAN, 1992, p. 95). These so-called well-behaved prefer-
ences are then of course reflected in the utility function. A utility function reflect-
ing these well-behaved preferences will 
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− be continuous, because this is implied by the underlying complete, reflex-
ive, transitive and continuous preferences (VARIAN, 1992, p. 95)
− be monotonically increasing in the bundles consumed as monotonic pref-
erences are assumed, meaning that more goods is always better and bads 
are not considered (VARIAN, 2006, p. 58). 
− exhibit local non-satiation, which implies that even small increases in the 
consumption bundle imply more utility. Geometrically this means that the 
indifference curves are lines, not rings (VARIAN, 1992, p. 96). 
− have upper level sets that are convex as averages are assumed to be pre-
ferred to extremes (VARIAN, 1992, p. 96). 
The first order condition for utility maximisation under the budget constraint is 
achieved using the Lagrange-multiplier method, differentiating the utility function 
w.r.t. demanded quantities and the Lagrange-multiplier. 
The second order condition for utility maximisation implies that the utility 
function must be locally quasi-concave in quantities (VARIAN, 1984, p. 101). 
Under the assumption of well behaved preferences, this means that the derived 
(Marshall27-) demand function is homogenous of degree zero in prices and in-
come (VARIAN, 1984, p. 115), i.e. the bundle of goods demanded remains un-
changed if all prices and income are multiplied by the same positive number. An-
other characteristic of the demand function is that in the optimum, the budget is 
always exhausted if local non-satiation is assumed (VARIAN, 1984, p. 116).
The Hicks demand function can be derived by differentiation of the expendi-
ture function28 w.r.t. prices under the condition that utility remains constant. The 
first derivative of the Hicks demand function w.r.t. prices renders the substitution 
effects. These in turn represent the second derivatives of the expenditure function 
w.r.t. prices and therefore the Hessian Matrix of the expenditure function. As the 
expenditure function e(p,U) is concave in prices, its Hessian Matrix is negative 
semidefinite (SYDSAETER et al., 2005a, p. 170). 
In summary, the requirements for a demand system consistent with utility 
maximizing behaviour is that is ensures
27 Marshall demand functions represent demand as a function of prices and income X(p,Y) as op-
posed to Hicks demand functions, that represent the reaction of demand exclusively due to the subs-
titution effect ????????, that is a movement along the same indifference curve (HENRICHSMEYER et 
al., 1994, p. 229).
28 The expenditure function e(p,U) is the minimum expenditure needed for obtaining a given utility 
level at given prices (SYDSAETER et al., 2005a, p.170). It can be derived by substituting the Hicks 
demand into the definition of expenditure 
n
i i
i
c x p= ⋅∑ .
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− Budget exhaustion.
− Homogeneity of degree zero in prices and income for the Marshall de-
mand function.
− Correct curvature. For the case of the Hicks demand that is a negative-
semidefinite Hessian of the expenditure function when differentiating 
w.r.t. prices. 
As in the case of the supply function, these features must be guaranteed either 
through the functional forms chosen or the calibration of the parameters.
Flexibility
Another criterion when choosing the functional form is its flexibility (LAU, 1986, 
p. 1520). A definition of what is a flexible functional form can be found in 
DIEWERT (2006), p. 2:
“A flexible functional form is a form that has enough parameters in it so 
that f can approximate an arbitrary twice continuously differentiable func-
tion f* to the second order at an arbitrary point x* in the domain of defini-
tion of f and f*. Thus f must have enough free parameters in order to satisfy 
the following 1+N+N2 equations”:
1. ( *) *( *)f x f x= renders one equation to be satisfied 
2. ( *) *( *)f x f x∇ = ∇ renders N equations to be satisfied 
3. 2 2( *) *( *)f x f x∇ = ∇ renders N2 equations29 to be satisfied.
N is the number of elements in the vector x*. In other words, if the function f is 
able to reproduce the function value of the true function f* at x* as well as the 
function value of the first and the second derivative w.r.t. the components of x and 
evaluated at x*, it is said to be flexible. If both f and f* are twice continuously 
differentiable30, then the Hessian matrix of the second derivatives of both func-
tions f and f* is symmetric according to Young´s Theorem (DIEWERT, 2006,). The 
number of free parameters that the function must have in order to be flexible is 
then reduced to 1+N+N(N+1)/2 (DIEWERT, 2006). This definition refers only to 
29 The number of equations for which the conditions in 1. to 3. have to hold can be explained by the 
following reasoning: 1. is simply the equation it self, therefore this condition has to hold only for 
one equation. The condition in 2. must hold true for all first derivatives versus all elements in the 
vector x*. If x* has the dimension N, this gives us N equations. 3. gives a restriction for the partial 
second derivatives and must hold for the entire Hessian matrix. If x* has the dimension N it must 
consequently hold for N2 equations. 
30 This can be thought of the function of the second derivatives to be continuous. 
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the point or vector x*, and is therefore called a local property. Other authors pro-
pose global properties, where an average error over derivatives of different orders 
is measured (THOMPSON, 1988).
Flexibility is an important criterion because there are functional forms that ful-
fil the requirements for consistency with the assumed economic behaviour, but 
have other characteristics that restrain their ability to approximate satisfactorily 
the economic relationship or behaviour of the agents. An example is a linear cost 
function that is theoretically consistent, but when deriving the input demand func-
tion from it, inputs are always employed in fixed proportions, that is, own and 
cross price elasticities are zero (LAU, 1986, p. 1540). In the context of this study, 
inflexible functional forms would complicate the parameter calibration process 
that is described later in this chapter.
Semiflexibility. The concept of semiflexible forms was introduced by DIEWERT et 
al. (1988). It addresses the problem that a flexible functional form might be im-
possible to estimate due to the large number of free parameters required. Accord-
ing to the definition of the authors, the conditions specified in 1. - 3. have to be 
fulfilled for a semiflexible function, too. The difference is that the rank K of the 
Hessian matrix 2 ( *)f x∇ is restricted to values smaller than N, that is K<N. A 
semiflexible functional form thus requires less free parameters than a flexible one, 
as at least one row or column vector of the Hessian matrix must be linearly de-
pendant on at least one other in the Hessian matrix (DIEWERT et al., 1988, p. 327-
328). In other words, once N-1 rows or columns of the Hessian matrix have been 
estimated, the values of the (at least) one remaining column or row are unambigu-
ously determined as well.
Other criteria
Other criteria that LAU (1986) mentions that are of interest when choosing the 
functional form are the domain of applicability, computational facility and factual 
conformity. The domain of applicability most commonly refers to the set of val-
ues of the independent variable, over which the requirements for theoretical con-
sistency are fulfilled. Factual conformity requires the functional form to be con-
sistent with known empirical facts, e.g. Engel´s Law.
5.7 Model equations 
In this section, the employed equations are presented in algebraic form. For the 
ease of reading, the formulation of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions including the 
shadow values inherent to the MCP approach will be suppressed in the notation 
unless they are of direct interest.
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Behavioural equations 
Supply and processing of live animals. The supply of live animals is derived from 
a normalised quadratic profit function via Hotelling´s Lemma. The profit function 
is called quadratic because it is quadratic in prices, and normalised because it is 
normalised with a price index. The resulting supply function depends then only on 
real output prices, and if both input and output prices increase by the same factor 
as e.g. in the case of inflation, the supplied quantity will not change. With this, 
homogeneity of degree zero in prices is achieved for the supply function. Correct 
curvature is imposed through the calibration of parameters, the procedure is ex-
plained later in this chapter.
The supply function xs of farmers (indicated through the superscript f) for any 
given r R∈% is defined by 
(3) ,, , , ,( )   ( , , ), ,
r yf f f
r x r x r x y
y Y r
p
xs p c x r w alive w W
px
β
∈
= + ⋅ ∀ = ∈∑ %% % %
%
%
where ( ){ }, , |Y r w alive w W= ∈% and 
{ }
{ }
{ }
{ }
, , , ,
,
, ,
( , , ) | , ,
R ARG BRA EU URU ROW
W HIGH OTHER
Q ALIVE FRESH FROZEN
X r w q r R w W q Q
=
=
=
= ∈ ∈ ∈
.
c represents the constant term of the supply function of farmers and subsumes 
prices of inputs and outputs that are constant in the mode. ? is a slope parameter 
determining the sign of the influence of the own and cross prices p. Prices are 
normalised with the price index px31.
Demand of the processing industry. The demand functions for animals for slaugh-
ter and for fresh meat for freezing are structured identically as the supply of live 
animals, with the only difference that instead of output prices, the processing 
margin determines the quantities demanded. 
Specifically, the demand of slaughterhouses (indicated by the superscript s) for 
live cattle of different qualities in any given r R∈% is defined by 
31 For this application, the price index was normalised to one.
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(4) ,, , , ,( ) ( , , ), ,
s
r ys s s
r x r x r x y
y Y r
pm
xd pm c x r w alive w W
px
β
∈
= + ⋅ ∀ = ∈∑ %% % %
%
%
where ( ){ }, , |Y r w alive w W= ∈% . Here and in the following, pm stands for the 
processing margin realised by the processing industry.
The demand for fresh meat from the deep freezing unit in a processing plant z is 
defined by 
(5) ,, , , ,( )    ( , , ), 
z
r yz z z
r x r x r x y
y Y r
pm
xd pm c x r w fresh w W
px
β
∈
= + ⋅ ∀ = ∈∑ %% % %
%
%
,
where ( ){ }, , |Y r w fresh w W= ∈% . 
The processing margin for slaughterhouses is defined on the raw product. For 
any r R∈% it is given by
(6) , , , , ,( )   ( , , ),  ,
s s f
r x r y r x y r x
y Y
pm p p p x r w ali w W
∈
= ⋅Λ − ∀ = ∈∑% % % % %
where ( ){ }|, , w WY r w fresh ∈= % .The factor ? captures the fact that the clas-
sification of beef into high quality beef and beef of other quality is not only based 
on requirements concerning the production process, but also on the specific cuts. 
Slaughtering an animal that was raised according to the requirements for high 
quality beef will therefore always entail not only the production of high quality 
beef, but also of other beef. On the other hand, an animal whose production proc-
ess does not fulfil the criteria for being high quality will not render any high qual-
ity beef at all. These relations are captured in the factor ??whose values are shown 
in Table A 12 of the annex. 
For deep freezers the processing margin is simply the difference between input 
and output cost minus the cost of deep freezing cf. For any given pair 
( , )r w R W∈ ×% % this is given by
(7) .( ) , ( , , ), ( , , )z z sr,x r,y r,x rpm p p p cf x r w fresh y r w frozen= − − = =% % % % % % % %
.
Supply of processed products. Supply of high or low quality fresh or frozen meat 
is not price dependant, but determined by the fixed technical coefficients ? from 
the processing demand, again representing a Leontief technology. The supply of 
fresh meat by the slaughterhouses for a given r R∈% is
57
(8) , , , ,( )   ( , , ),
s s
r x r y r y x
y Y
xs xd xd x r w fresh w W
∈
= ⋅Λ ∀ = ∈∑ % ,
where ( ){ }, , |Y r w ali w W= ∈% . Here again, ?? is the coefficient described 
above, ensuring that high quality beef is only made from high quality cattle but 
allowing beef of other quality to be made of cattle of both high and other quality. 
The supply of frozen beef is in quantitative terms simply equal to the demand 
of the freezers for fresh meat in each r R∈% .
(9) , , , ( , , ), ( , , )
z z
r x r yxs xd x r other frozen y r other fresh= = =% % % % . 
Human consumption. The demand system employed in this model has been taken 
and simplified from RYAN et al. (1999) and is referred to as the Generalised Leon-
tief Quadratic Expenditure System (see Box 2). 
As will be seen later, it has the advantage that the resulting demand function is 
homogenous of degree zero in prices and income, and it is automatically ensured 
that the budget is exhausted. Budget exhaustion and homogeneity of degree zero
are, as explained earlier, two criteria that a demand function reflecting utility 
maximizing behaviour must fulfil. As in the case of supply, correct curvature is 
imposed during the calibration process.
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Box 2 The generalised Leontief expenditure system
The indirect utility function v has the form 
(10) ( , )
G
v p Y
Y F
= −
−
.
(11) Here Y is income (or in a partial equilibrium model the income share allocated 
to the product group), and G and F are functions of prices and the parameters B and 
d: 
(12) 0,5 0,5
1 1
( )
n n
kl k l
k l
G p B p p
= =
= ⋅ ⋅∑∑
and
(13)
1
( )
n
k l
k
F p p d
=
= ⋅∑ .
G and F are homogenous of degree one in prices. Applying Roy´s Identity to 
equation (10), the demand function can be derived32.The function for consumers 
demand is then given by 
(14) ( ) ( )( , ) ( ) ,
i
i i
G
xd p Y Y F F i I
G
= − + ∀ ∈
where F(i) denotes the first derivative on F with respect to pi
33:
32 Roy´s Identity states that the demand function is equal to the negative ratio of the partial deriva-
tives of the indirect utility function versus own price and versus budget (CHIANG, 2005, p. 437). For 
(10) this becomes 
( )
2 2
( )
2
( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( )
i i
ii
i i
G y F d Gv
Gy F y Fp y F d x i Iv G G
y y F
− ⋅ − − ⋅−∂ −  − −∂ = = − ⋅ − − = − ∀ ∈ ∂   
∂ −
.
33 This demand function ensures budget exhaustion because 
( )
1
1 1
( ) ( ) .
i in n
i
i i i i
i i
G p
G
xd p Y F d p Y F F Y
G G
=
= =
⋅
⋅ = ⋅ − + ⋅ = ⋅ − + =
∑
∑ ∑ In other 
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(15) ( ) ( )i i
i
F
F p d i I
p
∂
= = ∀ ∈
∂
and G(i) denotes the first derivative of G w.r.t. pi:
(16) ( )
1
( ) ( / )
n
i ik k i
ki
G
G p B p p
p =
∂
= =
∂ ∑
With this specification of G and F, the Marshall demand function for any 
given pair ( , ) ´r x R X∈ ×% % becomes
(17)
, ,
0.5 0.5
, , , ,
´
, , , ,
0.5 0.5 ´
, ,
´
( , ) ( )
r x y
c
r x y r x r y n
y XC
r x r r x r x r x
c x X
r x r y
x X y X
p p
xd p YS YS p d d
p p
β
β
−
∈
∈
∈ ∈
 
⋅ ⋅ 
 = ⋅ − ⋅ +
 ⋅ ⋅ 
 
∑
∑
∑ ∑ %
% % % % %
% % % % % % %
% %
where ( ){ }| , \´ , , w W q Q aliveX r w q ∈ ∈= (RYAN et al., 1999). 
The variable YS stands for the income allocated to meat products. The set X´
contains the consumable goods, consisting of all products in the model with the 
exception of live animals. 
As stated above, this demand function is homogenous of degree zero in prices 
and group expenditure YS. 
The expenditure YS that is allocated to meat products is an endogenous vari-
able, allowing for adaption of the income spent on meat products depending on 
prices34. YS is determined through the system described by equation (18) - (21), 
that is based on the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) as described in 
SADOULET et al. (1995), p. 4335. 
words, the sum of all demanded quantities multiplied by its prices it equal to income. 
( )
1
n
i i
i
G p G
=
⋅ =∑ is computed by applying Euler´s Law for functions homogenous of degree one. 
34 This is desirable because otherwise even if prices for a certain product group would change signi-
fantly, expenditure on that product group would remain constant, which seems a rather strong as-
sumption.
35 This formulation implies a two stage budget allocation: First, total income is allocated to the two 
broad product categories “meat products” and “other products”, and then distributed among the 
different types of meat within the aggregate “meat products”. Assuming that separability exists, this 
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Equation (18) simply states that the expenditure on meat products is equal to 
the share of the total income spent on meat products is multiplied by the income 
itself.
(18) ( )r r rYS is is Y r R= ⋅ ∀ ∈ .
The share is in each region is defined according to equation (19) as a function 
of two price indexes PM and P 
(19) ( , ) ln ln rr r r r r
r
Y
is PM P a PM r R
P
δ ϑ= + ⋅ + ⋅ ∀ ∈ .
P is the stone geometric price index, and if the price index for all non-meat 
products in the economy is normalised to one, it can be computed by 
(20)
0 0
, ,
´
ln ( ) lnr x r xr r
x X r
xd p
P PM PM r R
Y∈
⋅
= ⋅ ∀ ∈∑ ,
where { }´ \X X alive= . PM stands for a meat price index that is calculated as 
a weighted average of prices and the income share spent on the respective product 
in the base period:
(21)
0 0
, ,
,
´
ln ( ) lnr x r xr r x
x X r
p xd
PM p p r R
Y∈
⋅
= ⋅ ∀ ∈∑ .
Other functions
Market clearing equations. The market clearing equations ensure that on each 
market total supply equals total demand. As mentioned earlier, in an MCP formu-
lation all equations in the model are matched with a slack variable, but this vari-
able was up to now suppressed in the notation. In the case of the market clearing 
equations, this variable can be interpreted as the product price. The price will only 
become positive if the market balance holds as an equality, that is, the market is 
cleared. Otherwise, the price is zero. 
As the model has various actors, the market balance must be fulfilled on each 
level of processing and for each product quality. 
leads to the same final choice as when the allocation is made in one single decision (SADOULET et 
al., 1995, p. 36).
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The market balance for alive cattle is simply the supply of live cattle minus the 
demand of the slaughterhouses. For any r R∈% this is achieved by forcing
(22) ,0 0
f s f
r,x r,x r xxs xd   p− ≥ ⊥ ≥% %
to hold, where ( , , ),x r w alive w W= ∈% . The symbol ⊥ is used to indicate or-
thogonality, i.e. either the expression on the left of the symbol “⊥” must hold as 
an equality, or the expression to its right. 
For fresh meat, the market balance is slightly more complex as it can also be 
exported, and meat can be imported and consumed by the final consumer. For all 
r R∈% , the market balance is defined by
(23) , , , , ,´ , ,´ , , ,´ ´
0 0  ,
( , , ), ,
s c z s
r x r x r x r r x ql r r x ql r x
r R ql QL r R ql QL
xs xd xd xt xt p
x r w fresh w W
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
− − + − ≥ ⊥ ≥
= ∈
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑% % % % % % % % % % % %
%
where { },QL in quota imports over quota imports= − − denotes in-quota 
and over-quota imports. The variable xt denotes trade flows. By definition 
, , , 0 , ,r r x qlxt r R x X ql QL= ∀ ∈ ∈ ∈ .
Deep freezing units receive fresh beef from the slaughterhouses and then 
freeze it. Frozen beef is either sold domestically to the final consumer or leaves 
the country as a trade flow. At the same time, it can be imported from other coun-
tries. The market balance for frozen beef in any r R∈% therefore consists of 
(24)
, , , ,´ , , ,´ , ,
´ ´
0 0 , 
( , , ).
z c z
r x r x r r x ql r r x ql r x
r R ql QL r R ql QL
xs xd xt xt p
x r other frozen
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
− + − ≥ ⊥ ≥
=
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑% % % % % % % % % %
%
Price transmission. The consumer price is determined by multiplication of the 
wholesale price with a factor reflecting the gap between the wholesale price and 
the consumer price in the base period. For each given pair ( , )r w R W∈ ×% % this 
leaves us with 
(25) , , , , ( , , )
c s s
r x r x r xpc p x r w freshγ= ⋅ =% % % % %
for fresh beef and
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(26) z, , , , ( , , )
c z
r x r x r xpc p x r w frozenγ= ⋅ =% % % % %
for frozen beef. 
Spatial arbitrage condition. The spatial arbitrage condition is crucial to a SPE 
model. In the MCP formulation, its dual variable is the choice variable of the un-
derlying Lagrange problem, the interregional trade flow xt. As for each type of 
beef there is only one actor supplying it, the spatial arbitrage condition can be 
represented in the following form for all { }\´a A farmer∈ : 
(27)
{ }
,´ , , , , , ,´ , ,´ , , , , , ,´ ,(1 ) 0
, ´ ,´ ( ,´ , ), , \ ,
a AV SP B M a
r x r x ql r x ql r r x r r x ql r x ql r x r r x qlp t t ct qr qr p xt
r R r R with r r x r w q w W q Q alive ql QL
⋅ + + + + + ≥ ⊥ ≥
∀ ∈ ∈ ≠ = ∈ ∈ ∈ 
with 
{ }´ , ,A farmer slaughterhouse freezing unit= .
Because in the model only processed products are traded internationally, equa-
tion (27) is only defined for meat products, not for live cattle. Moreover, intra-
regional trade is suppressed. The parameters tAV and tSP stand for the ad-valorem
tariff and the specific tariff applied by country r, respectively. Both tariffs have 
three indices, r, x and ql. The latter represents the quota level, that is, it defines 
whether the in-quota tariff or the over-quota tariff is applied. ct is the transport 
cost per unit between the regions r and r´. The variable qr is a model endogenous 
variable for the quota rent. 
Quota rents. The quota rents are, as already mentioned, an endogenous variable to 
the model. For the bilateral TRQs for high quality beef its value is determined as 
the dual multiplier of the quota constraint (28) shown below. 
(28)
{ }
, ,´ , , ,´ , , , ,´ , 0
, ´ ,´ ( ,´ , ), , \ , .
B B
r r x ql r r x q ql r r x qltrqnt xt qr
r R r R with r r x r w q w W q Q alive ql QL
≥ ⊥ ≥
∀ ∈ ∈ ≠ = ∈ ∈ ∈
trqnt represents the quota quantity and is specified for each pair of importing 
and exporting country, each product and each quota level. This formulation en-
sures the desired relation of the level of imports and the quota rent described ear-
lier in this section: As long as the quota quantity is larger than the trade flow, the 
quota rent is zero. When the trade flow is exactly at the level of the quota quan-
tity, that is the quota is filled, the slack variable qr becomes positive which means 
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that a quota rent exists. This is consistent with the economic theory presented in 
Chapter 236. 
To allow for prices differentiated by origin for frozen beef, and the multilateral 
TRQ had to be split up into parts allocated to the different exporting countries 
based on past exports, hence making it de facto bilateral. Merely the range of 
products for which the TRQs are defined differ between the multilateral and the 
bilateral one: 
(29) , ,´ , , ,´ , , ,
0
, ( ,´ , ), .
M M
r r x ql r r x ql r x qltrqnt xt qr
r R x r other frozen ql QL
≥ ⊥ ≥
∀ ∈ = ∈
Here, trqntM stands for the multilateral quota quantity. Analogously to the bi-
lateral TRQ, qrM stands for the quota rent arising from the multilateral quota and 
is only positive when the quota is either filled or over-filled. 
As mentioned above, it must be assured that first the quota is filled, before 
over-quota imports can take place. This is achieved by the interaction of the spa-
tial arbitrage condition (27) and equation (28) defining the quota rent: 
The spatial arbitrage condition is defined on the quota level ql, that means, for 
each part of the quota. Therefore, it must hold for both quota parts, but both are 
linked via the domestic price in the importing country, which is the same for each 
of the two parts37. The quota rent from the second part of a two-tier quota will 
always be zero by definition. The total over-quota tariff will always be higher 
than the in-quota tariff. The combination of these two facts assures that the spatial 
arbitrage condition is either satisfied only for the first part or for both parts simul-
taneously, and it will only then be satisfied for both parts if the quota rent from 
the first part is positive and equal to the tariff difference. 
This holds equivalently for the multilateral TRQ for frozen beef, only that in 
this case the interaction takes place between equation (27) and (29).
5.8 Calibration of the parameters in the behavioural functions 
As discussed in Section 5.6, theoretical consistency is one desired property of the 
functions used in a model. Choosing an appropriate functional form is one step 
towards a theoretically consistent system of behavioural functions. If through this 
choice not all the conditions following from the assumed economic behaviour are 
36 This equation is defined for all products in the model except for live cattle. For the qualities that 
are not comprised in the high-quality beef TRQ, the in-quota tariff and the over-quota tariff are 
simply equal. 
37 Note that the price has only a country index, not a „quota part“ index. 
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satisfied, the parameters must be determined in a way that the desired properties 
are guaranteed. 
In the calibration process, the parameters of the behavioural functions are 
treated as variables. Their values are not completely free, but a priori information 
from other studies is used. Where available, econometrically estimated elasticities 
taken from other studies were used as a benchmark from which the deviation was
minimised under a set of constraints. Where possible, these estimated elasticities 
where taken from CAP et al. (2007), where the authors present estimates of de-
mand and long-term elasticities for several agricultural products in different Mer-
cosur countries. Another source of elasticity estimates is the World Food Model. 
For some elasiticities, no estimates were available, and they had to be set by the 
authors judgement.
The calibration process can be seen as an optimisation process under con-
straints, providing 
1. parameters that render equations with the desired properties
2. elasticities that are as close as possible to the a priori information.
Calibration of the parameters for supply of live animals and demand for process-
ing 
For supply, homogeneity of degree zero in prices is guaranteed through the func-
tional form. 
For farmers, ?f for any r R∈% is given as
(30)
,0
,
, , , , ,0
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where ? is the price elasticity of supply. xs0 stands for the production quantity 
of the base year and p0 for the price in the base year38. 
For the processing industry, the price is replaced by the processing margin, 
and equation (30) becomes
(31)
,0
,
, , , , ,0
,
   ( , , ), ( , ,´ ), , ´
s
r xs s
r x y r x y s
r y
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%
% %
for the slaughterhouse and 
(32)
,0
,
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z
r xz z
r x y r x y z
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pm
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% %
for the deep freezing unit.
Regarding the correct curvature, it has been stated in 5.6 that to produce a 
profit function that reflects the assumed behaviour, the matrix of slope parameters 
BS has to be positive semidefinite. This is ensured by forcing all leading principal 
minors Dk of B
S to values greater than zero (SYDSAETER et al., 2005b, p. 36). 
Hence, for all r R∈ and ´a A∈ , 
(33) ( ){ }
, ( ), 0, 1,2,...,
( ) , , ( )
, , ,
( )
,
a
r x a kD for k n
where
X a r w q a
alive for a farmer slaughter house
q a
fresh for a freezing unit
> =
=
=
=  =
%
is enforced.
The calibrated elasticities must add up to zero. This is achieved by forcing the 
sum of own and cross output price elasticities for each product to values greater 
38The definition of ? can be easily explained: According to Hotelling´s Lemma, *x
p
=
∂
∂pi
, and the 
elasticity is defined as 
x
p
p
x
⋅
∂
∂
=
*
ε or equivalently 
x
p
pp
⋅
∂∂
∂
=
piε . Denominating 
p p
piβ ∂=
∂ ∂
and rearranging renders equation (30).
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than zero, and the elasticity of supply to input prices is then calculated residually. 
For any r R∈ and ´a A∈ , this is given by
(34) ( )
( )
0 ( ) ( ).ar,x a ,y
y X a
? ?? ??? ? ? ?
∈
> ∀ ∈∑ %
Finally, the set of parameters minimizing the square deviation of the calibrated 
elasticities from the original ones is found by
(35) ´ 2, , , ,
´ ( ) ( )
min   ( )   
N
a a
r x y r x y
r R a A y X a x X a
dev
ε
ε ε
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
= −∑∑ ∑ ∑
with ?´ being the elasticity estimates taken from the literature39. The resulting 
elasticities can be found in the annex Table A 8.
Calibration of the parameters of human consumption 
For human consumption, the functional form chosen ensures budget exhaustion 
and homogeneity of degree zero in prices and income. The parameters of the ?
matrix must therefore only ensure the correct curvature.
Despite the fact that the function of human consumption represents a Marshal-
lian demand function, in the calibration of the ?D matrix only Hicksian substitu-
tion effects are accounted for, i.e. the income effects of a price change are ig-
nored. The Marshall and Hicks demand functions can be expected to differ con-
siderably from each other in those cases only where either the budget share or the 
income elasticity for the product under consideration is significant40. In light of 
the nature and the fairly narrow range of products covered in this model, this is 
unlikely to be the case. 
In the calibration process, the cross price elasticities (36) of demand are speci-
fied for each r R∈% by
39 For the processing industry, no estimates were available. For slaughterhouses, the ones for far-
mers were used and then forced to more elastic values than the ones for farmers. 
40 This can be seen through the Slutsky Equation, that establishes the relationship between the Mar-
shall and the Hicks demand.
67
(36) ( )
, ,
0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
( )2 ,0
,
/
,´ ´
yc x
r x y
y x
ij r i r j r i r r y r
r r i c
r r r r x
pxd
p xd
G G G G pc px
Y F F
G G G xd
x X y X with x y
ε ∂= ⋅
∂
   ⋅
=  − ⋅ − − ⋅  ⋅        
∀ ∈ ∈ ≠
%%
% % %
% %
% % % % % % %
% %
% % % % %
% % % %
with G, G(j), F and F(i) being the functions described earlier in this chapter. G(ij)
stands for the second derivative of G w.r.t. cross prices. 
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For any r R∈% the own-price elasticities are defined as
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and G(ii) is given by
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For correct curvature, some restrictions on the elements in the matrix of substi-
tution terms BD  must be fulfilled. In the demand system, BD is the Hessian matrix 
of the expenditure function and must thus be symmetric. This is achieved by forc-
ing equation (41) to hold. 
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(41) , , , ,   ,´ ´
c c
r x y r y x x X y Xβ β= ∀ ∈ ∈ .
The off-diagonal elements of BD are forced to be greater than zero and the di-
agonal elements to values smaller than zero through equation (42) and (43):
(42) , ,  < 0  ,´ ´
c
r x y x X y X with x yβ ∀ ∈ ∈ =
(43) , , >  0  ,´ ´
c
r x y x X y X with x yβ ∀ ∈ ∈ ≠ .
These restrictions imply two things: One is that negative own-price effects are 
assured. The other one is that positive cross-price effects in combination with 
negative own-price effects guarantee that the Hessian Matrix of the expenditure 
function is negative semidefinite and therefore correct curvature is achieved41. 
Obviously, equation (42) and (43) put a restriction on the signs of the entries in 
the Hessian matrix, and therefore full flexibility of the system is not given. In 
practical terms the conditions posed on the off-diagonal elements states that all 
goods are Hicks substitutes, and no complementary relations between two goods 
are allowed for. 
As in the case of the derivation of the parameters for supply and for demand of 
the processing industry, the calibrated elasticities are forced to values as close as 
possible to given ones by seeking a set of parameters that minimises the deviation 
of the calibrated elasticities from the given ones. This set is determined by
(44) ´ 2 ' 2, , , , , ,
, ´ ´ ´
min ( ) ( )
c Y
D c c Y Y
r x y r x y r x r x
r R x X y X r R x X
dev
ε ε
ε ε ε ε
∈ ∈ ∈ ∈ ∈
= − + −∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ .
41 For calibration of the parameters of the demand function, it is not necessary to restrict the leading 
principal minors to positive values. All the cross-price effects are forced to positive values. This 
ensures concavity of the expenditure function (and therefore a negative semidefinite Hessian matrix) 
for the following reason: The expenditure function can be derived from the indirect utility function 
solved for income Y and then equated to expenditure (because the budget is always exhausted): 
( , )
( , )
G
Y F e U p
V p Y
= − = . G is a sum of either concave functions (for cross-prices) or 
linear functions (for own-prices). This implies that G is concave. In addition, the value of G is 
forced to values greater than zero in the calibration point. As V(p,Y) is negative as long as Y>F, the 
term 
( , )
G
V p Y
− is concave as well. F is linear, and as stated before, addition of a linear and a 
concave function renders again a concave function. Hence, e(U, p) is concave if the off-diagonal 
elements of the Hessian are positive. 
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Here, ?´C stands for the estimated demand elasticities taken from the literature, 
???? ??Y for the ones of income. The outcome of the calibration process is pre-
sented in Table A 9 of the annex.
Calibration of the parameters in the income allocation system
The price elasticity of meat consumption M is given by equation (45)
(45) 1cM rr r
r
M PM
r R
PM M is
δε ϑ∂= ⋅ = − + − ∀ ∈
∂%
.
The price elasticities are additionally restricted to values smaller than zero. 
The income elasticity of meat consumption is defined through
(46) 1YM rr
r
M Y
r R
Y M is
ϑε ∂= ⋅ = + ∀ ∈
∂
.
Homogeneity of the income allocation system and a positive income elasticity 
are guaranteed by forcing the sum of income and price elasticities to zero:
(47) 0cM YMr r Rε ε+ = ∀∈% .
As for the parameters of the supply function and the demand function for indi-
vidual meat products, a penalty function minimises the deviation of the calibrated 
elasticities from the ones taken from the literature, which are denoted by ´cMrε
and ´YMrε :
(48) 2 2
,
min ( ´ ) ( ´ )
cM YM
r r
M cM cM YM YM
r r r r
r R
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ε ε
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∈
 − + − ∑ . 
Additionally, the parameters must be such that is as defined as through equa-
tion (19) must hold with prices, quantities and the income share fixed to their base 
year values. Thus again, the procedure renders parameters that replicate the elas-
ticities taken from the literature as close as possible and exactly replicate the base 
year situation. 
5.9 Welfare Analysis
The possibility of carrying out a welfare analysis is included into the model. It 
is based on the approach of economic surplus that is based on the change in real 
income of the agents in the market (HENRICHSMEYER et al., 1994, p. 151). 
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In the present study, four subcategories of income are distinguished: The Mar-
shallian producer surplus, the Hicksian equivalent variation, the economic rent 
accruing from the binding quotas and the state budget. 
Producer surplus for farmers and processing industry
The producer surplus for farmers is computed by evaluating the integral under the 
farmers’ supply function between the initial price and the price in the simulation. 
This renders the economic surplus since the supply function has a one-to-one 
correspondence with the marginal cost function. So, for any given r R∈% we ob-
tain
(49)
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For the processing sector, the price is replaced by the processing margin (not 
shown). 
The model comprises multiple interdependent markets: Price changes in the 
market j influence the position of the curves in market i. In order to disentangle 
the effects of the prices on each market, a sequential procedure was adopted fol-
lowing VON LAMPE (1993) to compute the producer surplus on each market. The 
procedure can be described in the following manner:
In the first step, all prices ip are set to their initial value 
0
ip . Then, the inte-
gral on the first market k is evaluated between the limits 0kp and 
1
kp , all other 
prices being constant. Subsequently, the integral of the second market l is evalu-
ated between the limits 0lp and 
1
lp . Again, all other prices are held constant at 
0
ip with the exception of pk, that maintains the value 
1
kp . Continuing in this man-
ner, the welfare changes on every market are successively evaluated.
Consumers’ welfare
Consumers’ welfare is assessed according to the concept of the money metric 
utility.
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Box 3 Money Metric Utility
The change in the consumers´ welfare is expressed in terms of the money met-
ric utility measure as defined by DEATON et al. (1980). According to the authors, 
the money metric utility measure directly corresponds to the expenditure function 
e(p,U), that on its hand defines the minimum expenditure to achieve a given level 
of utility at given prices (DEATON et al., 1980, p. 38 and 179-180). The money met-
ric utility is thus a welfare measure expressed in monetary units. In fact, it is noth-
ing else than the equivalent variation defined as 
(50)
0 1 1 1( , ) ( , )EV e p U e p U= −
(HENRICHSMEYER et al., 1994, p. 230). 
Thus, the equivalent variation in monetary terms for each region can be com-
puted as 
(51)
0
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r r r r r r r r r
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= − = + ⋅ − − 42.
The equivalent variation can be interpreted as the income transfer that would 
be necessary to enable the consumer to achieve the new utility level at the initial 
price vector (HENRICHSMEYER et al., 1994, p. 228).
Quota rent and state revenue
The computation of the quota rent and the state revenue are straightforward. The 
quota rent is computed as the per unit quota rent multiplied by the quantity that 
generates the rent. The distribution between the actors is then made drawing on 
the information presented in Chapter 4: In Brazil and Uruguay, the quota rents 
arising from the high quality beef TRQ are fully assigned to the meat processing 
sector. In Argentina, 7 percent of the quota rent is allotted to farmers, and the 
42 Due to the underlying minimisation approach (dual solution to utility maximisation), the mini-
mum expenditure to reach a given utility level is equal to the income. Hence, the expenditure func-
tion is defined as ( , ) ( )
G G
e U p Y F F Y F
v G
= = − = − ⋅ − .
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remaining 93 percent to the meat processing sector. The quota rents arising from 
the multilateral TRQs for frozen beef contribute entirely to the welfare changes of 
the meat processing sector in the EU.
The tariff revenue is the tariff per unit times the quantity imported under the 
respective tariff regime, and allotted to the country that levies the tariff. 
5.10 Data sources 
Base year
The model was calibrated on a three year average reaching from 2004-2006 wher-
ever possible43. 
Production on farm 
For this exercise, animals produced on farms had to be classified as being appro-
priate for producing meat exportable under the TRQ for high quality or not. The 
requirements that the EU demands differ between the exporting countries 
(COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, 1997). Depending on the data 
availability, the closest match between the legislation or, where appropriate, ex-
pert statements and the animal categories for which data was available was made. 
As regards for feed, it was assumed that all animals are exclusively grass fed, 
which reflects reality pretty closely for the Mercosur countries. An overview of 
the resulting matching can be found in annex Table A 2 - Table A 6.
Data on slaughter production in Argentina is available from the Indicadores 
del Sector Vacuno of the Secretary of Agriculture (SECRETARÍA DE 
AGRICULTURA GANADERÍA  PESCA Y ALIMENTOS, n.d.). 
For Brazil, quantities of animals slaughtered and the carcass weight are avail-
able on the website of the Brazilian statistical institute (IBGE) (INSTITUTO 
BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATÍSTICA, n. d.a). 
For Uruguay, the Instituto Nacional de Carnes provides a comprehensive set 
of data. It comprises the number of animals slaughtered at considerable detail, as 
well as the average carcass weight (INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE CARNES, n.d.b). 
Data on slaughter production in heads in the EU were obtained from 
EUROSTAT (n.d.b). The data set differentiates between various types of cattle. An 
average carcass weight was also available from Eurostat and used to convert the 
number of animals slaughtered into meat production.
43 For some variables like for example population data, no average over 2006-2004 could be calcu-
lated because the data was not available. In those cases, the most recent data was used. 
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Data on production of animals on farm for the Rest-of-World aggregate was 
taken from FAOSTAT. The data does not differentiate between different types of 
animals. Hence, the herd structure of the U.S. was used as an indicator of the 
global herd structure (USDA, 2006)44. 
Generally, errors that are made in this step of data sampling and compilation 
are unlikely to be decisive for the assessment of the trade liberalisation scenarios. 
Production capacities were never considered as a limiting factor as regards the 
ability to benefit from trade liberalisation. 
Production of fresh meat 
Production of meat of different qualities was derived from slaughtered animals by 
applying the fixed coefficients presented in the annex Table A 12. Of each carcass 
of high quality, 25 kg are assumed to be high quality cuts, whereas the remaining 
is assumed to be cuts of other than high quality. This figure was derived from 
expert interviews stating that the weight of cuts exported to Europe (mostly ten-
derloins, striploins, rumps, cuberolls, eye rounds, topsides and silversides, de-
pending on the exporting country) is on average 25 kg per carcass. These high 
quality cuts were set in relation to average carcass weight in the respective coun-
try. For the Rest-of-World aggregate, the average carcass weight in the U.S. was 
used (USDA, 2006). 
For animals of other than high quality, this procedure was not necessary as 100 
percent of the carcass is seen as meat of other than high quality. The resulting 
quantities can be found in annex Table A 2 - Table A 6
Production of frozen meat 
For the European Union, data on the quantities of frozen beef sold are available 
from Eurostat (EUROSTAT, n.d.b). 
Data for the production of frozen meat could not be retrieved for the Mercosur 
countries. The assumption was made that meat is mainly frozen for transportation 
purposes, and production has been equalised to exports of frozen beef. Though 
this is likely to underestimate the production of frozen meat, it was the only feasi-
ble solution. At the same time, experts from the Mercosur countries confirmed the 
limited extent to which meat is frozen for storage reasons and then consumed 
domestically. 
For the Rest-of-World aggregate, not only exports of frozen meat with partners 
external to the aggregate, but also the quantities traded inside the aggregate were 
44 Given that that the U.S. are the largest beef producer, and other large beef producers like Brazil, 
Argentina, Uruguay and the EU are not part of the Rest-of-World aggregate, the U.S. data represent
this aggregate fairly well.
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summed up to approximate total production. Information on the resulting quanti-
ties are presented in annex Table A 2 - Table A 6.
Processing demand
As described earlier, demand of slaughterhouses for live cattle is simply equalised 
to the production of meat, and the demand for fresh meat for deep freezing is 
equal to the production of frozen beef. 
Consumption data
Consumption data for meat is readily available for most countries. In the frame-
work of this study however, it was necessary to distinguish between consumption 
of different kinds of beef. For some countries, data on the consumed quantities of 
different cuts is provided, that could then be matched with the different qualities 
of beef considered for this model. Where this was not the case, this was extrapo-
lated from other countries or calculated residually from the market balance. 
For Brazil, the quantities of domestic per capita consumption of different cuts 
are compiled by IBGE and are available through its website (INSTITUTO 
BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFÍA E ESTATÍSTICA, n. d.b). The latest survey dates back 
to 2003, so under the assumption of unchanged consumption patterns, this data 
has been updated with World Bank population data and adjusted for out of house 
consumption with FAO data. 
For Argentina, consumption data was available on a per capita basis from the 
Secretary of agriculture (SECRETARÍA DE AGRICULTURA GANADERÍA  PESCA Y 
ALIMENTOS, n.d.). Total consumption was derived using World Bank population 
statistics. 
Consumption data for Uruguay was taken from the OECD´s outlook database 
(OECD, n.d.a).
Data for different fresh meat cuts was not available for the European Union. 
Consumption of different qualities of meat was thus calculated residually from the 
market balance. The same procedure had to be applied for the Rest-of-World ag-
gregate. 
Information on consumption of frozen meat could not be retrieved for any of 
the countries in question. The assumption was made that all imported frozen beef 
is consumed domestically, i.e. no transit trade takes place. Together with the as-
sumption made for production of frozen meat, consumption of this type of meat 
can be equalised to imports. 
The outcome of this process is presented in annex Table A 2 - Table A 6
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Prices 
Producer prices. Average producer prices are published by national authorities in 
many countries. Here, the challenge was to retrieve prices for different qualities of 
animals. Generally, it was aimed at achieving consistency with the matching be-
tween type of animal and type of meat made for the production data. This was not 
always possible, and other ways of approximating the price for different animal 
types had to be thought of.
For Argentina, producer prices for live cattle of different categories quoted on 
the Mercado de Liniers were made available (MERCADO DE LINIERS, n.d.). 
Producer prices for live cattle Brazil could not be obtained from any national 
sources. FAO data was therefore used to derive a ratio between the Argentine 
producer price and the Brazilian producer price reported by FAO, and that factor 
was then applied to the Brazilian producer price. 
Producer prices for live cattle in Uruguay are available at great level of detail 
from several issues of the market information provided by the MINISTERIO DE 
GANADERIA, AGRICULTURA Y PESCA. 
For the EU, producer prices were taken from the OECD´s Producer Support 
Estimate database (OECD, n.d.b). These are assumed to reflect the price for ani-
mals of high quality.
Farm prices for the Rest-of-World aggregate for high quality animals were 
taken from the OECD´s Agricultural Outlook Database (OECD, n.d.a) and are 
represented through the U.S. Nebraska Choice Steers price. Prices for other than 
high quality animals were derived from USDA livestock prices (USDA, 2006). 
The farm price data is presented in Table A 7.
Consumer prices of domestic meat. In order to achieve consumer prices for differ-
ent qualities of beef, prices for different cuts were mapped to the categories of 
beef used in the model. 
In the case of Argentina, consumer prices for different cuts of beef are avail-
able from the SECRETARÍA DE AGRICULTURA GANADERÍA, PESCA Y ALIMENTOS
(2006). 
Consumer prices in Brazil for different fresh cuts were not available from offi-
cial sources, but were obtained from the consulting company Scot Consultoria. 
Consumer prices in Uruguay were obtained from the Ministry for Agriculture 
for two cuts of beef from several issues of the MINISTERIO DE GANADERIA,
AGRICULTURA Y PESCA. 
Consumer prices were hard to retrieve for the EU. It was necessary to use a lo-
cal price as an indicator for the EU price (ZENTRALE MARKT- UND 
PREISBERICHTSSTELLE, 2007). While this is clearly a strong assumption, the fact 
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that Germany is by far the biggest market for South American beef in the EU 
palliates the error introduced. 
Consumer prices for the Rest-of-World aggregate were taken from the USDA 
for different cuts (ERS-USDA, n.d.). 
The data on consumer prices can also be found in Table A 7.
Prices on the level of meat processing. Domestic market prices on the level of the 
meat processing sector were difficult to obtain. In the Mercosur countries, the 
export unit value taken from EUROSTAT (EUROSTAT, n.d.a) of the respective 
products on 8-digit level of the combined nomenclature was used as proxy for the 
wholesale price. 
It should be noted that the resulting price has to be interpreted as the export 
price for meat designated to exports to Europe. It is important to distinguish these 
prices from prices for the – seemingly – same quality of meat for the internal 
market45. 
Approximating wholesale prices with export unit values was not seen as an 
appropriate measure for the EU, as the meat exported under the tariff lines that are 
eligible for the high quality beef quota is highly heterogeneous, other than for the 
Mercosur states that export mainly high quality cuts. Therefore, a price reported 
by the German Zentrale Markt und Preisberichtsstelle (ZMP) was used as a proxy 
for the price of beef on the European market (ZENTRALE MARKT- UND 
PREISBERICHTSSTELLE, 2007). No satisfying indicator for the price of other than 
high quality meat was available from this source. It was therefore derived assum-
ing that the ratio between high and other quality meat is the same on consumer 
and wholesale level. 
Approximating wholesale prices for the Rest-of-World aggregate for beef of 
different quality through export unit values did not render satisfying results for 
this aggregate because of the high heterogeneity of exports. Information on the 
margins between consumer and wholesale prices for the U.S. were available 
(USDA, 2006), which were exploited to compute wholesale prices back from 
consumer prices. 
Prices on processing level are also presented in Table A 7.
Processing Margins
The processing margins were calculated from the price data obtained from differ-
ent sources and the factor representing the Leontief technology. For slaughter-
45 The latter is likely to differ significantly from the export price when like in this case, quality 
aspects play a role. This is why in some cases, the domestic consumer price is lower than the export 
price.
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houses and deep freezing units, it was derived evaluating equation (6) or equation 
(7) at the observed prices.
Exchange Rates
Annual exchange rates of the US Dollar, the Argentine Peso and the Brazilian 
Real were obtained from the Bank of Canada (BANK OF CANADA, n.d.). The ex-
change rate of the Uruguayan Peso was not available from this source, but was 
taken from the German Office for Foreign Trade (BUNDESAGENTUR FÜR 
AUßENWIRTSCHAFT, 2007). Where available, an average from 2004 to 2006 was 
used, in the case of Uruguay, only data for 2006 and 2007 was available. 
Trade data
Data sources. Two main sources of trade data were used. One is EUROSTAT, 
which provides trade flows between the European Union and all its trading part-
ners at 8-digit level through the web interface COMEXT (EUROSTAT, n.d.a). Eu-
rostat provides only bilateral trade flows in which the EU is involved, so a second 
source of trade data had to be used for all other trade flows in which the EU is not 
involved. 
To cover this part of the data, the trade database provided by the United Na-
tions (UN), COMTRADE (UNITED NATIONS, n.d.), was used. There are two main 
differences between the data bases: While Eurostat provides data on monthly 
level, the United Nations do this only on a calendar year basis. Using UN data to 
analyze the trade flows under the quota schemes of the EU would necessarily 
introduce an error, as the quota quantities are defined on marketing years, not on 
calendar years. To circumvent this problem, monthly data has been aggregated to 
marketing years for all the trade flows concerning the EU. 
The other difference is the level of product aggregation. For all trade flows be-
tween partners other than the EU, UN data on the more aggregated 6-digit level 
was used. The level of product aggregation does not present a major problem in 
the context of the study, as TRQs and the corresponding disaggregated product 
specification apply only for the EU. The resulting data can be found in annex 
Table A 2 - Table A 6.
Product aggregation. The trade data had to be matched to the product aggregation 
for this model. This was done making three assumptions:
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− high quality beef is traded always fresh or chilled
− beef of other quality can be fresh or frozen 
− the composite commodity “other meat” consists of pork, meat from sheep 
and goats as well as poultry.
The mapping of the respective tariff lines and these meat categories is given in 
annex Table A 1.
5.11 Balancing data
When compiling data from different sources, the data set is very unlikely to be 
balanced initially. A procedure has to be set up to make the data consistent with 
the assumption that markets are in equilibrium in the initial state. Generally, three 
methods are common to generate consistent market balances. 
The first one consists of calculating one item of the market balance residually 
from the others. Typically, consumption is the item that is calculated residually, 
because it is frequently subject to severe data limitations. Another approach con-
sists of introducing an error term reflecting the statistical differences in the market 
balance, and keeping it constant in the model solution. A more refined method 
includes searching a dataset that is internally consistent with a market clearing 
assumption and at the same time as close as possible to the original data. 
This latter approach was used here. An optimisation procedure under con-
straints was set up, that minimises the percentage difference from the original data 
and at the same time renders a balanced data set. The solution is found by
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as well as equation (22), (23) and (24) are satisfied simultaneously and where 
( ){ }´´ ,´ , | ´ , , \X r w q r R w W q Q alive= ∈ ∈ ∈ .
xs´, xd´ and xt´ represent the observed data. NT denotes the net-trade of each 
country r R∈ . 
Equation (53) and (54) are a restatement of the production technology where 
slaughterhouses purchase live animals from the farming sector and then decom-
pose them into different types of meat. 
Equation (55) states that consumption of foreign beef equals imports. Equation 
(56) defines the net-trade of each country, and global market clearing is ensured 
in equation (57). 
5.12 Conclusions of the chapter
The model was designed to allow for a highly detailed representation of the meat 
sector. 
Three different qualities of beef are distinguished, high quality fresh beef, 
other quality fresh beef and frozen beef. Furthermore, each type of beef is charac-
terised through its place of production. Hence, each type of beef is described by 
three attributes. This allows for bilateral trade of the group product beef.
On the regional dimension, the model covers Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, the 
EU and a Rest-of-World aggregate. 
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In the production chain, farmers and the processing sector are represented 
through individual behavioural equations. 
Desired properties such as the consistency with assumed economic behaviour 
and sufficient flexibility are partially achieved through the functional forms, par-
tially through the choice of their parameters.
Market clearing equations for each product ensure that supply meets the de-
mand for each product, and determine the price. 
The economic rents arising from a binding or over-filled quota are an endoge-
nous variable that is determined exploiting the Kuhn-Tucker conditions.
A broad range of national and international data sources were used. The model 
is calibrated to a 2004-2006 average.
The contribution of this model to the assessment of the economic impact of 
trade liberalisation scenarios between the EU and the Mercosur countries is pre-
sented in the following chapter.
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6 Quantitative analysis 
In this section, an attempt is made to assess the impact of a possible free trade 
agreement between the EU and the Mercosur countries applying the model de-
scribed in the previous chapter. Key indicators in this context will be the devel-
opment of trade flows under different outcomes of the negotiations as well as the 
resulting changes in producer and consumer welfare, state revenue and quota 
rents. The analysis will reveal not only which countries, but also which economic 
agent within the country will loose or benefit from the policy change. 
6.1 Scenario definition
This quantitative assessment is based on the proposals exchanged by the two ne-
gotiating parties in 2005. The analysis based on the EU proposal will hereinafter 
be referred to as the EU-proposal, the proposal presented by the Mercosur coun-
tries as the Mercosur-proposal. 
For the beef sector, the EU-proposal includes, in the absence of a conclusion 
of the Doha round, the expansion of the existing TRQ for high quality beef by 
additional 100,000 tonnes. According to this proposal, the in-quota tariff shall be 
fixed at “50 percent of the lowest of the bound in-quota duty rates for the existing 
WTO bound tariff quotas for the relevant product” (USDA, 2005). In the case of 
the high quality beef TRQs of the EU, this materialises into an in-quota tariff 
reduction of 50 percent. The over-quota tariff remains unchanged. The EU pro-
posal does not contain any provisions on how to allocate the additional quota 
quantities among the Mercosur countries. The industry consultation that was car-
ried out in the framework of this study revealed an intra industry agreement that 
lays down the distribution of the additional quota among the Mercosur countries. 
The agreed distribution of additional quota quantities as well as the resulting total 
quota quantities for high quality beef are presented in Table 3.
Table 3 Trade liberalisation proposals for high quality beef
Agreed distribution
additional quota 
(tonnes) total quota (tonnes)
additional quota 
(tonnes) total quota (tonnes)
Uruguay 21.0% 21,000 27,300 63,000 69,300
Argentina 29.5% 29,500 57,500 88,500 116,500
Brazil 42.5% 42,500 47,500 127,500 132,500
Paraguay 7.0% 7,000 8,000 21,000 22,000
Sum 100% 100,000 140,300 300,000 340,300
in-quota tariff reduction
EU-Proposal Mercosur-Proposal
50% 100%
Sources: Own compilation based on USDA (2005), personal communication with the Commission of the Euro-
pean Union and industry representatives.
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The Mercosur proposal differs from the proposal made by the European Union 
mainly in two points: First, the additional quantities of high quality beef are three 
times higher. Instead of additional 100,000 tonnes as offered by the EU, the Mer-
cosur countries requested 300,000 tonnes of additional quota for high quality 
beef. Second, the Mercosur countries requested the abolition of the in-quota tariff 
instead of a reduction as proposed by the EU. Allocation of the quota among the 
Mercosur countries would also be achieved according to the abovementioned intra 
industry agreement, leading to the additional quota presented in Table 3.
6.2 Impact assessment
In this section, the adjustments of the economy to the changed political frame-
work will be discussed. It starts off with an analysis of the most directly affected 
economic variable, the trade flows. This is followed by analysis of the welfare 
changes, giving a monetary indication of losses and benefits due to the trade lib-
eralisation.
Impact on trade flows
The development of beef trade between the EU and the Mercosur countries under 
both scenarios is presented in Figure 15. 
The first observation is that under the EU-proposal, the expansion of imports 
is very limited. Though the quota quantity is increased by 100,000 tonnes, total 
beef imports of the EU increase by less than 7,000 tonnes or 2 percent. This lim-
ited response of trade flows to the new conditions is explained by the 
quota-overfill in the base situation. As described in Chapter 2, expansion of an 
over filled quota does not automatically imply additional export opportunities, the 
quota may remain over-filled in the new policy environment. In how far this is the 
case for the individual countries and quotas will be discussed in more detail later 
in this chapter. 
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Figure 15 EU imports of beef 
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A second observation is that under the Mercosur-proposal with a much 
stronger quota expansion in combination with the abolishment of the tariffs, the 
shipments of beef meat into the EU increase much stronger than under the provi-
sions set out in the EU-proposal. Under the Mercosur-proposal, the EU purchases 
more than 100,000 additional tonnes of beef meat from the South American free 
trade area, which is equivalent to an increase of over 37 percent compared to the 
base situation. 
Imports from other countries than Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay decrease 
only by around 3,000 tonnes, indicating limited substitution effects.
While giving an overview, the aggregated representation in Figure 15 hides 
away some interesting detail. A more disaggregated view on the development of 
imports of the EU from the Mercosur countries is presented in Figure 16, where 
the developments of trade are shown only for high quality beef. 
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Figure 16 EU imports of high quality beef 
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The model results indicate that Uruguay, that in the base situation exports the 
smallest quantities of beef to the EU, increases its exports to the latter country 
group by more than 65 percent under the conditions set out in the EU-proposal. 
Already under these relatively modest provisions, this small country does not fill 
the allocated quota anymore. The same finding holds true for the more far reach-
ing Mercosur-proposal, but what is more, exports of high quality beef from Uru-
guay to the EU decrease slightly compared to the simulation result under the 
EU-proposal, as meat originating in Uruguay is crowded out by meat originating 
in other Mercosur countries.
For Argentina the picture is different. With considerable quantities exported at 
full levy in the base situation, the trade expansion under the EU-proposal follows 
the quota expansion, and the quota becomes the binding element in the trade re-
gime. As the quota was over-filled in the base situation, this materialises into only 
slightly more than 4,000 additional tonnes of high quality beef from Argentina on 
the European market. The expansion of exports is far less than the additional 
quota of 29,500 tonnes allocated to this country. Under the Mercosur-proposal
however, exports stay behind the largely increased quota. Imports of the EU of 
Argentinean high quality beef increase by over 48,000 tonnes or over 90 percent 
compared to the base situation. 
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Brazil has, in the current situation and despite its considerable exports, the 
smallest allocated quota among the three Mercosur countries considered here. 
Consequently, the EU-proposal does not provide this South American state with 
any further trade opportunities, the quota remains over-filled and the over-quota 
tariff the binding instrument. On the contrary, Brazil even reduces its exports to 
the EU slightly under this scenario, a development that can be explained by com-
peting exports from the other two Mercosur countries. If on the other hand, an 
agreement was based on the bid of the South American country group, shipments 
of high quality beef from Brazil to the EU would increase considerably to the new 
quota level of 132,500 tonnes, which implies a more than 85 percent increase 
compared to the base situation.
The above discussion shows that the Mercosur-proposal would de facto pro-
vide Uruguay and Argentina with a tariff and quota free access for high quality 
meat to the European market. Brazil on the other hand would be bound by the 
enlarged quota.
Welfare analysis
A natural question is the one for winners and losers of a possible understanding 
between the EU and the Mercosur countries. To answer this question, a welfare 
analysis for the different countries and actors involved is carried out46. 
An overview of the welfare changes is given in Table 4. It shows that both 
trade liberalisation scenarios would result in increased global welfare, though the 
absolute changes are small. Another salient feature of the welfare effect is that the 
EU would incur losses if an agreement was to be based on its own proposal, and 
for Uruguay, both liberalisation proposals would imply a negative welfare effect, 
though in absolute terms the effect is negligible. Interestingly, on national level,
an agreement based on the EU-proposal would leave the Mercosur countries with 
a slightly superior economic situation than when an agreement was based on the 
Mercosur-proposal. This result deserves further attention and will be discussed 
later in this chapter. 
46 It should be kept in mind that this welfare analysis is based on a partial approach, taking into 
account only changes related to the meat and in particular the beef sector, both in terms of the sce-
nario set up as well as in terms of economic adjustment to the new situation. In a framework cover-
ing the entire economy, a simulation of a free trade agreement covering other sectors like, for exam-
ple, services is likely to lead to a different outcome. 
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Table 4 Welfare changes compared to the base situation
EU-proposal Mercosur proposal
Farmers percent 0.0 -0.5
absolute (Mio. EURO) -4.6 -53.1
Meat processing percent 0.0 -0.4
absolute (Mio. EURO) -3.3 -36.3
Quota rent percent 0.0 0.0
absolute (Mio. EURO) 0.0 0.0
Consumers percent 0.1 1.0
absolute (Mio. EURO) 96.8 989.0
Budget percent -47.0 -87.6
absolute (Mio. EURO) -280.6 -523.2
Total percent -0.2 0.3
absolute (Mio. EURO) -191.6 376.4
Farmers percent 2.5 2.6
absolute (Mio. EURO) 7.8 7.9
Meat processing percent 0.1 0.1
absolute (Mio. EURO) 1.5 1.4
Quota rent percent -100.0 -100.0
absolute (Mio. EURO) -16.5 -16.5
Consumers percent -3.1 -3.3
absolute (Mio. EURO) -16.9 -18.3
Budget percent 0.0 0.0
absolute (Mio. EURO) 0 0
Total percent -0.3 -0.4
absolute (Mio. EURO) -7.6 -9.0
Farmers percent 0.4 2.0
absolute (Mio. EURO) 12.9 69.6
Quota rent percent 137 -100
absolute (Mio. EURO) 7.2 -5.2
Meat processing percent 1.2 1.0
absolute (Mio. EURO) 112.3 89.0
Quota rent percent 137 -100
absolute (Mio. EURO) 95.4 -69.4
Consumers percent -0.1 -1.5
absolute (Mio. EURO) -9.6 -112.7
Budget percent 2.1 27.8
absolute (Mio. EURO) 4.1 53.5
Total percent 0.6 0.5
absolute (Mio. EURO) 119.7 99.4
Farmers percent -0.1 2.3
absolute (Mio. EURO) -1.4 54.4
Meat processing percent 1.5 1.4
absolute (Mio. EURO) 133.3 124.1
Quota rent percent 1,013 9
absolute (Mio. EURO) 136.8 1.2
Consumers percent 0.0 -0.6
absolute (Mio. EURO) 1.5 -99.7
Budget percent 0.0 0.0
absolute (Mio. EURO) 0 0
Total percent 0.5 0.3
absolute (Mio. EURO) 133.5 78.8
Total percent 0.0 0.1
absolute (Mio. EURO) 66.5 631.2
World
European Union
Uruguay
Argentina
Brazil
Source: Model results
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Looking at a more disaggregated level, for the EU, three sub-items of national 
welfare contribute to the losses under its own proposal: The farm sector and the 
meat processing industry experience welfare losses due to the increased competi-
tion from South America. The state revenue is reduced because less tariff revenue 
is generated. This is an outcome of the reduced in-quota tariff for imports of high 
quality beef, the regime switches for Argentina und Uruguay and the expanded 
TRQ for Brazil. The loss of tariff revenue accounts for the bulk of the total losses. 
The positive income effect for consumers in the EU is not sufficient to outweigh 
these losses. Under the scenario based on the Mercosur-proposal, the direction of 
the changes for individual economic agents is not altered, but they are more pro-
nounced. Particularly, the increases in consumer welfare over-compensate for 
losses in the other components, leading to an overall positive welfare effect for 
the EU. 
In Uruguay, under both policy proposals, the agricultural sector and the meat 
processing industry benefit from increased export opportunities and consequently 
higher prices for animals and meat of high quality, that outweigh the loss of the 
quota rent incurred by the slaughter houses. At the same time, consumers are ad-
versely affected by higher consumer prices under both scenarios. In the simulation 
based on the Mercosur-proposal, the latter effect is even more pronounced, not 
because Uruguay exports more high quality beef, but because of decreased im-
ports of Uruguay as trade from Brazil is diverted away towards the European 
markets. This leaves Uruguay with a slightly smaller increase in national welfare 
than under the EU-proposal. 
Like in Uruguay, Argentine cattle farmers and the meat processing sector 
benefit from the liberalisation proposals. For both, the increase in welfare under 
the EU-proposal is largely due to an increase in the quota rent that is captured by 
these agents. In the simulations based on the Mercosur-proposal, the quota rent 
vanishes away. For the meat processing sector, that captured a large share of the 
quota rent in the initial situation, this loss is not fully compensated by gains from 
additional trade, so that from the perspective a meat processor owning the rent, 
the EU-proposal is slightly more attractive. This is true for the national level, too, 
but is mainly due to a pronounced loss of consumer surplus under the policy sce-
nario based on the Mercosur countries request, that is not offset by the increases 
in export taxes and producer surplus. 
In Brazil, cattle farmers experience a small loss of welfare in the simulations 
based on the EU-proposal since exports decrease slightly due to increased compe-
tition from Argentina. The meat processing sector on the other hand increases its 
welfare compared to the base situation by 1.5 percent, because the increase of the 
quota rent compensates for the losses accruing from reduced export opportunities. 
Consumers benefit from lower prices, but to a very limited extent. Under the 
Mercosur-proposal, the picture is changed. Farmers benefit from higher prices 
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triggered by increased exports. So does the meat processing industry, but at the 
same time, the quota rent increases only modestly, and consumers´ expenditure 
for meat increases. Taking these latter two effects together, trade liberalisation 
under the Mercosur-proposal is still welfare enhancing compared to the base 
situation, but slightly inferior to the impact under the EU-proposal. 
The role of the quota rents 
Quota rents are a windfall profit generated from the specific trade policy instru-
ment. As discussed earlier, their distribution can be decisive in the assessment of 
the welfare effects. In the case of the TRQs for high quality beef between the EU 
and the Mercosur countries, the quota rents remain fully in the exporting country, 
and there, with the exception of Argentina, entirely in the meat processing sector. 
The changes of the quota rents and their share in total welfare effects are depicted 
in Figure 17. In the upper panel, the contribution of the changes in the quota rent 
as a share of the total welfare effects is depicted for the EU-proposal, in the lower 
panel, for the Mercosur-proposal. 
89
Figure 17 Contribution of the quota rents to welfare changes
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Under the EU-proposal, substantive shares of the total welfare effects can be 
attributed to changes in the quota rents arising from the high quality beef TRQs. 
Especially in the case of Brazil, where the quota is still over-filled under the 
EU-proposal, the quota rent is the determining factor for the sign of the overall 
welfare change. This is an example of the economic mechanism discussed in Sec-
tion 2.3, where expansion of an overfilled quota leads almost exclusively to the 
conversion of tariff revenue into quota rent. If this rent was captured by the im-
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porting country, i.e. the EU, liberalisation according to the EU-proposal would 
result in welfare losses for Brazil. 
In Argentina, despite accounting for roughly 85 percent of the economic gains, 
the quota rent is not critical for the overall welfare effect. Even if it was captured 
by the importing side, the policy change would be advantageous for Argentina. 
Another interesting detail here is that despite the fact that the quota is binding 
now, the change in the quota rent is still positive, a result of both the in-quota 
tariff reduction and the intersection of the supply and demand curves. In other 
words, the circumstances outlined in Section 2.3 under which the quota rent is 
reduced as a consequence of the quota expansion have not come into place, or are 
over-compensated by the increase of the quota rent triggered by the reduction of 
the first-tier tariff.
Uruguay is a particular case: As the quota rent vanishes away under the provi-
sions of the EU-proposal, Uruguay would have greater interest in this agreement 
if the quota rent was initially captured by the importing country, and consequently 
the importer would be the party incurring the loss. The distribution of the rent is 
decisive for the direction of the total income change for Uruguay: While in the 
current setting, the welfare impact on national level is negative, it would be posi-
tive if the quota rent was initially captured (and consequently lost) by the import-
ing party. 
From the perspective of the EU, liberalisation according to the EU-proposal
would be welfare enhancing if the quota rents were captured by European import-
ers. 
The role of the quota rents is less marked in the scenario based on the Merco-
sur-proposal. For Brazil, the role of the quota rent is limited, thus an alternative 
distribution on international level would not change the picture for Brazil much. 
Argentina looses the entire quota rent, but the quota rent is not key to the overall 
national welfare effect either. Only for Uruguay, the quota rent determines the 
sign of the overall economic impact.
6.3 Sensitivity analysis of parameters 
As for any simulation, the model output depends on the input parameters. For this 
study, available estimated parameters have been altered to achieve consistency 
with the assumed microeconomic behaviour. In some cases, estimates were not 
available, and a pragmatic approach with “guesstimates” as described in 
SADOULET et al. (1995), p. 163 was taken: The elasticity values from which the 
squared deviation was minimised in the calibration process were set using com-
mon sense and economic intuition. Both implies uncertainty about the values of 
the parameters and the resulting elasticities. 
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In order to analyze the influence of the parameters on the model output and to 
test for the robustness of modelling results to changes in the parameter values, 
several methods have been proposed in the literature. An overview is provided in 
OECD (2001) p. 65. The authors distinguish five methods for dealing with pa-
rameter uncertainty in economic models: 
1. Conditional systematic sensitivity analysis (CSSA) based on 
HARRISON et al. (1993). This method consists of variation of each pa-
rameter of the economic model individually, leaving the others un-
changed.
2. Unconditional systematic sensitivity analysis (USSA), as also pro-
posed by HARRISON et al. (1993), where each parameter is varied from 
its point estimate, but simultaneously all other parameters are varied, 
too (HARRISON et al. 1993). 
3. A variation of the USSA was proposed by HARRISON AND VINOD 
(1992). The statistical procedure proposed consists of randomly select-
ing only a subset of all possible parameter constellations (HARRISON 
et al., 1992).
4. A procedure based on the Gaussian quadrature, that reproduces the 
moments of the endogenous variables in the model as proposed by 
PRECKEL et al. (1992).
5. Monte Carlo experiments are a fifth method mentioned. A Monte 
Carlo experiment consists of randomly sampling sets of parameters 
from an assumed distribution.
A key limitation of the CSSA is that it ignores the possibility of simultaneous 
variation of more than one parameter at a time. This is overcome by the USSA, 
which on the other hand is only computational feasible for models with a very 
limited number of parameters. The same criticism is brought forward against the 
fourth method based on the Gaussian quadrature. The third procedure is not as 
demanding in terms of computational power, but bears the risk of 
miss-representing the moments of the parameter distribution (OECD, 2001, p. 
66). The authors finally recommend a Gaussian quadrature in cases where it is 
feasible, and a Monte Carlo experiment elsewhere.
Given the relatively large number of parameters in the model and the ease of 
implementation, a Monte Carlo method was applied in this study.
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Procedure 
The parameters that were randomly disturbed from their initial values are the elas-
ticities, from which the deviation in the calibration process is minimised. In other 
words, the elasticities of supply and demand of beef and other meat as well as the 
income and price elasticities of group expenditure were systematically altered. 
They were sampled from a normal distribution, with the original, deterministic 
values as the mean. The standard deviation of the distribution was chosen making 
use of information concerning the accuracy of the estimated elasticities where 
possible. Unfortunately, confidence intervals or the standard error of the estima-
tion were rarely available, in fact only for human consumption, and here only for 
Argentina and Uruguay. For Argentina, the standard error of the estimation of the 
price effects was available from CAP et al. (2007). The standard error was set into 
relation with the parameter estimate, and the resulting factor applied to determine 
the standard deviation of the distribution from which the elasticities were ran-
domly sampled. 
For Uruguay, it was not the standard error of the estimation that was available, 
but the upper and the lower bounds of the 90 percent confidence level of the elas-
ticity estimate. The bounds were available from CAP et al. (2007) only for own 
price elasticities. These bounds were used as the standard deviation of the distri-
bution from which the elasticities were sampled. 
For all elasticities where either no estimate or no information on the accuracy 
of the estimate was available, the standard deviation was set rather arbitrarily to 
0.5 times the elasticity estimate. Subsequently, the calibration process was re-
peated, with the difference that the elasticities from which the squared deviation 
was minimised were now the randomly generated ones.
To test for the robustness of the main policy conclusions, each policy scenario 
was repeated 210 times with alternative sets of parameters. Not for all sets of 
parameters a model solution could be achieved. The policy scenario based on the 
EU-proposal could be solved 192 times, the one based on the Mercosur-proposal
199 times.
Sensitivity of trade impacts
The first variable to be looked at in the context of trade liberalisation scenarios is 
the sensitivity of the trade flows to changes in the model parameters. The results 
of the stochastic simulations have been summarised in the box-whiskers dia-
grams47 in Figure 18. 
47 A box-whiskers diagram shows the two extreme values of the distribution (minimum and maxi-
mum), the median and the range in between which 50 percent of the observations are found.
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In none of the simulations carried out, Uruguay fills the expanded quota. In 
other words, the finding that Uruguay does not fill the quota and looses the quota 
rent under both scenarios is robust to the variations of the parameters carried out 
here. The same holds true for Argentina under both scenarios: The quota is always 
binding under the provisions of the EU-proposal, and always under-filled in the 
scenario based on the Mercosur-proposal. Equally, in the case of Brazil, the quota 
is always found to be over-filled in all the simulations based on the proposal made 
by the European Union, irrespective of the parameters chosen. In the simulations 
involving the Mercosur-proposal, more variation was found in the results: The 
expanded TRQ is not filled in all stochastic iterations, but is under-filled in almost 
30% of the simulations. At the same time, the expanded TRQ was not found to be 
over-filled in any of the simulations.
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Figure 18 Sensitivity of trade flows
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Some additional descriptive statistics are presented in Table 5. In the case of the 
EU-proposal, the variation in trade flows is small both in absolute terms as well as measured 
in terms of the coefficient of variation. 
For all countries except Brazil, the variability in trade flows is higher under the Merco-
sur-scenario. This is especially true for Argentina, where the TRQ is no longer binding.
Table 5 Statistics of the sensitivity of trade flows
Mean (tonnes) Standard deviation (tonnes) Coefficient of variation
Uruguay 19,817 203 0.01
Argentina 57,500 0 0.00
Brazil 69,191 688 0.01
Rest-of-World 18,598 635 0.03
Uruguay 19,009 907 0.05
Argentina 103,386 3,354 0.03
Brazil 131,722 1,787 0.01
Rest-of-World 12,099 1,763 0.15
EU-proposal
Mercosur-propsal
Source: Calculations based on model results
Sensitivity of welfare impacts 
The impact of the variation of the elasticities on national and global welfare effects under both 
scenarios is shown in the box-whiskers diagrams in Figure 19.
Perhaps the most interesting case is Uruguay, where in some of the stochastic simulations,  
the national welfare effect changes the direction compared to the deterministic simulations. 
Under the EU-proposal, 5 percent of the parameter sets led to a positive national welfare effect 
for Uruguay. This is the case for 5 percent of the parameter sets under the Mercosur-proposal. 
Under both policy scenarios, this change in sign can be attributed to an increase in producer 
surplus on farm level that is much more pronounced than when the policy scenarios are run 
with other parameter constellations. In the iterations where the switch of sign takes place, the 
supply of high quality animals was found to be rather inelastic, leading to a more pronounced 
increase of prices on the farm level. However, it should be noted that these changes in national 
welfare, whatever the direction, are small in absolute terms and close to zero in relative terms.
For the other countries in this study, no change of sign occurs for the national welfare ef-
fect: Under the EU-proposal, the EU looses no matter on which set of parameters the simula-
tion was based, whereas for Argentina and Brazil the policy change proves to be advantageous. 
For the Rest-of-World aggregate as well as the world the total welfare effect never switches 
sign neither, but remain positive under each of the stochastic simulations based on the EU´s
offer (not shown). 
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Figure 19 Sensitivity of welfare changes 
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Similarly, the key message for all countries except Uruguay remains un-
changed when comparing the stochastic simulations of the Mercosur-proposal to 
the deterministic ones: No change in the direction of change was observed under
any of the simulations. 
A detail that is worth mentioning is found in the case of Argentina: Though the 
median of the economic gain is higher under the EU-proposal than under the 
Mercosur-proposal, the maximum increase in welfare is with around 190 million 
Euro higher than under the EU-proposal with roughly 130 million Euros. This 
implies that for some sets of parameters, the ranking between the different policy 
scenarios is changed, and the Mercosur-proposal is superior to the EU-proposal
from the perspective of Argentina.
Some additional descriptive statistics are presented in Table 6. 
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Table 6 Sensitivity of welfare changes
Mean (Mio EURO) Standard deviation (Mio. EURO) Coefficient of variation
EU-proposal
Farmers -5.6 2.9 -0.52
Meat processing -2.9 1.4 -0.48
Quota rent 0.0 0.0 0.31
Consumers 99.0 6.5 0.07
Budget -280.2 2.7 -0.01
Total -189.7 6.6 -0.03
Farmers 9.7 6.5 0.67
Meat processing 1.0 3.3 3.26
Quota rent -16.5 0.0 0.00
Consumers -17.0 0.6 -0.04
Budget 0.0 0.0 0.00
Total -6.3 3.7 -0.59
Farmers 14.7 4.0 0.27
Quota rent 7.2 3.1 0.03
Meat processing 110.5 4.8 0.04
Quota rent 95.7 3.1 0.03
Consumers -9.5 0.8 -0.08
Budget 4.1 0.2 0.04
Total 119.8 3.8 0.03
Farmers -1.8 1.3 -0.74
Meat processing 134.0 1.5 0.01
Quota rent 136.8 0.0 0.00
Consumers 1.8 1.7 0.93
Budget 0.0 0.0 0.00
Total 134.0 0.9 0.01
Total 71.2 6.1 0.09
Mercosur-proposal
Farmers -63.3 25.1 -0.40
Meat processing -33.9 13.0 -0.38
Quota rent 0.0 0.0 0.52
Consumers 1,018.1 40.6 0.04
Budget -524.3 8.5 -0.02
Total 396.6 26.5 0.07
Farmers 10.0 6.9 0.69
Meat processing 1.4 4.2 2.92
Quota rent -16.5 0.0 0.00
Consumers -18.4 2.0 -0.11
Budget 0.0 0.0 0.00
Total -7.0 4.2 -0.60
Farmers 96.5 53.0 0.55
Quota rent -5.2 0.0 0.00
Meat processing 63.9 48.0 0.75
Quota rent -69.4 0.0 0.0
Consumers -114.9 8.6 -0.07
Budget 54.2 3.7 0.07
Total 99.8 35.6 0.36
Farmers 70.8 47.9 0.68
Meat processing 124.1 40.4 0.33
Quota rent 3.7 17.1 4.60
Consumers -115.3 39.9 -0.35
Budget 0.0 0.0 0.00
Total 79.6 17.7 0.22
Total 651.6 41.5 0.1
Brazil
World
World
EU
Uruguay
Argentina
EU
Uruguay
Argentina
Brazil
Source: Model results
Often, the coefficient of variation is higher for farmers than for the other eco-
nomic agents in the model. This finding holds true for both scenarios. Under the 
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provisions set out in the EU-proposal, the variation of the welfare impact on na-
tional level is with the exception of Uruguay, between 1 and 9 percent. A particu-
larly high coefficient of variation was found for the meat processing industry in 
Uruguay, where the mean value is small, and changes in the sign occur in cases 
where the loss of the quota rent is not offset by gains in producer surplus.
Under the stochastic simulations based on the Mercosur-proposal, the coeffi-
cient of variation on national level, again excluding Uruguay, is higher than under 
the EU-proposal, ranging between 1 and 36 percent approximately. Again, the 
coefficient of variation of the meat processing sector in Uruguay stands out for 
the same reasons as above. Another variable that exhibits a large coefficient of 
variation in this policy setting is the quota rent for Brazil, where, as explained 
above, the quota is not always filled, thus the quota rent takes a zero value in 
some iterations.
6.4 Discussion of results and comparison with other studies
Discussion
The analysis of the sensitivity of the model results to changes in parameter values 
has shown that the simulation results and thus the conclusions drawn from them 
are fairly robust for most countries. With the exception of Uruguay, the direction 
of change in national welfare is not sensitive to changes in the parameters as car-
ried out here, and only for Argentina the ranking between the two policy options 
changes in a limited number of cases. Moreover, the quota regime that is in place 
in the alternative policy settings is sensitive to the parameter values only in Bra-
zil, and only in light of the Mercosur-proposal. However, beyond parameter un-
certainties, the model results certainly rely on a number of other assumptions and 
conditions.
One is the representation of a limited number of goods, which may or may not 
be critical to the validity of the results. By restricting the model to the meat mar-
kets, it is implicitly assumed that the prices of all other products and services as 
well as the GDP remain unchanged. Assuming a fixed GDP is a typical assump-
tion in the context of partial equilibrium modelling, and is valid when the shocks 
to which the economy is exposed are small. As the latter is the case in this analy-
sis, assuming fixed income seems defendable. 
The assumption of fixed prices for capital and other agricultural goods is an-
other debatable presumption. For capital goods, no direct effect e.g. through in-
creased imports from the Mercosur countries can be expected. An indirect impact, 
e.g. on land prices, can be expected to be negligible in light of the proposals 
made. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that prices for other agricultural products may 
remain completely unaffected if trade between the two country blocks was to be 
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liberalised. At the same time, these effects were estimated to be limited: Prices for 
wheat were estimated to remain almost unchanged in simulations employing more 
comprehensive modelling systems. Changes in corn prices are only noteworthy 
under the Mercosur-proposal, and even under this proposal are limited to around 
5 percent (WEISSLEDER et al., 2008). Grains play only a limited role as a feed 
input in European beef production, hence the influence of small changes in grain
prices on the profitability of beef production will be limited. In addition, no clear 
picture with regards to the fill rate of the existing TRQ for corn could be observed 
in the past. In most of the years, the EU imported less than the TRQ quantity, and 
no obvious reason why this should change in the medium term could be identi-
fied. This means that whether or not the proposed creation of a TRQ for corn for 
the Mercosur countries leads to increased imports and hence to decreasing prices 
depends heavily on changing market conditions and the extent of the in-quota 
tariff reduction48. Finally, the negotiations between the EU and the Latin Ameri-
can country group go beyond trade of agricultural and non-agricultural goods, and 
an inclusion of liberalisation of trade in services may not significantly impact 
meat or other agricultural markets, but certainly play a role in the national and 
global welfare assessment.
The model established here captures cross effects in consumption from other 
meat products only to a limited extent, as these are represented merely in an ag-
gregated fashion. According to the study carried out by WEISSLEDER et al. (2008), 
that considers pork and poultry in a more explicit way, prices hardly change in 
consequence of the policy change, backing the validity of the partial approach 
taken in this study up. 
Generally, it seems counterintuitive that the Mercosur countries request a pol-
icy change that leaves them worse off than under the proposal made by the Euro-
pean commission, and that the EU rather concedes market access that triggers a 
loss in welfare than a gain. These results are in most cases robust to changes in 
the model parameters. Besides the abovementioned limitations and caveats at-
tached to this study, lobbying power of certain economic groupings, lack of in-
formation or different assumptions on market developments could provide an 
explanation. Finally, with regards to the ranking for the two proposals from the 
perspective of the Mercosur countries, it should be reiterated that the absolute 
differences are small, and a reversal of the ranking under different assumptions 
does not seem completely outside the range of possibilities, though this study 
confirms this possibility only for Argentina.
48 How much the in-quota tariff for maize would be decreased is not easy to determine. In reality, 
the in-quota tariff is adapted according to the prevailing market conditions, complicating the as-
sessment of initial in-quota tariff and consequently the degree of its reduction. 
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Comparison with other studies 
A number of studies deal with the potential effect of trade liberalisation between 
the EU and the Mercosur countries. Comparison across these studies is difficult, 
as different model scope, design, suppositions, parameter values and data issues 
necessarily lead to different model results. Nevertheless, a brief discussion of 
similarities and differences shall be given here.
DROGUÉ et al. (2005) apply the well know GTAP modelling system to the 
question of the free trade negotiations between the Mercosur and the EU. This 
study estimates a surge of beef purchases of the EU from the South American 
country group of almost 100 percent under the EU-proposal. The TRQ for the 
product group “cattle meat” remains over-filled (DROGUÉ et al., 2005). Welfare 
changes can not be compared, since they are not reported by commodity, but only 
as an aggregate across commodities. The conclusions on the development of trade 
flows of bovine meat are strikingly different from the findings of this study. One 
reason that is likely to contribute to this are differences in the scenario specifica-
tion: DROGUÉ et al. (2005) assume an expansion of the bilateral TRQ for high 
quality beef of 160,000 tonnes under the EU-proposal instead of 100,000 tonnes 
in this study. Furthermore, the level of aggregation both on regional as well as 
commodity level adds to the approximate character of the analysis. However, the 
fact that the quota remains over-filled in the simulation and at the same time ex-
ports increase contradicts economic theory. Though interpreting the quota fill rate 
of 126% as imports at quota level, the paper falls short of a satisfying explanation 
for this result. 
A second comprehensive ex-ante assessment of EU-Mercosur trade liberalisa-
tion was carried out by WEISSLEDER et al. (2008), applying the CAPRI modelling 
system. CAPRI is a partial equilibrium model that operates at a relatively low 
level of product aggregation. The Mercosur countries are represented as individ-
ual countries, and beef is not mingled with other meat products. At the same time, 
the model considers only one single quality of beef. For a further description of 
the modelling system see (BRITZ, 2005). The policy scenario set up is identical to 
the one in this study, but the distribution of the additional TRQs differs. Another 
difference lies in the time horizon of the two studies: While here, no future devel-
opments on agricultural markets are incorporated, CAPRI solves for the year 
2013. 
There are significant differences in the findings with regard to the develop-
ment of bilateral trade flows. Whereas WEISSLEDER et al. (2008) find an expan-
sion of beef imports of over 92,000 tonnes or 50 percent under the EU-proposal, 
this study indicates an increase of around 7,000 tonnes or 2 percent compared to 
the base situation. 
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The differences can partly be attributed to different allocation of the additional 
bilateral TRQs: Lacking further information, WEISSLEDER et al. (2008) assume a 
repartition based on past performance, which leads to higher allocation of addi-
tional TRQ to Brazil than when these are distributed as agreed in the in-
tra-industry agreement. This provides Brazil with additional export opportunities, 
whereas this was not the case in this study. 
But also the base year, that in the study carried out by WEISSLEDER et al.
(2008) is 2002, contributes to this likely over-estimation of the consequences of 
trade liberalisation: Brazil has been increasing its shipments to the European Un-
ion rapidly since then, and Argentina was still impacted by the consequences from 
the FMD epidemic that hit the country in 2000, 2001, 2002 and was not eradi-
cated until 2003 (OIE, n.d.). This implies that the degree of over-fill in the base 
situation is underestimated in the simulations with CAPRI, and consequently, the 
impact of the quota expansion is likely to be overestimated. 
The same general picture holds true for the simulations based on the Merco-
sur-proposal. According to the CAPRI results, beef imports increase by over 
270,000 tonnes, or 137 percent. This stands in sharp contrast to the results ob-
tained here, were beef imports increase only by around 100,000 tonnes or 37 per-
cent compared to the base situation. The same reasoning as above holds true. 
Little can be stated with regards to the welfare impact, as WEISSLEDER et al.
(2008) present welfare aggregated across all markets. For the EU, the welfare 
changes found here under the EU-proposal are generally smaller in absolute 
terms, with the exception of the changes in tariff revenue, that were found to be in 
a similar range. Under Mercosur-proposal however, WEISSLEDER et al. (2008) 
find a negative overall welfare impact for the EU. This is probably attributable to 
the much more increased meat imports, and also to increased corn imports, which 
drive prices down and cause losses to the cereals producing sector in the EU that 
are not outweighed by benefits from lower feed prices in other parts of the agri-
cultural economy.
Comparing the welfare effects of the two studies for the other countries, all 
that can be said is that the ones found here are of opposite sign for Uruguay, 
higher for Argentina under the EU-proposal and in a similar range under the Mer-
cosur-proposal. For Brazil, the welfare impact estimated in this study is well be-
low the one estimated by WEISSLEDER et al. (2008).
A third study assesses EU trade liberalisation and Mercosur exports. The au-
thors state clearly that “[…] our simulations should not be interpreted as a realis-
tic outcome of the negotiation as far as the substitution between domestic and 
imported beef is concerned” (RAMOS et al., 2007). Moreover, the Mercosur coun-
tries are not represented individually but as an aggregate. Taking this together, 
further analysis of similarities or discrepancies seems undue.
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Three other studies could be identified, but none of them seems suitable for a 
detailed comparison for different reasons. The study carried out by BERRETTONI 
et al. (2002) departs from completely different assumptions with regards to the 
policy changes, and consequently renders different results. 
The paper prepared by NIEMI et al. (2005) approaches the question of trade 
liberalisation between the EU and the Mercosur countries from a different angle, 
but underlines that trade liberalisation would lead to increased trade mainly for 
beef and sugar, leaving other commodities rather unaffected.
Finally, BCHIR et al. (2001) compare different options for establishing free 
trade areas for the Mercosur countries, including a free trade agreement with the 
EU. Though the scenario set up is little detailed, it states that among the agricul-
tural commodities modelled, beef will be the most affected one in case of lower-
ing barriers to trade between the two country groups.
6.5 Conclusions of the chapter
Simulations based on the negotiation proposals made by the EU and the Mercosur 
countries were carried out with the model described in the preceding chapter. For 
beef, the two scenarios differ in the extent of the proposed quota expansion and 
reduction of the in-quota tariff: The EU´s offer was of additional 100,000 tonnes 
of high quality beef, the Mercosur countries requested three times this quantity. 
The EU proposed a reduction of the in-quota tariff by 50 percent, whereas the 
Mercosur countries aimed at its abolishment. 
The simulations indicate that if an agreement was to be based on the EU´s of-
fer, limited impact on beef trade can be expected. This is explained by the largely 
overfilled high quality beef TRQs of Argentina and Brazil, and the limited ability 
of Uruguay to respond with additional exports.
Nonetheless, Argentina and Brazil would experience welfare gains under this 
scenario. Uruguay on the other hand would loose, though the change is very 
small. For the EU, the welfare impact would be negative as gains in consumer 
surplus to not compensate for losses of tariff revenue. 
The quota rents play a prominent role in the changes of total welfare for the 
Mercosur countries. Almost all the welfare impact observed for Brazil can be 
attributed to changes in the quota rent, and for Argentina they account for around 
85 percent of the total welfare gain. 
For Brazil, an alternative distribution of the rent on international level would 
in fact make beef trade liberalisation based on the EU-proposal an economically 
unattractive option, where as for Uruguay the opposite case is true.
The picture is changed under the simulations based on the Mercosur-proposal. 
It would lead to de facto free trade of high quality beef for Argentina and Uru-
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guay, because the bilateral TRQs would not be filled anymore, and the in-quota 
tariff is reduced to zero. 
Argentina, Brazil as well as the EU would experience welfare gains, as for the 
latter, gains in consumer surplus outweigh the losses of tariff revenue. 
The quota rents of Argentina and Uruguay vanish, but the loss is for the first 
two countries by far over-compensated through the economic gains from the 
largely improved market access.
On a national level, of the two policy options the EU-proposal is preferable to 
the Mercosur countries, whereas for the EU, trade liberalisation based on the 
Mercosur-proposal would lead to greater welfare.
Some of these general findings are sensitive to the value of the parameters 
used. Among these are the total welfare effects for Uruguay, the ranking of the 
two policy options for Argentina and the binding element of the TRQ for Brazil 
under the Mercosur-proposal.
Direct comparison of the results with other studies is difficult because of dif-
ferences in the country and product aggregation, the policy scenarios simulated or 
the underlying database. 
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7 Summary, limitations of the work and conclusions
7.1 Summary
This work analyses the economic impact that different options for reducing barri-
ers to beef trade between the EU and the Mercosur countries may have. 
The paper starts with a discussion of the economic theory underlying TRQs 
and their administration. A TRQ is constituted of three elements, and whether or 
not liberalisation of these or combinations of these elements are relevant for trade 
and/or welfare depends on the regime that is in place prior to the policy change as 
well as on the extent of liberalisation of the elements. Liberalisation of an element 
that was redundant in the initial setting and remains being so after the policy 
change will bring no change to trade flows, and may even leave welfare of the 
involved parties unchanged. Whether the latter is true depends on the existence 
and the distribution of the quota rents. It was shown that in some cases, the wel-
fare effects can not be determined unambiguously without information on the 
repartition of the quota rents. This repartition depends crucially on two factors: 
One is the administration of the quota, and the other one is the prevailing market 
structure.
An overview of the trade patterns and the current trade policies between the 
two country groups is given. For beef, the Mercosur countries enjoy preferential 
market access through three different TRQ regimes: Bilateral TRQs for high qual-
ity beef, the so-called “GATT frozen beef quota”, and the quota for frozen beef for 
processing. The fill rates of the beef TRQs could not be unequivocally assessed, 
but it was shown that with the exception of the high quality beef TRQ for Para-
guay, all existing preferential schemes for beef are fully utilised. The proposals of 
both the EU and the Mercosur countries put forward in 2005 foresee expansion of 
the existing TRQs for high quality beef.
For the high quality beef TRQs allocated to Argentina, Brazil and Uruguay, 
the rent is fully captured by the exporting country, and there mostly by the meat 
processing sector. It was found that two key factors drive the distribution of the 
rent. One is the design of the administrational process related to the TRQ. Be-
cause the import certificate has to be matched with an export licence, the export-
ing party is aware of the tariff to be paid at the border. Moreover, a security has to 
be lodged by the importer, that has a limited validity and is lost if no transaction 
takes place. In addition, the market structure influences the distribution of rents 
between the parties involved such that the rent is entirely captured by the export-
ing side. 
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A detailed description of the model set up for the purpose of this study was
given. The model belongs to the class of SPE models, and covers five regions, six 
meat products and four economic actors. Bilateral trade is captured by characteris-
ing each type of meat by its country of origin. The model features a supply system 
derived from a normalised quadratic profit function, and a demand system based 
on the generalised Leontief expenditure system. TRQs are accurately reflected 
through an MCP approach. The model is calibrated to a 2004-2006 average. 
In the following chapter, the results of different policy scenarios were dis-
cussed. The model results indicate that the liberalisation steps that the EU pro-
posed leads only to a very limited expansion of shipments of high quality beef 
from the Mercosur countries to the EU, which is mainly explained by the quota 
overfill in the base situation. Nevertheless, welfare is impacted due to changes in
the arising quota rent. Interestingly, the EU would be worse off under its own 
proposal. The same holds true for Uruguay, whereas the EU´s proposal proves to 
be advantageous for the other countries in the South American country group. 
Under the EU-proposal, substantive shares of the total welfare effects can be at-
tributed to changes in the quota rents arising from the high quality beef TRQs, 
and their distribution is decisive for the overall welfare effect in more than one 
country.
If the Mercosur countries were to achieve acceptance of their request in terms 
of access to the European beef markets, exports to the EU would be expanded by 
roughly 37 percent, leading to welfare gains for all countries except Uruguay. The 
relative importance of the quota rent is reduced under this hypothetical policy 
setting, but for Uruguay the change in the quota rent is still the determining factor 
for the direction of change of its welfare.
Interestingly, trade liberalisation based on the Mercosur-proposal is neither on 
national level nor for all economic agents in the Mercosur countries superior to 
the outcome of the liberalisation scenario based on the EU-proposal. Again, the 
quota rents are key among the factors that lead to this result. 
Though the changes to the analysed indicators vary with changes in the pa-
rameter values, most of the general findings are fairly robust to changes in the 
parameter values chosen. Exceptions to this are the total welfare effects for Uru-
guay, the ranking of the two policy options for Argentina and the binding element 
of the TRQ for Brazil under the Mercosur-proposal.
The results from the simulations are mostly in line with the ones from similar 
studies, at least in qualitative terms. Differences can be explained e.g. from differ-
ent policy scenario specifications, product coverage, base year data and assump-
tions on future developments of the agricultural markets. It is judged that the re-
sults of this study are not challenged by these differing findings.
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7.2 Limitations and further research areas
Though considerable effort has been made to capture the complexity of the re-
search question as precisely as possible, this could not always be achieved to a 
fully satisfying extent. 
First and foremost, as any empirical work, this study is subject to limitations in 
the availability of accurate data. The TRQs for high quality beef are defined at a 
more detailed level than the available trade data, and overlap with other preferen-
tial trading schemes are a challenge that could not be fully overcome in this study. 
The same holds true for the share of high quality beef that enters the EU as a fro-
zen product, a possibility that has not been accounted for in this study. Though 
the assumptions made were discussed with experts from the meat industry, they 
remain assumptions that are unlikely to fully replicate reality. As better data is 
unlikely to become available in the near future, calibrating the model to different 
data sets with alternative assumptions on the data aggregation and repeating the 
policy scenarios would help to judge on the sensitivity of the results to data is-
sues.
Another limitation relates to the values of the parameters. Empirically esti-
mated elasticities were not always available, and were certainly not estimated for 
the same level of product aggregation. In addition, the existing values were al-
tered to achieve consistency with the assumed economic behaviour. In some 
cases, this process led to values that deviate notably from their original ones, be-
cause a compromise between given values, consistency with the assumed micro-
economic behaviour and achieving a technical solution had to be made. Nonwith-
standing the sensitivity analysis that revealed the limited importance of the pa-
rameters to the overall findings of this study, an econometric estimation of the full 
set of elasticities including the constraints imposed by economic theory would 
provide value added. 
In the model, two-step budgeting was assumed. The underlying assumptions 
on consumers´ preferences may or may not appropriately reflect reality.
One could also challenge the model results on the grounds of the time horizon 
of the applied model. It is benchmarked to a 2004-2006 average, and does not 
include any projection into the future. This presents a constraint as beef produc-
tion in the EU is projected to decline in the coming years, and further reforms of 
the CAP foreseen for 2013 can be expected to enhance this development. The 
simulated policy changes are unlikely to be implemented in the near future. This 
may lead to a systematic over-estimation of the impact of the policy change on 
trade flows and welfare. On the other hand, technical progress over time could 
further improve productivity in the Mercosur countries, enabling them to export 
larger quantities to the European market than foreseen in this study. Incorporating 
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(different) forecasts into the analysis would be a way to narrow down the uncer-
tainties attached to the time horizon of the model.
Another point of criticism can be seen in the coverage of different policy sce-
narios. The negotiations did not only cover bilateral trade liberalisation, but also 
multilateral reductions of trade barriers in the context of an agreement in the 
WTO. The latter has sometimes been advocated as the policy option with more 
prospects of becoming reality, but is not analysed here. Another scenario could be 
run to see the impact of combined multilateral and bilateral reduction of trade 
barriers, but it was judged that the current model setup in terms of country and 
commodity space is not adequate for answering questions of multilateral trade 
liberalisation. 
This leads to another shortcoming of the employed model. The product cover-
age limits the validity of the quantitative analysis. Services and trade of other 
(agricultural) goods have been completely ignored in this study. One of the dis-
tinctive features of the agricultural sector are the close and complex relations of 
different sub-sectors. On the production side, corn as a feed input has been men-
tioned earlier in this study. On the demand side, pork and poultry as substitutes 
for beef are likely to play a role. The latter have been captured to some degree in 
this analysis, and the magnitude of the former is probably not very relevant for the 
research question here. Other studies have underlined the limited impact of the 
proposed liberalisation steps to these other commodities. Nevertheless, an as-
sessment of the impact on beef in a more comprehensive framework would be 
preferable. But it is questionable in how far it is feasible to capture all the neces-
sary detail of the meat sector while at the same time covering the whole range of 
other commodities and services from which economic spill-over effects or welfare 
changes can be expected.
7.3 Conclusions
The overall objective of this study was to assess the economic impact of beef 
trade liberalisation scenarios between the EU and the Mercosur countries. On this 
subject, the main findings can be summarised as follows:
− The rents arising from the high quality beef TRQs allocated to the 
Mercosur countries are fully captured by the exporting country.
− The rents from the multilateral frozen beef TRQs are fully captured by 
importers in the EU.
− The impact on trade is limited under the provisions set out in the pro-
posal the EU made. However, welfare is affected as redistribution of 
tariff revenues to quota rents takes place.
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− The impact on trade is more pronounced under the proposal made by 
the Mercosur countries and would lead to de facto free trade for Ar-
gentina and Uruguay.
− The quota rents are reduced in the scenarios based on the Merco-
sur-proposal, making this policy option less attractive than the 
EU-proposal for some economic agents.
− With some exceptions, the results are robust againts changes in the pa-
rameter values. 
The analysis has confirmed the hypothesis that the quota rents and their distri-
bution can be decisive for the assessment of the overall economic gains or losses 
to be realised when barriers to trade are reduced. Any evaluation that falls short of 
taking this sub-item of total welfare into account runs the risk of seriously misin-
terpreting the economic consequences of the change in trade policies.
If the preference giving country pursues certain political or development goals 
by establishing TRQs, it should carefully check the prevailing market structure 
and tailor the quota administration process accordingly. 
The modelling results differ from the ones found in studies applying models 
working at a higher level of product aggregation. This underlines the value that a 
model operating at a product definition as close as possible to the one found in 
real economy can add. 
From a methodological point of view, setting up a bilateral trade model by dif-
ferentiating products explicitly by country of origin (instead of recurring to the 
Armington approach) is feasible and produces satisfactory results. At the same 
time, the resulting number of model equations, variables and parameters is large. 
The calibration of the resulting system is challenging and not always satisfactory, 
and the possibility of expanding the commodity coverage to other sectors is likely 
to reach its limits fairly quickly. The approach seems to be suitable for research 
questions where a low level of product aggregation is desired, but at the same 
time economic spill-over effects from other sectors are limited either because of 
the nature of the product under study, or the political change envisaged. 
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ANNEX I DATA AND PARAMETERS
Table A 1 Mapping of trade data to meat qualities
Product Source
fresh beef, high quality Argentina 02013000 02061095 020130  020610
Brazil 02013000 02061096 020130  020610
Uruguay 02013000 02061098 020130  020610
Rest-of-World 02013000 02061099 020130  020610
02021000 020210
02022010 020220
02022030
02022050
02022090
02023010 020230
02023050
02023090
02062991 020629
02012020 020120
02012030
02012050
02012090
02061091 020610
02061099
02062100 020621
02062200 020622
02062910 020629
Combined Nomenclature 
(CN 8)
Harmonised System 
(HS)
frozen beef
fresh beef, other quality
iii
Table A 2 Base data EU
Country Item Product Actor Raw data Balanced data Absolute difference Percentage difference
alive cattle, high quality (a) farmers 5,932,001 5,954,398 22,397 0.4
alive cattle, other quality (a´) farmers 1,996,163 1,990,015 1,990,015 -0.3
fresh beef, high quality (b) slaughterhouse 530,915 532,920 2,005 0.4
fresh beef, other quality (b) slaughterhouse 7,397,249 7,411,493 14,245 0.2
frozen beef c) deep freezing unit 929,161 932,463 3,302 0.4
alive cattle, high quality (d) slaughterhouse 5,932,001 5,954,398 22,397 0.4
alive cattle, other quality (d) slaughterhouse 1,996,163 1,990,015 -6,148 -0.3
fresh beef, other quality (e) deep freezing unit 929,161 932,463 3,302 0.4
fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) (f) consumers 54,052 53,391 -661 -1.2
fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) (f) consumers 157 0 -157 -100.0
frozen beef (from Argentina) (f) consumers 8,420 8,420 0 0.0
fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) (f) consumers 73,625 71,391 -2,234 -3.0
fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) (f) consumers 58 0 -58 -100.0
frozen beef (from Brazil) (f) consumers 100,178 100,177 -1 0.0
fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) (f) consumers 11,610 11,862 252 2.2
fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) (f) consumers 2,591 2,584 -7 -0.3
frozen beef (from Uruguay) (f) consumers 8,358 8,355 -3 0.0
fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) (f) consumers 20,051 20,051 0 0.0
fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) (f) consumers 4,988 4,988 0 0.0
frozen beef (from Rest-of-Worldl) (f) consumers 7,867 7,870 3 0.0
fresh beef, high quality (from EU) (g) consumers 514,413 500,423 -13,990 -2.7
fresh beef, other quality (from EU) (g) consumers 7,507,044 6,410,040 -1,097,005 -14.6
frozen beef (from EU) (g) consumers 855,361 835,493 -19,868 -2.3
Country of origin Product Trade regime
Uruguay (h) fresh beef, high quality in-quota 6,300 6,300 0 0.0
Uruguay (h) fresh beef, high quality over-quota 5,310 5,562 252 4.7
Uruguay (h) fresh beef, other quality 2,591 2,584 -7 -0.3
Uruguay (h) frozen beef in-quota 6,965 6,965 0 0.0
Uruguay (h) frozen beef over-quota 1,393 1,390 -3 -0.2
Argentina (h) fresh beef, high quality in-quota 28,000 28,000 0 0.0
Argentina (h) fresh beef, high quality over-quota 26,052 25,391 -661 -2.5
Argentina (h) fresh beef, other quality 157 0 -157 -100.0
Argentina (h) frozen beef in-quota 7,017 7,017 0 0.0
Argentina (h) frozen beef over-quota 1,403 1,403 0 0.0
Brazil (h) fresh beef, high quality in-quota 5,000 5,000 0 0.0
Brazil (h) fresh beef, high quality over-quota 68,625 66,391 -2,234 -3.3
Brazil (h) fresh beef, other quality 58 0 -58 -100.0
Brazil (h) frozen beef in-quota 83,486 83,486 0 0.0
Brazil (h) frozen beef over-quota 16,692 16,690 -1 0.0
Rest-of-World (h) fresh beef, high quality in-quota Eps 0 Eps 0.0
Rest-of-World (h) fresh beef, high quality over-quota 20,051 20,051 0 0.0
Rest-of-World (h) fresh beef, other quality 4,988 4,988 0 0.0
Rest-of-World (h) frozen beef in-quota 6,556 6,556 0 0.0
Rest-of-World (h) frozen beef over-quota 1,311 1,314 3 0.2
E
U
production (t)
processing demand (t)
imports (t)
consumption (t)
Legend: See after Table A 6
iv
Table A 3 Base data Uruguay
Country Item Product Actor Raw data Balanced data
Absolute 
difference
Percentage 
difference
alive cattle, high quality (i) farmers 583,716 447,928 -135,788 -23.3
alive cattle, other quality (i´) farmers 15,472 15,423 -49 -0.3
fresh beef, high quality (j) slaughterhouse 63,392 48,646 -14,747 -23.3
fresh beef, other quality (j) slaughterhouse 535,796 414,706 -121,090 -22.6
frozen beef (k) deep freezing unit 244,997 229,093 -15,904 -6.5
alive cattle, high quality (d) slaughterhouse 583,716 447,928 -135,788 -23.3
alive cattle, other quality (d) slaughterhouse 15,472 15,423 -49 -0.3
fresh beef, other quality e) deep freezing unit 244,997 229,093 -15,904 -6.5
consumption (t) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) (l) consumers 497 0 -497 -100.0
frozen beef (from Argentina) (l) consumers 21 0 -21 -100.0
fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) (l) consumers 2,566 2,561 -5 -0.2
frozen beef (from Brazil) (l) consumers 250 0 -250 -100.0
fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) (v) consumers 27,443 33,844 6,401 23.3
fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) (v) consumers 224,065 168,610 -55,455 -24.7
frozen beef (from EU) (f) consumers 0 0 0 0.0
imports (t) Country of origin Product
EU (h) frozen beef 0 0 0 0.0
Argentina (m) fresh beef, high quality 497 0 -497 0.0
Argentina (m) frozen beef 21 0 -21 -100.0
Brazil (m) fresh beef, high quality 2,566 2,561 -5 -0.2
Brazil (m) frozen beef 250 0 -250 -100.0
production (t)
processing demand (t)
U
ru
gu
ay
Legend: See after Table A 6
vTable A 4 Base data Argentina
Country Item Product Actor Raw data Balanced data
Absolute 
difference
Percentage 
difference
alive cattle, high quality (n) farmers 2,261,038 2,440,700 179,662 7.9
alive cattle, other quality (n´) farmers 801,962 793,636 -8,325 -1.0
fresh beef, high quality (o) slaughterhouse 258,109 278,619 20,509 7.9
fresh beef, other quality (o) slaughterhouse 2,804,891 2,955,718 150,827 5.4
frozen beef (k) deep freezing unit 316,786 315,571 -1,216 -0.4
alive cattle, high quality (d) slaughterhouse 2,261,038 2,440,700 179,662 7.9
alive cattle, other quality (d) slaughterhouse 801,962 793,636 -8,325 -1.0
fresh beef, other quality e) deep freezing unit 316,786 315,571 -1,216 -0.4
consumption (t) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) (p) consumers 413,834 220,916 -192,918 -46.6
fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) (p) consumers 3,036,781 2,578,609 -458,171 -15.1
fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) (l) consumers 6 0 -6 -100.0
fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) (l) consumers 75 0 -75 -100.0
frozen beef (from Brazil) (l) consumers 76 0 -76 -100.0
fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) (l) consumers 2,673 2,665 -7 -0.3
frozen beef (from Uruguay) (l) consumers 119 0 -119 -100.0
fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) (l) consumers 69 0 -69 -100.0
frozen beef (from Rest-of-Worldl) (l) consumers 234 0 -234 -100.0
frozen beef (from EU) (f) consumers 4 0 -4 -100.0
Country of origin Product
imports (t) EU (h) frozen beef 4 0 -4 -100.0
Uruguay (m) fresh beef, other quality 2,673 2,665 -7 -0.3
Uruguay (m) frozen beef 119 0 -119 -100.0
Brazil (m) fresh beef, high quality 6 0 -6 -100.0
Brazil (m) fresh beef, other quality 75 0 -75 -100.0
Brazil (m) frozen beef 76 0 -76 -100.0
Rest-of-World (m) fresh beef, other quality 69 0 -69 -100.0
Rest-of-World (m) frozen beef 234 0 -234 -100.0
A
rg
en
tin
a
production (t)
processing demand (t)
Legend: See after Table A 6
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Table A 5 Base data Brazil
Country Item Product Actor Raw data Balanced data
Absolute 
difference
Percentage 
difference
alive cattle, high quality (q) farmers 3,421,942 3,622,444 200,502 5.9
alive cattle, other quality (q´) farmers 2,933,300 2,779,027 -154,273 -5.3
fresh beef, high quality (s) slaughterhouse 331,916 351,364 19,448 5.9
fresh beef, other quality (s) slaughterhouse 6,023,326 6,050,108 26,782 0.4
frozen beef (k) deep freezing unit 1,068,456 1,065,985 -2,470 -0.2
alive cattle, high quality (d) slaughterhouse 3,421,942 3,622,444 200,502 5.9
alive cattle, other quality (d) slaughterhouse 2,933,300 2,779,027 -154,273 -5.3
fresh beef, other quality e) deep freezing unit 1,068,456 1,065,985 -2,470 -0.2
fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) (l) consumers 4,327 4,312 -16 -0.4
fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) (l) consumers 5,279 5,278 -1 0.0
frozen beef (from Argentina) (l) consumers 3,662 3,662 0 0.0
fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) (w) consumers 695,254 277,412 -417,843 -60.1
fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) (x) consumers 5,150,547 4,918,124 -232,423 -4.5
frozen beef (from Brazil) (l) consumers 0 0 0 0.0
fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) (l) consumers 2,880 2,940 60 2.1
fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) (l) consumers 3,733 3,721 -12 -0.3
frozen beef (from Uruguay) (l) consumers 2,105 2,102 -3 -0.1
fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) (l) consumers 0 0 0 -100.0
frozen beef (from Rest-of-Worldl) (l) consumers 974 0 -974 -100.0
fresh beef, high quality (from EU) (f) consumers 10 0 -10 -100.0
frozen beef (from EU) (f) consumers 22 0 -22 -100.0
Country of origin Product
imports (t) EU (h) fresh beef, high quality 10 0 -10 -100.0
EU (h) frozen beef 22 0 -22 -100.0
Uruguay (m) fresh beef, high quality 2,880 2,940 60 2.1
Uruguay (m) fresh beef, other quality 3,733 3,721 -12 -0.3
Uruguay (m) frozen beef 2,105 2,102 -3 -0.1
Argentina (m) fresh beef, high quality 4,327 4,312 -16 -0.4
Argentina (m) fresh beef, other quality 5,279 5,278 -1 0.0
Argentina (m) frozen beef 3,662 3,662 0 0.0
Rest-of-World (m) fresh beef, other quality 0 0 0 -100.0
Rest-of-World (m) frozen beef 974 0 -974 -100.0
consumption (t)
production (t)
processing demand (t)
B
ra
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l
Legend: See after Table A 6
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Table A 6 Base data Rest-of-World
Country Item Product Actor Raw data Balanced data
Absolute 
difference
Percentage 
difference
alive cattle, high quality (t) farmers 37,136,288 36,888,594 -247,694 -0.7
alive cattle, other quality (t´) farmers 5,082,735 5,072,430 -10,304 -0.2
fresh beef, high quality (u) slaughterhouse 3,594,793 3,570,816 -23,977 -0.7
fresh beef, other quality (u) slaughterhouse 38,624,230 38,390,209 -234,022 -0.6
frozen beef (k) deep freezing unit 2,158,337 734,980 -1,423,357 -65.9
alive cattle, high quality (d) slaughterhouse 37,136,288 36,888,594 -247,694 -0.7
alive cattle, other quality (d) slaughterhouse 5,082,735 5,072,430 -10,304 -0.2
fresh beef, other quality e) deep freezing unit 2,158,337 734,980 -1,423,357 -65.9
fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) (l) consumers 56,342 56,261 -82 -0.1
frozen beef (from Argentina) (l) consumers 304,684 303,489 -1,195 -0.4
fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) (l) consumers 66,018 65,998 -20 0.0
frozen beef (from Brazil) (l) consumers 967,892 965,809 -2,083 -0.2
fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) (l) consumers 8,077 8,032 -45 -0.6
frozen beef (from Uruguay) (l) consumers 234,407 218,637 -15,770 -6.7
fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) (y) consumers 3,574,742 3,550,765 -23,976 -0.7
fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) (y) consumers 38,619,173 37,650,241 -968,933 -2.5
frozen beef (from Rest-of-Worldl) (l) consumers 545,178 727,109 181,932 33.4
fresh beef, high quality (from EU) (f) consumers 32,526 32,497 -30 -0.1
fresh beef, other quality (from EU) (f) consumers 69,038 68,990 -48 -0.1
frozen beef (from EU) (f) consumers 97,101 96,970 -130 -0.1
Country of origin Product
imports (t) EU (h) fresh beef, high quality 32,526 32,497 -30 -0.1
EU (h) fresh beef, other quality 69,038 68,990 -48 -0.1
EU (h) frozen beef 97,101 96,970 -130 -0.1
Uruguay (m) fresh beef, other quality 8,077 8,032 -45 -0.6
Uruguay (m) frozen beef 234,407 218,637 -15,770 -6.7
Argentina (m) fresh beef, other quality 56,342 56,261 -82 -0.1
Argentina (m) frozen beef 304,684 303,489 -1,195 -0.4
Brazil (m) fresh beef, other quality 66,018 65,998 -20 0.0
Brazil (m) frozen beef 967,892 965,809 -2,083 -0.2
R
es
t-
of
-W
or
ld
consumption (t)
production (t)
processing demand (t)
Legend: See next page
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(a) EUROSTAT (n. d.b), calculation: Slaughter numbers of bullocks, bulls and heifers (head) x carcass weight 
(a´) EUROSTAT (n. d.b), calculation: Slaughter numbers of cows (head) x carcass weight
(b) EUROSTAT (n. d.b), calculation: Slaughter numbers (head) x carcass weight x leontief coefficient
(c) EUROSTAT, n. d.b
(d) Calculation: Equalised to production of live animals
(e) Calculation: Equalised to production of frozen beef
(f) EUROSTAT (n.d.a), calculation: Equalised to imports
(g) EUROSTAT (n. d.b), calculation: Total consumption - imports
(h) EUROSTAT (n.d.a): Aggregation see Table A 1
(i) INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE CARNES (n.d.), calculation: Slaughter numbers of young bulls (novillos) and cows (head) x carcass weight
(i´) INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE CARNES (n.d.), calculation: Slaughter numbers of bulls and calves (head) x carcass weight
(j) INSTITUTO NACIONAL DE CARNES (n.d.), calculation: Slaughter numbers (head) x carcass weight x leontief coefficient
(k) UNITED NATIONS (n.d.), calculation: Equalised to exports
(l) UNITED NATIONS (n.d.), calculation: Equalised to imports
(m) UNITED NATIONS (n.d.), calculation: Aggregation see table Table A 1
(n) SECRETARÍA DE AGRICULTURA GANADERÍA  PESCA Y ALIMENTOS (n.d.), calculation: Total slaughter production (CW) x share of young bulls (novillos) and cows
(n´) SECRETARÍA DE AGRICULTURA GANADERÍA  PESCA Y ALIMENTOS (n.d.), calculation: Total slaughter production (CW) x share of calves and bulls
(o) SECRETARÍA DE AGRICULTURA GANADERÍA  PESCA Y ALIMENTOS (n.d.), calculation: Total slaughter production (CW) x share of animal type x leontief coefficient
(p) SECRETARÍA DE AGRICULTURA (2006), WORLD BANK, (n.d.), calculation: Per capita consumption x population x consumption share from Brazil
(q) INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATÍSTICA (n. d.a), calculation: Slaughter production of young bulls (novilhos) (CW)
(q´) INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATÍSTICA (n. d.a), calculation: Slaughter production of cows, calves and bulls (CW)
(s) INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFIA E ESTATÍSTICA (n. d.a), calculation: Slaughter production (CW) x leontief coefficient
(t) FAO (n.d.), USDA (2006), calculation: World slaughter production (CW) x share of steers, bulls and heifers - production EU, Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil
(t´) FAO (n.d.), USDA (2006), calculation: World slaughter production (CW) x share of cows - production EU, Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil
(u) FAO (n.d.), USDA (2006), calculation: World slaughter production (CW) x share of cows - production EU, Uruguay, Argentina, Brazil) x leontief coefficient
(v) OECD (n.d.), WORLD BANK (n.d.): Per capita consumption x population x consumption share from Brazil
(w) INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFÍA E ESTATÍSTICA (n.d.b), WORLD BANK (n.d.): Consumption of tenderloin, (alactrá, filet mignon, Contrafilé)
(x) INSTITUTO BRASILEIRO DE GEOGRAFÍA E ESTATÍSTICA, n. d.b), WORLD BANK (n.d.): Consumption of 21 other meat cuts 
(y) Residual from market balance
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Table A 7 Price data
Farm price
Wholesale price (Export Unit 
value/Import Unit value)
fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 9,567 13,833
frozen beef (from Argentina) 5,584 8,039
fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 8,272 13,002
frozen beef (from Brazil) 5,248 8,181
fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 9,602 15,093
fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 6,400 9,976
frozen beef (from Uruguay) 6,350 9,899
fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 8,739 13,736
fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 5,283 8,235
frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 4,089 6,375
alive cattle, high quality (a) 2,673
alive cattle, other quality (a´) 2,208
fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 7,100 11,160 (b)
fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 4,189 6,530 (b´)
frozen beef (from the EU) 2,920 4,552
fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 4,162 2,327
alive cattle, high quality c) 1,310
alive cattle, other quality (c´) 1,190
fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 5,510 3,080 (d)
fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 3,637 2,040 (d´)
frozen beef (from Uruguay) 3,657
alive cattle, high quality e) 1,150
alive cattle, other quality (e´) 950
fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 4,823 2,580 (f)
fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 3,811 2,030 (f´)
frozen beef (from Argentina) 2,382
fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 3,637 1,937
fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 5,547 4,508
fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 4,382 4,011
frozen beef (from Argentina) 2,739 2,484
alive cattle, high quality (g) 788
alive cattle, other quality (g´) 651
fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 4,162 3,890 (h)
fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 2,622 2,760 (h´)
frozen beef (from Brazil) 2,447
fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 5,510 5,150
fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 3,637 3,828
frozen beef (from Uruguay) 3,657 3,813
fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 4,382 7,083
frozen beef (from Argentina) 2,739 6,976
fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 2,622 4,874
frozen beef (from Brazil) 2,447 7,166
fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 3,637 6,759
frozen beef (from Uruguay) 3,657 10,709
alive cattle, high quality i) 2,450
alive cattle, other quality (i´) 1,568
fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 5,057 9,400 (j)
fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 2,959 5,500 (j´)
frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 1,901 5,567
fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 7,100 13,197
fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 4,189 7,786
frozen beef (from the EU) 2,920 8,551
Brazil
Rest-of-World
Consumer price
Euro/Tonne
EU
Uruguay
Argentina
Legend: see next page
x(a) EU beef producer price at farm gate (OECD, n. d.)
(a´) Calculation based on (a) and the price ratio in the U.S.
(b) Calculation based on (b´) and price ratio in the U.S.
(b´) Hamburg central market roast beef (ZENTRALE MARKT- UND PREISBERICHTSSTELLE, n.d.)
(c) Average of novillos gordos exportacion (especiales, buenos, generales), vaquillonas gordas (especiales, buenas) (MINISTERIO DE 
GANADERÍA, AGRICULTURA Y PESCA(2004), MINISTERIO DE GANADERÍA, AGRICULTURA Y PESCA (2005), MINISTERIO DE GANADERIA,
AGRICULTURA Y PESCA (2006))
(c´) Average of novillos abasto (especiales, buenos), vacas gordas (especiales, buenas, generales), toros gordos, novillos gordos 
indústria, vacas manufactura alta (MINISTERIO DE GANADERÍA, AGRICULTURA Y PESCA (2004), MINISTERIO DE GANADERÍA,
AGRICULTURA Y PESCA (2005), MINISTERIO DE GANADERIA, AGRICULTURA Y PESCA, (2006))
(d) Topside or rump (nalga o quadríl) (MINISTERIO DE GANADERIA, AGRICULTURA Y PESCA, 2007)
(d´) Chuck (aguja de primera) (MINISTERIO DE GANADERIA, AGRICULTURA Y PESCA, 2007)
(e) Average price of young bulls and cows (novillos, novillitos, vaquillonas), Liniers cattle market quotation (MERCADO DE LINIERS, n.d.)
(e´) Average price of cows and bulls (vacas, toros y torunos), Liniers cattle market quotation (MERCADO DE LINIERS, n.d.)
(f) Average price of topsides and rump (nalga and quadril) (SECRETARÍA DE AGRICULTURA GANADERÍA, PESCA Y ALIMENTOS, 2006)
(f´) Average price of roast, minced meat, shoulder, golden coin (asado, carne picada, paleta, bife angosto) (SECRETARÍA DE 
AGRICULTURA GANADERÍA, PESCA Y ALIMENTOS, 2006)
(g) Calculation based on FAO livestock prices and price ratio observed in Argentina (FAO, n.d.)
(g´) Calculation based on FAO livestock prices and price ratio observed in Argentina (FAO, n.d.)
(h) Average price of tenderloin, sirloin and rump (filet mignon, contra filet, alcatra) (SCOT CONSULTORIA, n.d.)
(h´) Average price of needle point, hump, thin skirt, shoulder, brisket, rump cap, parts of topsides (costela, cumpim, fraldinha, patela, 
peito, picanha, coxao mole, coxao duro) (SCOT CONSULTORIA, n.d.)
(i) Nebraska choice steers (OECD, n.d.)
(i´) Calculation based on (i) and USDA price data (USDA, 2006)
(j) Average price of steak and sirloin (ERS-USDA, n.d.)
(j´) Average price of ground chuck, ground beef, chuck roast, round roast, boneless beef for stew (ERS-USDA, n.d.)
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Table A 8 Elasticities of supply
Actor Raw data Balanced data
Absolute 
difference
Percentage 
difference Source
EU alive cattle, high quality alive cattle, high quality farmers 0.93 0.91 -0.02 -2.5 World Food Model*
alive cattle, other quality farmers -0.20 -0.10 0.10 -50.0
other animals farmers -0.04 -0.04
alive cattle, high quality slaughter houses 0.93 0.95 0.02 2.4 World Food Model*
alive cattle, other quality slaughter houses -0.20 -0.10 0.10 -50.0
alive cattle, other quality alive cattle, high quality farmers -0.20 -0.36 -0.16 81.1
alive cattle, other quality farmers 0.93 0.91 -0.02 -2.5 World Food Model*
other animals farmers -0.13 -0.13
alive cattle, high quality slaughter houses -0.20 -0.27 -0.07 34.2
alive cattle, other quality slaughter houses 0.93 0.95 0.02 2.4 World Food Model*
fresh beef, other quality fresh beef, other quality deep freezing unit 0.30 0.30 0.30
other animals alive cattle, high quality farmers -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -35.8
alive cattle, other quality farmers -0.02 -0.01 0.01 -35.8
other animals farmers 1.02 1.03 0.01 0.7 World Food Model*
Uruguay alive cattle, high quality alive cattle, high quality farmers 1.66 0.97 -0.69 -41.6 Cap et al. (2007)*
alive cattle, other quality farmers -0.20 -0.01 0.19 -96.7
other animals farmers 0.00 0.00
alive cattle, high quality slaughter houses 1.66 1.02 -0.64 -38.7 Cap et al. (2007)*
alive cattle, other quality slaughter houses -0.20 -0.02 0.18 -91.0
alive cattle, other quality alive cattle, high quality farmers -0.20 -0.21 -0.01 5.5
alive cattle, other quality farmers 1.66 1.47 -0.19 -11.5 Cap et al. (2007)*
other animals farmers -0.26 -0.26
alive cattle, high quality slaughter houses -0.20 -0.54 -0.34 171.5
alive cattle, other quality slaughter houses 1.66 1.54 -0.12 -7.0 Cap et al. (2007)*
fresh beef, other quality fresh beef, other quality deep freezing unit 0.30 0.30
other animals alive cattle, high quality farmers -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.0
alive cattle, other quality farmers -0.02 -0.05 -0.03 134.1
other animals farmers 0.70 0.69 0.00 0.0 World Food Model*
* Same values were used for different qualities and stages of processing
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Table A 8 Elasticities of supply (continued)
Actor Raw data Balanced data
Absolute 
difference
Percentage 
difference Source
Argentina alive cattle, high quality alive cattle, high quality farmers 0.52 0.51 -0.01 -2.5 Cap et al. (2007)*
alive cattle, other quality farmers -0.20 -0.10 0.10 -50.0
other animals farmers -0.01 -0.01
alive cattle, high quality slaughter houses 0.52 0.53 0.01 2.4 Cap et al. (2007)*
alive cattle, other quality slaughter houses -0.20 -0.10 0.10 -50.0
alive cattle, other quality alive cattle, high quality farmers -0.20 -0.37 -0.17 86.1
alive cattle, other quality farmers 0.52 0.51 -0.01 -2.5 Cap et al. (2007)*
other animals farmers -0.05 -0.05
alive cattle, high quality slaughter houses -0.20 -0.30 -0.10 49.2
alive cattle, other quality slaughter houses 0.52 0.53 0.01 2.4 Cap et al. (2007)*
fresh beef, other quality fresh beef, other quality deep freezing unit 0.30 0.30
other animals alive cattle, high quality farmers -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.0
alive cattle, other quality farmers -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.0
other animals farmers 0.87 0.87 0.00 0.0 World Food Model*
Brazil alive cattle, high quality alive cattle, high quality farmers 1.01 0.98 -0.03 -2.5 Cap et al. (2007)*
alive cattle, other quality farmers -0.20 -0.15 0.05 -26.1
other animals farmers -0.03 -0.03
alive cattle, high quality slaughter houses 1.01 1.03 0.02 2.4 Cap et al. (2007)*
alive cattle, other quality slaughter houses -0.20 -0.17 0.03 -15.0
alive cattle, other quality alive cattle, high quality farmers -0.20 -0.23 -0.03 16.6
alive cattle, other quality farmers 1.01 0.98 -0.03 -2.5 Cap et al. (2007)*
other animals farmers -0.05 -0.05
alive cattle, high quality slaughter houses -0.20 -0.22 -0.02 11.5
alive cattle, other quality slaughter houses 1.01 1.03 0.02 2.4 Cap et al. (2007)*
fresh beef, other quality fresh beef, other quality deep freezing unit 0.30 0.30
other animals alive cattle, high quality farmers -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.0
alive cattle, other quality farmers -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.0
other animals farmers 0.85 0.85 0.00 0.0 World Food Model*
* Same values were used for different qualities and stages of processing
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Table A 8 Elasticities of supply (continued)
Actor Raw data Balanced data
Absolute 
difference
Percentage 
difference Source
Rest-of-World alive cattle, high quality alive cattle, high quality farmers 0.78 0.76 -0.02 -2.5 Cap et al. (2007)*
alive cattle, other quality farmers -0.20 -0.10 0.10 -50.0
alive cattle, high quality slaughter houses 0.78 0.80 0.02 2.4 Cap et al. (2007)*
alive cattle, other quality slaughter houses -0.20 -0.10 0.10 -50.0
alive cattle, other quality alive cattle, high quality farmers -0.20 -1.14 -0.94 468.2
alive cattle, other quality farmers 0.78 1.14 0.36 45.7 Cap et al. (2007)*
alive cattle, high quality slaughter houses -0.20 -0.37 -0.17 86.2
alive cattle, other quality slaughter houses 0.78 1.19 0.41 53.0 Cap et al. (2007)*
fresh beef, other quality fresh beef, other quality deep freezing unit 0.30 0.30
other animals alive cattle, high quality farmers -0.02 0.02 -100.0
alive cattle, other quality farmers -0.02 0.02 -100.0
other animals farmers 0.94 1.00 0.06 7.0 World Food Model*
* Same values were used for different qualities and stages of processing
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Table A 9 Elasticities of demand (legend see end of table)
Raw data Calibrated data Absolute difference Percentage difference Source
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) -0.66 -0.66 0.00 0.0 WFM
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.66 0.59 -0.07 -11.3 calculation 2)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.66 0.10 -0.56 -85.5 calculation 2)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.66 0.16 -0.50 -75.9 calculation 2)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.66 0.57 -0.09 -14.1 calculation 2)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.04 0.05 0.01 17.9 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) other meat (from Argentina) 0.19 0.00 -0.19 -98.2 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) other meat (from Brazil) 0.19 0.02 -0.17 -91.9 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.19 0.00 -0.19 -99.7 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.19 0.07 -0.12 -60.8 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) other meat (from the EU) 0.19 0.05 -0.14 -73.6 WFM 1)
EU frozen beef (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -85.6 calculation 1)
EU frozen beef (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Argentina) -0.66 -0.66 0.00 0.0 WFM
EU frozen beef (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -82.0 calculation 1)
EU frozen beef (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.66 0.34 -0.32 -48.0 calculation 2)
EU frozen beef (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -96.5 calculation 1)
EU frozen beef (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.9
EU frozen beef (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.66 0.33 -0.33 -50.5 calculation 2)
EU frozen beef (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -94.6 calculation 1)
EU frozen beef (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.2
EU frozen beef (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.66 0.23 -0.43 -65.3 calculation 2)
EU frozen beef (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.04 0.04 0.00 8.6 calculation 1)
EU frozen beef (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.20 0.34 0.14 67.5
EU frozen beef (from Argentina) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.66 0.30 -0.36 -54.1 calculation 2)
EU frozen beef (from Argentina) other meat (from Argentina) 0.19 0.02 -0.17 -89.2 WFM 1)
EU frozen beef (from Argentina) other meat (from Brazil) 0.19 0.00 -0.19 -99.9 WFM 1)
EU frozen beef (from Argentina) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.19 0.01 -0.18 -97.2 WFM 1)
EU frozen beef (from Argentina) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.19 0.00 -0.19 -99.5 WFM 1)
EU frozen beef (from Argentina) other meat (from the EU) 0.19 0.34 0.15 77.0 WFM 1)
xv
Raw data Calibrated data Absolute difference Percentage difference Source
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.66 0.47 -0.19 -29.4 calculation 2)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) -0.66 -0.66 0.00 0.0 WFM
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.66 0.08 -0.58 -88.4 calculation 2)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.66 0.13 -0.53 -80.3 calculation 2)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.66 0.68 0.02 2.5 calculation 2)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.04 0.05 0.01 17.9 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) other meat (from Argentina) 0.19 0.00 -0.19 -98.6 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) other meat (from Brazil) 0.19 0.01 -0.18 -93.3 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.19 0.00 -0.19 -99.8 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.19 0.07 -0.12 -64.1 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) other meat (from the EU) 0.19 0.12 -0.07 -38.2 WFM 1)
EU frozen beef (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -83.6 calculation 1)
EU frozen beef (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.66 0.03 -0.63 -95.7 calculation 2)
EU frozen beef (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -79.4 calculation 1)
EU frozen beef (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Brazil) -0.66 -0.66 0.00 0.0 WFM
EU frozen beef (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -96.0 calculation 1)
EU frozen beef (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -98.9
EU frozen beef (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.66 0.04 -0.62 -94.3 calculation 2)
EU frozen beef (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -93.9 calculation 1)
EU frozen beef (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.01 -0.19 -97.1
EU frozen beef (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.66 0.02 -0.64 -97.2 calculation 2)
EU frozen beef (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.04 0.04 0.01 24.0 calculation 1)
EU frozen beef (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.20 0.38 0.18 87.7
EU frozen beef (from Brazil) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.66 0.77 0.11 16.2 calculation 2)
EU frozen beef (from Brazil) other meat (from Argentina) 0.19 0.00 -0.19 -98.3 WFM 1)
EU frozen beef (from Brazil) other meat (from Brazil) 0.19 0.02 -0.17 -91.8 WFM 1)
EU frozen beef (from Brazil) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.19 0.00 -0.19 -99.7 WFM 1)
EU frozen beef (from Brazil) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.19 0.09 -0.10 -54.9 WFM 1)
EU frozen beef (from Brazil) other meat (from the EU) 0.19 0.38 0.19 98.4 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.66 0.39 -0.27 -40.4 calculation 2)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.66 0.40 -0.26 -40.0 calculation 2)
xvi
Raw data Calibrated data Absolute difference Percentage difference Source
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) -0.66 -0.66 0.00 0.0 WFM
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.66 0.35 -0.31 -47.2 calculation 2)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.66 0.32 -0.34 -51.7 calculation 2)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.04 0.05 0.01 17.9 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) other meat (from Argentina) 0.19 0.01 -0.18 -93.8 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) other meat (from Brazil) 0.19 0.03 -0.15 -81.6 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.19 0.00 -0.19 -98.9 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.19 0.00 -0.19 -100.0 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) other meat (from the EU) 0.19 0.05 -0.14 -73.6 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -81.6 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.8
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -76.9 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.20 0.07 -0.13 -65.8
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -95.5 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) -0.50 -0.50 0.00 0.0
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.01 -0.19 -92.9
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -93.1 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.66 0.63 -0.03 -4.6 calculation 2)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.9
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.04 0.05 0.01 39.1 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.66 0.52 -0.14 -20.8 calculation 2)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.20 0.06 -0.14 -68.2
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) other meat (from Argentina) 0.19 0.08 -0.11 -57.1 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) other meat (from Brazil) 0.19 0.10 -0.09 -46.1 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.19 0.02 -0.17 -91.6 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.19 0.07 -0.12 -60.9 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) other meat (from the EU) 0.19 0.42 0.23 119.4 WFM 1)
EU frozen beef (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -85.5 calculation 1)
EU frozen beef (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.66 0.27 -0.39 -59.5 calculation 2)
EU frozen beef (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -81.8 calculation 1)
EU frozen beef (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.66 0.37 -0.29 -43.4 calculation 2)
EU frozen beef (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -96.5 calculation 1)
EU frozen beef (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -97.8
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Raw data Calibrated data Absolute difference Percentage difference Source
EU frozen beef (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Uruguay) -0.66 -0.66 0.00 0.0 WFM
EU frozen beef (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -94.6 calculation 1)
EU frozen beef (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.01 -0.19 -93.6
EU frozen beef (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.66 0.20 -0.46 -69.7 calculation 2)
EU frozen beef (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.04 0.04 0.00 9.4 calculation 1)
EU frozen beef (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.20 0.34 0.14 68.6
EU frozen beef (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.66 0.32 -0.34 -50.8 calculation 2)
EU frozen beef (from Uruguay) other meat (from Argentina) 0.19 0.02 -0.17 -89.2 WFM 1)
EU frozen beef (from Uruguay) other meat (from Brazil) 0.19 0.02 -0.17 -89.6 WFM 1)
EU frozen beef (from Uruguay) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.19 0.00 -0.18 -97.6 WFM 1)
EU frozen beef (from Uruguay) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.19 0.00 -0.19 -99.4 WFM 1)
EU frozen beef (from Uruguay) other meat (from the EU) 0.19 0.34 0.15 78.2 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.66 0.43 -0.23 -35.3 calculation 2)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.66 0.44 -0.22 -33.5 calculation 2)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.66 0.23 -0.43 -65.7 calculation 2)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) -0.66 -0.66 0.00 0.0 WFM
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.66 0.34 -0.32 -49.2 calculation 2)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.04 0.05 0.01 17.9 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Argentina) 0.19 0.01 -0.18 -95.7 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Brazil) 0.19 0.03 -0.16 -84.2 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.19 0.00 -0.19 -99.3 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.19 0.04 -0.15 -80.2 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from the EU) 0.19 0.05 -0.14 -73.6 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -81.6 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -98.5
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -76.9 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.20 0.12 -0.08 -42.0
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -95.5 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.66 0.40 -0.26 -40.1 calculation 2)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.03 -0.17 -87.1
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -93.2 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) -0.50 -0.50 0.00 0.0
xviii
Raw data Calibrated data Absolute difference Percentage difference Source
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.9
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.04 0.05 0.01 38.8 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.66 0.57 -0.09 -14.1 calculation 2)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.20 0.11 -0.09 -45.8
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Argentina) 0.19 0.07 -0.12 -63.9 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Brazil) 0.19 0.15 -0.04 -22.8 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.19 0.01 -0.18 -94.6 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.19 0.13 -0.06 -31.6 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from the EU) 0.19 0.41 0.23 118.9 WFM 1)
EU frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -85.8 calculation 1)
EU frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.66 0.31 -0.35 -53.2 calculation 2)
EU frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -82.2 calculation 1)
EU frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.66 0.30 -0.36 -54.3 calculation 2)
EU frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -96.6 calculation 1)
EU frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.9
EU frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.66 0.33 -0.33 -50.1 calculation 2)
EU frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -94.7 calculation 1)
EU frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.9
EU frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) -0.66 -0.66 0.00 0.0 WFM
EU frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.04 0.04 0.00 7.2 calculation 1)
EU frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.20 0.33 0.13 65.8
EU frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.66 0.27 -0.39 -58.9 calculation 2)
EU frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Argentina) 0.19 0.02 -0.17 -91.7 WFM 1)
EU frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Brazil) 0.19 0.00 -0.19 -99.9 WFM 1)
EU frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.19 0.01 -0.18 -96.4 WFM 1)
EU frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.19 0.00 -0.19 -99.5 WFM 1)
EU frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from the EU) 0.19 0.33 0.14 75.2 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.66 0.07 -0.59 -88.6 calculation 2)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.66 0.11 -0.55 -83.0 calculation 2)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.66 0.01 -0.65 -98.5 calculation 2)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.66 0.02 -0.64 -97.5 calculation 2)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) -0.66 -0.66 0.00 0.0 WFM
EU fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.04 0.05 0.01 17.9 calculation 1)
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Raw data Calibrated data Absolute difference Percentage difference Source
EU fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.04 0.01 -0.04 -83.3 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) other meat (from Argentina) 0.19 0.00 -0.19 -99.8 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) other meat (from Brazil) 0.19 0.00 -0.19 -99.1 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.19 0.00 -0.19 -100.0 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.19 0.01 -0.18 -94.8 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) other meat (from the EU) 0.19 0.20 0.01 4.8 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
EU fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
EU fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.66 0.00 -0.66 -100.0 calculation 2)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
EU fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.66 0.00 -0.66 -100.0 calculation 2)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
EU fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) -0.66 -0.66 0.00 0.0 WFM
EU fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
EU fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) other meat (from Argentina) 0.19 0.00 -0.19 -100.0 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) other meat (from Brazil) 0.19 0.00 -0.19 -100.0 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.19 0.00 -0.19 -100.0 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.19 0.00 -0.19 -100.0 WFM 1)
EU fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) other meat (from the EU) 0.19 0.14 -0.05 -26.7 WFM 1)
EU frozen beef (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -85.0 calculation 1)
EU frozen beef (from the EU) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.66 0.01 -0.65 -99.2 calculation 2)
EU frozen beef (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.04 0.01 -0.03 -81.2 calculation 1)
EU frozen beef (from the EU) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.66 0.16 -0.50 -75.1 calculation 2)
EU frozen beef (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -96.4 calculation 1)
EU frozen beef (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.8
EU frozen beef (from the EU) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.66 0.01 -0.65 -98.9 calculation 2)
EU frozen beef (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.04 0.00 -0.03 -94.4 calculation 1)
EU frozen beef (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.4
EU frozen beef (from the EU) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.66 0.00 -0.66 -99.5 calculation 2)
EU frozen beef (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.04 0.05 0.01 42.7 calculation 1)
EU frozen beef (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.20 0.35 0.15 73.5
EU frozen beef (from the EU) frozen beef (from the EU) -0.66 -0.66 0.00 0.0 WFM
EU frozen beef (from the EU) other meat (from Argentina) 0.19 0.00 -0.19 -99.6 WFM 1)
EU frozen beef (from the EU) other meat (from Brazil) 0.19 0.00 -0.19 -98.3 WFM 1)
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Raw data Calibrated data Absolute difference Percentage difference Source
EU frozen beef (from the EU) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.19 0.00 -0.19 -99.9 WFM 1)
EU frozen beef (from the EU) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.19 0.02 -0.17 -90.9 WFM 1)
EU frozen beef (from the EU) other meat (from the EU) 0.19 0.35 0.16 83.3 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.33 0.13 -0.21 -61.5 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.33 0.07 -0.26 -79.1 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.33 0.13 -0.20 -60.9 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.33 0.13 -0.20 -60.3 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.33 0.11 -0.23 -67.7 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.33 0.11 -0.23 -68.4 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.33 0.09 -0.25 -74.5 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.33 0.12 -0.22 -65.4 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.33 0.14 -0.19 -57.7 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.33 0.04 -0.29 -88.1 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.33 0.13 -0.21 -61.4 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.33 0.29 -0.04 -12.5 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Argentina) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.33 0.13 -0.21 -61.3 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Argentina) other meat (from Argentina) -0.58 -0.58 0.00 0.0 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Argentina) other meat (from Brazil) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -97.9
EU other meat (from Argentina) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
EU other meat (from Argentina) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.3
EU other meat (from Argentina) other meat (from the EU) 0.20 0.29 0.09 46.5
EU other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.33 0.17 -0.16 -48.6 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.33 0.00 -0.33 -99.9 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.33 0.18 -0.16 -46.4 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.33 0.19 -0.15 -44.4 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.33 0.09 -0.24 -72.2 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.33 0.04 -0.30 -88.4 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.33 0.02 -0.31 -92.8 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.33 0.12 -0.21 -63.2 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.33 0.09 -0.25 -73.6 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.33 0.00 -0.33 -100.0 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.33 0.17 -0.16 -48.0 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.33 0.30 -0.04 -11.6 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Brazil) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.33 0.18 -0.16 -47.7 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Brazil) other meat (from Argentina) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.4
EU other meat (from Brazil) other meat (from Brazil) -0.58 -0.58 0.00 0.0 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Brazil) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
EU other meat (from Brazil) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.06 -0.14 -70.4
EU other meat (from Brazil) other meat (from the EU) 0.20 0.30 0.10 48.0
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EU other meat (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.33 0.11 -0.22 -65.7 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.33 0.11 -0.23 -68.5 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.33 0.12 -0.22 -65.6 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.33 0.12 -0.22 -65.5 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.33 0.11 -0.22 -66.7 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.33 0.12 -0.22 -64.3 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.33 0.11 -0.23 -67.8 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.33 0.11 -0.22 -66.3 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.33 0.12 -0.21 -63.6 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.33 0.10 -0.23 -70.1 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.33 0.11 -0.22 -65.7 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.33 0.30 -0.04 -10.7 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.33 0.11 -0.22 -65.7 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Uruguay) other meat (from Argentina) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
EU other meat (from Uruguay) other meat (from Brazil) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.9
EU other meat (from Uruguay) other meat (from Uruguay) -0.58 -0.58 0.00 0.0 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Uruguay) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.6
EU other meat (from Uruguay) other meat (from the EU) 0.20 0.30 0.10 49.6
EU other meat (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.33 0.22 -0.12 -35.7 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.33 0.00 -0.33 -99.9 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.33 0.25 -0.09 -25.9 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.33 0.27 -0.07 -20.0 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.33 0.00 -0.33 -99.7 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.33 0.01 -0.33 -97.8 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.33 0.00 -0.33 -99.9 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.33 0.04 -0.29 -87.6 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.33 0.02 -0.31 -93.9 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.33 0.00 -0.33 -100.0 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.33 0.24 -0.09 -27.4 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.33 0.30 -0.03 -10.2 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.33 0.25 -0.09 -26.4 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Argentina) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.9
EU other meat (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Brazil) 0.20 0.02 -0.18 -92.3
EU other meat (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
EU other meat (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Rest-of-World) -0.58 -0.58 0.00 0.0 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from the EU) 0.20 0.30 0.10 50.3
EU other meat (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.33 0.00 -0.33 -100.0 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from the EU) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.33 0.00 -0.33 -100.0 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.33 0.00 -0.33 -99.6 WFM 1)
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EU other meat (from the EU) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.33 0.00 -0.33 -100.0 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.33 0.00 -0.33 -100.0 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.33 0.00 -0.33 -100.0 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from the EU) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.33 0.00 -0.33 -100.0 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.33 0.00 -0.33 -100.0 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.33 0.00 -0.33 -100.0 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from the EU) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.33 0.00 -0.33 -100.0 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.33 0.02 -0.31 -94.1 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.33 0.14 -0.20 -58.5 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from the EU) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.33 0.00 -0.33 -100.0 WFM 1)
EU other meat (from the EU) other meat (from Argentina) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
EU other meat (from the EU) other meat (from Brazil) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
EU other meat (from the EU) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
EU other meat (from the EU) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
EU other meat (from the EU) other meat (from the EU) -0.58 -0.58 0.00 0.0 WFM 1)
Uruguay fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) -0.82 -0.82 0.00 0.0 Cap et al. (2007)
Uruguay fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.82 0.86 0.04 5.3 calculation 3)
Uruguay fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.05 0.49 0.44 839.9 calculation 1)
Uruguay fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) other meat (from Brazil) 0.02 0.08 0.06 305.1 WFM 2)
Uruguay fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.02 0.04 0.02 116.2 WFM 2)
Uruguay fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.82 0.05 -0.77 -94.5 calculation 3)
Uruguay fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) -0.82 -0.82 0.00 0.0 Cap et al. (2007)
Uruguay fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.05 0.26 0.21 396.0 calculation 1)
Uruguay fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) other meat (from Brazil) 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -85.7 WFM 2)
Uruguay fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.02 0.10 0.08 383.2 WFM 2)
Uruguay fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 3)
Uruguay fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.04 0.00 -0.04 -100.0 calculation 3)
Uruguay fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) -0.80 -0.80 0.00 0.0 Cap et al. (2007)a
Uruguay fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) other meat (from Brazil) 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -100.0 WFM 2)
Uruguay fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -100.0 WFM 2)
Uruguay other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.22 0.19 -0.03 -11.9 WFM 2)
Uruguay other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.22 0.22 0.00 0.2 WFM 2)
Uruguay other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.22 0.59 0.38 171.0 WFM 2)
Uruguay other meat (from Brazil) other meat (from Brazil) -0.63 -0.63 0.00 0.0 WFM 2)
Uruguay other meat (from Brazil) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.21 0.01 2.8
Uruguay other meat (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.22 0.00 -0.22 -99.5 WFM 2)
Uruguay other meat (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.22 0.15 -0.07 -29.7 WFM 2)
Uruguay other meat (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.22 0.39 0.17 79.7 WFM 2)
Uruguay other meat (from Uruguay) other meat (from Brazil) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -97.8
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Uruguay other meat (from Uruguay) other meat (from Uruguay) -0.63 -0.63 0.00 0.0 WFM 2)
Argentina fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) -0.36 -0.36 0.00 0.0 Cap et al. (2007)b
Argentina fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.02 0.35 0.32 1401.1 Cap et al. (2007)d
Argentina fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -100.0 Cap et al. (2007)d
Argentina fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) other meat (from Argentina) 0.02 0.10 0.08 351.1 WFM 1)
Argentina fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) other meat (from Brazil) 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -86.9 WFM 1)
Argentina fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -94.8 WFM 1)
Argentina fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -100.0 Cap et al. (2007)e
Argentina fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) -0.37 -0.37 0.00 0.0 Cap et al. (2007)c
Argentina fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.37 0.00 -0.37 -100.0 Calculation 4)
Argentina fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) other meat (from Argentina) 0.02 0.02 0.00 11.3 WFM 1)
Argentina fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) other meat (from Brazil) 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -100.0 WFM 1)
Argentina fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -100.0 WFM 1)
Argentina fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.02 0.02 0.00 3.4 Cap et al. (2007)e
Argentina fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.37 0.52 0.15 41.2 Calculation 4)
Argentina fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) -0.50 -0.50 0.00 0.0
Argentina fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) other meat (from Argentina) 0.02 0.11 0.09 420.0 WFM 1)
Argentina fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) other meat (from Brazil) 0.02 0.14 0.12 533.7 WFM 1)
Argentina fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.02 0.11 0.09 392.5 WFM 1)
Argentina other meat (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.26 0.01 -0.25 -94.5 calculation 1)
Argentina other meat (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.26 0.26 0.00 -0.3 calculation 1)
Argentina other meat (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.26 0.00 -0.26 -100.0 calculation 1)
Argentina other meat (from Argentina) other meat (from Argentina) -0.25 -0.25 0.00 0.0 calculation 1)
Argentina other meat (from Argentina) other meat (from Brazil) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.8
Argentina other meat (from Argentina) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.9
Argentina other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.1 calculation 1)
Argentina other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.26 0.42 0.16 62.4 calculation 1)
Argentina other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.26 0.11 -0.15 -57.7 calculation 1)
Argentina other meat (from Brazil) other meat (from Argentina) 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.4
Argentina other meat (from Brazil) other meat (from Brazil) -0.25 -0.25 0.00 0.0 calculation 1)
Argentina other meat (from Brazil) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.10 -0.10 -52.3
Argentina other meat (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.26 0.26 0.00 0.0 calculation 1)
Argentina other meat (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.26 0.42 0.16 62.9 calculation 1)
Argentina other meat (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.26 0.22 -0.04 -16.8 calculation 1)
Argentina other meat (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Argentina) 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.1
Argentina other meat (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Brazil) 0.20 0.24 0.04 20.7
Argentina other meat (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Rest-of-World) -0.25 -0.25 0.00 0.0 calculation 1)
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) -1.03 -1.03 0.00 0.0 -calculation 4)
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.07 0.01 -0.05 -79.5 calculation 3)
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Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.07 0.00 -0.06 -92.6 calculation 3)
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 1.03 0.89 -0.14 -13.9 calculation 4)
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 0.07 0.28 0.21 315.8 calculation 3)
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 1.03 0.67 -0.36 -34.9 calculation 4)
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.07 0.01 -0.06 -86.6 calculation 3)
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.07 0.01 -0.06 -91.8 calculation 3)
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) other meat (from Brazil) 0.03 0.04 0.01 27.3 0.03
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -47.8 0.03
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.05 0.01 -0.04 -76.8 calculation 3)
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) -0.50 -0.50 0.00 0.0
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.20 0.10 -0.10 -49.2
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.05 0.04 -0.01 -21.8 calculation 3)
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 1.03 1.02 -0.01 -1.1 calculation 4)
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.05 0.01 -0.05 -82.6 calculation 3)
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 1.03 0.69 -0.34 -33.2 calculation 4)
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.09 -0.11 -55.2
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) other meat (from Brazil) 0.03 0.07 0.04 139.6 0.03
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.03 0.02 -0.01 -25.4 0.03
Brazil frozen beef (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.05 0.01 -0.04 -80.7 calculation 3)
Brazil frozen beef (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.20 0.24 0.04 18.3
Brazil frozen beef (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Argentina) -1.03 -1.03 0.00 0.0 -calculation 4)
Brazil frozen beef (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.05 0.06 0.00 1.0 calculation 3)
Brazil frozen beef (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 0.20 0.34 0.14 71.0
Brazil frozen beef (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.05 0.01 -0.05 -82.4 calculation 3)
Brazil frozen beef (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.13 -0.07 -35.5
Brazil frozen beef (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 1.03 0.96 -0.07 -6.7 calculation 4)
Brazil frozen beef (from Argentina) other meat (from Brazil) 0.03 0.05 0.02 76.8 0.03
Brazil frozen beef (from Argentina) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.03 0.05 0.02 59.3 0.03
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 1.03 0.02 -1.02 -98.5 calculation 4)
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.07 0.00 -0.07 -99.1 calculation 3)
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.07 0.00 -0.07 -99.4 calculation 3)
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) -1.03 -1.03 0.00 0.0 -calculation 4)
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 0.07 0.29 0.23 339.5 calculation 3)
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 1.03 0.01 -1.02 -99.0 calculation 4)
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.07 0.00 -0.07 -99.8 calculation 3)
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.07 0.00 -0.07 -99.5 calculation 3)
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) other meat (from Brazil) 0.03 0.06 0.03 88.3 0.03
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.03 0.00 -0.03 -98.7 0.03
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.05 0.00 -0.05 -99.8 calculation 3)
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Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 1.03 0.00 -1.03 -99.9 calculation 4)
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.05 0.01 -0.05 -85.0 calculation 3)
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) -1.03 -1.03 0.00 0.0 -calculation 4)
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.05 0.00 -0.05 -99.9 calculation 3)
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 1.03 0.00 -1.03 -100.0 calculation 4)
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) other meat (from Brazil) 0.03 0.03 0.00 3.4 0.03
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.03 0.00 -0.03 -99.9 0.03
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 1.03 0.86 -0.17 -16.5 calculation 4)
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.07 0.01 -0.05 -80.3 calculation 3)
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.07 0.01 -0.06 -91.4 calculation 3)
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 1.03 0.72 -0.31 -30.1 calculation 4)
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 0.07 0.26 0.19 290.9 calculation 3)
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) -1.03 -1.03 0.00 0.0 -calculation 4)
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.07 0.01 -0.06 -85.8 calculation 3)
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.07 0.00 -0.06 -92.6 calculation 3)
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) other meat (from Brazil) 0.03 0.03 0.00 14.8 0.03
Brazil fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.03 0.00 -0.03 -91.1 0.03
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.05 0.01 -0.04 -77.3 calculation 3)
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 1.03 1.03 -0.01 -0.7 calculation 4)
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.20 0.08 -0.12 -58.8
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.05 0.03 -0.02 -43.4 calculation 3)
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 1.03 0.81 -0.23 -22.0 calculation 4)
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.05 0.01 -0.04 -81.2 calculation 3)
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) -0.50 -0.50 0.00 0.0
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.08 -0.12 -60.7
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) other meat (from Brazil) 0.03 0.09 0.06 198.9 0.03
Brazil fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.03 0.01 -0.02 -66.5 0.03
Brazil frozen beef (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.05 0.01 -0.04 -75.6 calculation 3)
Brazil frozen beef (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.20 0.24 0.04 18.4
Brazil frozen beef (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Argentina) 1.03 1.09 0.06 5.9 calculation 4)
Brazil frozen beef (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.05 0.06 0.00 0.9 calculation 3)
Brazil frozen beef (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 0.20 0.34 0.14 71.0
Brazil frozen beef (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.05 0.01 -0.05 -82.8 calculation 3)
Brazil frozen beef (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.14 -0.06 -30.2
Brazil frozen beef (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Uruguay) -1.03 -1.03 0.00 0.0 -calculation 4)
Brazil frozen beef (from Uruguay) other meat (from Brazil) 0.03 0.05 0.02 76.9 0.03
Brazil frozen beef (from Uruguay) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.03 0.05 0.02 73.2 0.03
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Raw data Calibrated data Absolute difference Percentage difference Source
Brazil other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.10 0.00 -0.10 -99.7 WFM 1)
Brazil other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.10 0.00 -0.10 -99.7 WFM 1)
Brazil other meat (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.10 0.00 -0.10 -99.9 WFM 1)
Brazil other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.10 0.02 -0.08 -75.5 WFM 1)
Brazil other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 0.10 0.38 0.28 284.2 WFM 1)
Brazil other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.10 0.00 -0.10 -99.8 WFM 1)
Brazil other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.10 0.00 -0.10 -99.8 WFM 1)
Brazil other meat (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.10 0.00 -0.10 -99.9 WFM 1)
Brazil other meat (from Brazil) other meat (from Brazil) -0.84 -0.84 0.00 0.0 WFM 1)
Brazil other meat (from Brazil) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.9
Brazil other meat (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Argentina) 0.10 0.06 -0.04 -36.3 WFM 1)
Brazil other meat (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.10 0.10 0.00 -1.3 WFM 1)
Brazil other meat (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.10 0.09 -0.01 -9.4 WFM 1)
Brazil other meat (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Brazil) 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.1 WFM 1)
Brazil other meat (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 0.10 0.41 0.31 306.5 WFM 1)
Brazil other meat (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Uruguay) 0.10 0.01 -0.09 -91.4 WFM 1)
Brazil other meat (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.10 0.03 -0.07 -70.3 WFM 1)
Brazil other meat (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.10 0.09 -0.01 -13.1 WFM 1)
Brazil other meat (from Uruguay) other meat (from Brazil) 0.20 0.20 0.00 0.2
Brazil other meat (from Uruguay) other meat (from Uruguay) -0.84 -0.84 0.00 0.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) -0.70 -0.70 0.00 0.0
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -98.0
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 0.70 0.34 -0.36 -51.7
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.20 0.01 -0.19 -93.5
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.70 0.05 -0.65 -93.5
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -97.8
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.07 -0.13 -65.9
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.70 0.54 -0.16 -23.2
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.01 -0.19 -96.2
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.20 0.03 -0.17 -83.1
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.70 0.53 -0.17 -24.8
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.2
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) other meat (from Argentina) 0.15 0.03 -0.12 -83.1 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) other meat (from Brazil) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -98.7 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -99.2 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.15 0.38 0.23 155.7 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) other meat (from the EU) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -96.8 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.8
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Argentina) -0.70 -0.70 0.00 0.0
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Raw data Calibrated data Absolute difference Percentage difference Source
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.8
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.70 0.40 -0.30 -43.1
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.70 0.24 -0.46 -66.3
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.05 -0.15 -77.0
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.40 0.20 99.6
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.70 0.31 -0.39 -55.9
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.20 0.02 -0.18 -91.2
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.7
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Argentina) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.70 0.10 -0.60 -85.4
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Argentina) other meat (from Argentina) 0.15 0.01 -0.14 -95.8 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Argentina) other meat (from Brazil) 0.15 0.03 -0.12 -80.5 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Argentina) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -99.8 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Argentina) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.15 0.28 0.13 90.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Argentina) other meat (from the EU) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -98.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.70 0.42 -0.28 -40.1
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -98.1
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) -0.70 -0.70 0.00 0.0
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.20 0.01 -0.19 -93.7
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.70 0.06 -0.64 -92.0
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -97.9
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.07 -0.13 -66.9
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.70 0.53 -0.17 -25.0
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.01 -0.19 -96.3
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.6
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.70 0.49 -0.21 -30.2
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.3
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) other meat (from Argentina) 0.15 0.02 -0.13 -88.7 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) other meat (from Brazil) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -98.7 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -99.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.15 0.37 0.22 149.9 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) other meat (from the EU) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -96.9 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.7
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.70 0.12 -0.58 -82.6
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.8
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Brazil) -0.70 -0.70 0.00 0.0
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.70 0.14 -0.56 -79.7
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.23 0.03 16.5
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Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.44 0.24 117.5
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.70 0.32 -0.38 -53.9
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.20 0.01 -0.19 -95.1
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -98.5
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Brazil) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.70 0.04 -0.66 -95.0
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Brazil) other meat (from Argentina) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -98.5 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Brazil) other meat (from Brazil) 0.15 0.04 -0.11 -73.2 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Brazil) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -100.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Brazil) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.15 0.31 0.16 107.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Brazil) other meat (from the EU) 0.15 0.12 -0.03 -21.6 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.70 0.33 -0.37 -52.5
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -98.1
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 0.70 0.33 -0.37 -52.8
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.20 0.01 -0.19 -93.8
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) -0.70 -0.70 0.00 0.0
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -97.9
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.07 -0.13 -67.4
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.70 0.52 -0.18 -25.9
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.01 -0.19 -96.4
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.6
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.70 0.33 -0.37 -52.8
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.3
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) other meat (from Argentina) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -99.9 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) other meat (from Brazil) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -98.7 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.15 0.01 -0.14 -95.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.15 0.37 0.22 146.7 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) other meat (from the EU) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -97.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.8
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.70 0.21 -0.49 -69.5
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.8
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.70 0.42 -0.28 -40.2
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Uruguay) -0.70 -0.70 0.00 0.0
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.05 -0.15 -77.1
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.40 0.20 99.4
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.70 0.31 -0.39 -55.0
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.20 0.02 -0.18 -91.4
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.7
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.70 0.09 -0.61 -86.7
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Raw data Calibrated data Absolute difference Percentage difference Source
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Uruguay) other meat (from Argentina) 0.15 0.01 -0.14 -96.1 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Uruguay) other meat (from Brazil) 0.15 0.04 -0.11 -76.6 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Uruguay) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -99.9 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Uruguay) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.15 0.28 0.13 89.7 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Uruguay) other meat (from the EU) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -98.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.9
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.5
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.9
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.20 0.04 -0.16 -79.5
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.4
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) -0.70 -0.70 0.00 0.0
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.21 0.01 7.1
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.0
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.3
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.9
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.8
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Argentina) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -99.8 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Brazil) 0.15 0.01 -0.14 -95.6 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -100.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.15 0.22 0.07 44.7 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from the EU) 0.15 0.02 -0.13 -86.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.70 0.00 -0.70 -100.0
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 0.70 0.00 -0.70 -100.0
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.70 0.00 -0.70 -100.0
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) -0.70 -0.70 0.00 0.0
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.70 0.00 -0.70 -100.0
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Argentina) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -100.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Brazil) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -100.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -100.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -100.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from the EU) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -100.0 WFM 1)
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Raw data Calibrated data Absolute difference Percentage difference Source
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.8
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.70 0.16 -0.54 -76.9
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.8
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.70 0.55 -0.15 -21.4
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.70 0.18 -0.52 -74.0
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.05 -0.15 -76.9
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.40 0.20 100.3
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) -0.70 -0.70 0.00 0.0
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.20 0.01 -0.19 -93.3
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.7
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.70 0.06 -0.64 -92.1
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Argentina) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -97.5 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Brazil) 0.15 0.05 -0.10 -69.9 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -99.9 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.15 0.29 0.14 90.6 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from the EU) 0.15 0.08 -0.07 -48.7 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.20 0.03 -0.17 -84.3
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.20 0.09 -0.11 -56.1
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.7
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.20 0.16 -0.04 -20.2
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.10 -0.10 -52.4
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.15 -0.05 -24.8
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.48 0.28 138.9
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.13 -0.07 -35.8
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) -0.70 -0.70 0.00 0.0
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.20 0.10 -0.10 -48.5
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.3
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) other meat (from Argentina) 0.15 0.04 -0.11 -72.1 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) other meat (from Brazil) 0.15 0.17 0.02 11.5 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -99.2 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.15 0.34 0.19 127.3 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) other meat (from the EU) 0.15 0.15 0.00 -2.4 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.70 0.39 -0.31 -44.2
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -98.0
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 0.70 0.29 -0.41 -58.2
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.20 0.04 -0.16 -79.2
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.70 0.03 -0.67 -95.2
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Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -97.8
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.07 -0.13 -65.6
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.70 0.54 -0.16 -22.7
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.01 -0.19 -96.2
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.20 0.08 -0.12 -58.8
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) -0.70 -0.70 0.00 0.0
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.2
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) other meat (from Argentina) 0.15 0.03 -0.12 -82.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) other meat (from Brazil) 0.15 0.08 -0.07 -48.7 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -99.4 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.15 0.39 0.24 157.4 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) other meat (from the EU) 0.15 0.04 -0.11 -73.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.8
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from the EU) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.70 0.26 -0.44 -62.7
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.8
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from the EU) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.70 0.29 -0.41 -58.0
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from the EU) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.70 0.26 -0.44 -62.4
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.05 -0.15 -76.2
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.41 0.21 104.8
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from the EU) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.70 0.27 -0.43 -61.4
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.7
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.7
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from the EU) frozen beef (from the EU) -0.70 -0.70 0.00 0.0
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from the EU) other meat (from Argentina) 0.15 0.01 -0.14 -92.4 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from the EU) other meat (from Brazil) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -99.1 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from the EU) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -99.6 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from the EU) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.15 0.29 0.14 94.9 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World frozen beef (from the EU) other meat (from the EU) 0.15 0.00 -0.15 -97.9 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.31 0.08 -0.23 -73.9 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.31 0.11 -0.20 -65.2 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 0.31 0.04 -0.27 -85.9 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.31 0.13 -0.18 -58.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.31 0.00 -0.31 -100.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.31 0.11 -0.20 -64.4 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.31 0.13 -0.18 -58.6 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.31 0.48 0.17 54.4 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Argentina) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.31 0.12 -0.19 -61.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Argentina) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.31 0.14 -0.17 -53.6 WFM 1)
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Raw data Calibrated data Absolute difference Percentage difference Source
Rest-of-World other meat (from Argentina) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.31 0.12 -0.19 -62.6 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Argentina) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.31 0.08 -0.24 -75.6 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Argentina) other meat (from Argentina) -0.55 -0.55 0.00 0.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Argentina) other meat (from Brazil) 0.20 0.03 -0.17 -84.3
Rest-of-World other meat (from Argentina) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.9
Rest-of-World other meat (from Argentina) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.34 0.14 71.4
Rest-of-World other meat (from Argentina) other meat (from the EU) 0.20 0.03 -0.17 -86.6
Rest-of-World other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.31 0.00 -0.31 -99.8 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.31 0.06 -0.25 -81.3 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 0.31 0.00 -0.31 -99.8 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.31 0.26 -0.05 -16.9 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.31 0.00 -0.31 -100.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.31 0.08 -0.23 -75.3 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.31 0.25 -0.07 -20.9 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.31 0.49 0.17 56.2 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Brazil) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.31 0.17 -0.14 -45.3 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.31 0.07 -0.24 -78.7 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Brazil) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.31 0.04 -0.27 -87.8 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Brazil) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.31 0.00 -0.31 -99.6 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Brazil) other meat (from Argentina) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -98.2
Rest-of-World other meat (from Brazil) other meat (from Brazil) -0.55 -0.55 0.00 0.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Brazil) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
Rest-of-World other meat (from Brazil) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.35 0.15 73.4
Rest-of-World other meat (from Brazil) other meat (from the EU) 0.20 0.18 -0.02 -8.8
Rest-of-World other meat (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.31 0.11 -0.20 -63.8 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.31 0.11 -0.20 -63.6 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 0.31 0.11 -0.20 -64.3 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.31 0.11 -0.20 -63.4 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.31 0.09 -0.22 -70.7 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.31 0.11 -0.20 -63.6 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.31 0.11 -0.20 -63.4 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.31 0.51 0.20 64.9 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.31 0.11 -0.20 -63.5 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Uruguay) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.31 0.11 -0.20 -63.1 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Uruguay) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.31 0.11 -0.20 -63.5 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Uruguay) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.31 0.11 -0.20 -64.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Uruguay) other meat (from Argentina) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -98.3
Rest-of-World other meat (from Uruguay) other meat (from Brazil) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -98.3
Rest-of-World other meat (from Uruguay) other meat (from Uruguay) -0.55 -0.55 0.00 0.0 WFM 1)
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Raw data Calibrated data Absolute difference Percentage difference Source
Rest-of-World other meat (from Uruguay) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.37 0.17 83.1
Rest-of-World other meat (from Uruguay) other meat (from the EU) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -97.8
Rest-of-World other meat (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.31 0.00 -0.31 -100.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.31 0.00 -0.31 -100.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 0.31 0.00 -0.31 -100.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.31 0.00 -0.31 -100.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.31 0.00 -0.31 -100.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.31 0.00 -0.31 -100.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.31 0.01 -0.30 -95.3 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.31 0.00 -0.31 -100.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.31 0.00 -0.31 -100.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.31 0.00 -0.31 -100.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Rest-of-World) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.31 0.00 -0.31 -100.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Rest-of-World) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.31 0.00 -0.31 -100.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Argentina) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
Rest-of-World other meat (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Brazil) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
Rest-of-World other meat (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
Rest-of-World other meat (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from Rest-of-World) -0.55 -0.55 0.00 0.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from Rest-of-World) other meat (from the EU) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
Rest-of-World other meat (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from Argentina) 0.31 0.00 -0.31 -99.8 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from the EU) frozen beef (from Argentina) 0.31 0.00 -0.31 -98.9 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from Brazil) 0.31 0.00 -0.31 -99.8 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from the EU) frozen beef (from Brazil) 0.31 0.32 0.01 3.8 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from Uruguay) 0.31 0.00 -0.31 -100.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from the EU) frozen beef (from Uruguay) 0.31 0.00 -0.31 -98.8 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.31 0.32 0.01 3.1 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from Rest-of-World) 0.31 0.48 0.17 55.6 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from the EU) frozen beef (from Rest-of-World) 0.31 0.12 -0.19 -59.9 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from the EU) fresh beef, high quality (from the EU) 0.31 0.02 -0.29 -92.0 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from the EU) fresh beef, other quality (from the EU) 0.31 0.01 -0.30 -97.3 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from the EU) frozen beef (from the EU) 0.31 0.00 -0.31 -99.6 WFM 1)
Rest-of-World other meat (from the EU) other meat (from Argentina) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -99.3
Rest-of-World other meat (from the EU) other meat (from Brazil) 0.20 0.08 -0.12 -60.9
Rest-of-World other meat (from the EU) other meat (from Uruguay) 0.20 0.00 -0.20 -100.0
Rest-of-World other meat (from the EU) other meat (from Rest-of-World) 0.20 0.35 0.15 72.7
Rest-of-World other meat (from the EU) other meat (from the EU) -0.55 -0.55 0.00 0.0 WFM 1)
Legend: see next page
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calculation 1): The ratio of demand elasticities for beef of high and other quality from Argentina applied to the demand elasticity taken from the WFM
calculation 2): The inverse of the elasticity taken from the WFM
Calculation 3): The ratio of demand elasticities for beef of high and other quality from Argentina applied to the demand elasticity taken from the Cap et al. (2007)
Calculation 4): The inverse of the elasticity taken from Cap et al. 
WFM 1): Weighted average of cross price elasticities for pork and poultry taken from the WFM
WFM 2): Weighted average of cross price elasticities for pork, sheep and poultry 
Cap et al. (2007): Demand elasticity for boneless hind quarters
Cap et al. (2007) a: Average of elasticities of ground beef and forequarters
Cap et al. (2007) b: Elasticity for "beef A"
Cap et al. (2007) c: Elasticity for "beef B"
Cap et al. (2007) d: Cross price elasticity for "beef A" and "beef B"
Cap et al. (2007) e: Cross price elasticity for "beef B" and "beef A"
Table A 10 Demand elasticity for product group meat
Raw data Balanced data Absolute difference Source
EU -0.30 -0.30 0.0 Own calculation based on Seale et al. (2003) and Eurostat (n.d.b)
Uruguay -0.48 -0.48 0.0 Seale et al. (2003)
Argentina -0.44 -0.44 0.0 Seale et al. (2003)
Brazil -0.54 -0.54 0.0 Seale et al. (2003)
Rest-of-World -0.33 -0.33 0.0 Richards et al. (1999); Seale et al. (2003);You et al. (1996)
Table A 11 Income elasticity for product group meat
Raw data Balanced data Absolute difference Percentage difference Source
0.38 0.30 -0.07 -19 Own calculation based on Seale et al. (2003) and Eurostat (n.d.b)
0.60 0.48 -0.11 -19 Seale et al. (2003)
0.55 0.44 -0.11 -19 Seale et al. (2003)
0.66 0.54 -0.13 -19 Seale et al. (2003)
0.10 0.35 0.25 352 Richards et al (1999); Seale et al.(2003);You et al. (1996)
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Table A 12 Leontief coefficient
fresh beef, high quality fresh beef, other quality
EU live cattle, high quality 0.09 0.91
live cattle, other quality 0.00 1.00
Uruguay live cattle, high quality 0.11 0.89
live cattle, other quality 0.00 1.00
Argentina live cattle, high quality 0.11 0.89
live cattle, other quality 0.00 1.00
Brazil live cattle, high quality 0.10 0.90
live cattle, other quality 0.00 1.00
Rest-of-World live cattle, high quality 0.10 0.90
live cattle, other quality 0.00 1.00
Source: Own compilation
Table A 13 Transport costs
Euro/Tonne Uruguay Argentina Brazil
EU fresh beef 313 289 481
frozen beef 249 465 481
Source: Own compilation
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ANNEX II SCENARIO ANALYSIS
********************************************************************************************************
*            *
*   Model code for EU-Mercosur beef trade scenario analysis              *
*                                                          *
********************************************************************************************************
FILE  CON / CON /;
CON.lw = 0;
CON.nw = 0;
$offlisting
* read sets
$include sets.gms
* read policy information
$include policy.gms
* definition of auxiliary parameters
$include auxiliary parameters.gms
parameters
bd_sens(r,xx,yy,acto,i)      slope parameter of demand function
cd_sens(r,xx,acto,i)         constant term of demand function
bs_sens(r,xx,yy,acto,i)      slope parameter of supply function
cs_sens(r,xx,acto,i)         constant term of supply function
fcost(r)                     cost for freezing
tcu_cat(r,r1,xx)             transport cost
pritrans(r,xx)       price transmission between producer and consumer price
ai(r)                        constant term of income allocation system
bi(r)                        slope parameter of income allocation system
xxxviii
ci(r)                        slope parameter of income allocation system
ai_sens(r,i)                 constant term of income allocation system in sensitivity analysis
bi_sens(r,i)                 slope parameter of income allocation system  in sensitivity analysis
ci_sens(r,i)       slope parameter of income allocation system  in sensitivity analysis
GDP(r)                       GDP of country
;
* read base data
$include read basedata.gms
* read parameters for baseline and stochastic analysis
execute_load "parameters_sens.gdx" bd_sens, cd_sens, bs_sens, cs_sens;
* read parameters of the income allocation system
execute_load "income_parameters_sens.gdx"  ai_sens, bi_sens, ci_sens, iscal, PMcal, pcal, incomecal, GDP;
* initialise parameters with result from calibration to values from literature (i=1)
ai(r)=ai_sens(r,"1");
bi(r)=bi_sens(r,"1");
ci(r)=ci_sens(r,"1");
* calculate missing parameters for price transmission
pritrans(r,xxt) $ (sum(acto,prical(r,xxt,acto)) AND hconcal(r,xxt,"cons")) =
priconscal(r,xxt)/sum(acto ,prical(r,xxt,acto));
* set the pricetransmission to 1 where it is missing
pritrans(r,xxt) $ (not pritrans(r,xxt) and hconcal(r,xxt,"cons"))=1;
********************************************************************************************************
equations
m_ (r, xx,acto)          market balance
sa_(r,r1,xx,ql)          spatial arbitrage condition
quota_(r,r1,xx,ql)       bilateral TRQ for high quality beef
prodt_(r,xx,acto)        production of farmers and slaughterhouses and freezers
procdem_(r,xx,acto)      demand of processors for beef_ah and beef_ao
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hcon_(r,xx,acto)         demand by consumers
procmarg_(r,xx, acto)    processing margin of the  slaughterhouse
pritrans_(r,xx)          price transmission from slaughterhouses and freezers to consumers
*       demand
f_(r,acto)               part of the generalized leontief expenditure system
g_(r,acto)               part of the generalized leontief expenditure system
gi_(r,xx,acto)           first derivative of g versus own prices
income_(r)               equation allocating income to meat and other products
is_(r)                   equation determining the budget share spent on meat
P_(r)                    general price index
PM_(r)                   meat price index
;
Variables
trade(r,r1,xx,ql)       trade flow from region r1 to region r
pri(r,xx,acto)          price
pricons(r,xx)           consumer price
qr(r,r1,xx,ql)          bilateral quota rent per unit
prodt(r,xx,acto)        production of each of the actors
procdem (r,xx,acto)     demand of processors for beef_ah and beef_ao
hcon (r,xx,acto)        demand by consumers
procmarg(r,xx,acto)     processing margin of the slaughterhouse
g(r,acto)               part of the generalized leontief expenditure system
gi(r,xx,acto)           first derivative of g versus own prices
f(r,acto)               part of the generalized leontief expenditure system
P(r)                    stone-geary price index
PM(r)                   stone-geary price index for meat
income(r)               budget allocated to meat consumption
is(r)                   share of total income allocated to meat products
;
xl
Parameters
bs(r,xx,yy,acto)        matrix of slope parameters for SUPPLY (hessian matrix of objective function)
cs(r,xx,acto)           constant term of the supply function
bd(r,xx,yy,acto)        matrix of slope parameters for DEMAND (hessian matrix of objective function)
cd(r,xx,acto)           constant term of demand function
;
* set parameters to calibrated values. i=1 is the value from calibration to values from literature (i=1)
bs(r,xx,yy,acto) $ ((prodtcal(r,xx,acto) AND prodtcal(r,yy,acto))
OR (procdemcal(r,xx,acto) AND (procdemcal(r,yy,acto)))) =bs_sens(r,xx,yy,acto,"1");
cs(r,xx,acto)    $ (prodtcal(r,xx,acto) or procdemcal(r,xx,acto))=cs_sens(r,xx,acto,"1");
bd(r,xx,yy,acto) $ (hconcal(r,xx,acto) AND hconcal(r,yy,acto))=bd_sens(r,xx,yy,acto,"1");
cd(r,xx,acto)    $ (hconcal(r,xx,"cons"))= cd_sens(r,xx,acto,"1");
* restrict certain variables to values greater zero
positive variable  prodt;
positive  variable trade;
positive variable  hcon;
positive  variable qr;
positive  variable pri;
positive  variable procdem;
positive  variable hcon;
positive variable  pricons;
* create price index
parameter prindex(r);
prindex(r)=1;
xli
************************* Income allocation module ******************************************************
*     Income allocated to meat
income_(r) ..
income(r)=E=is(r)* GDP(r);
*     Equation determining the share of income spent on meat
is_(r) ..
is(r)=E= (ai(r)+ bi(r)* LOG(PM(r)) + ci(r)* LOG(GDP(r)/P(r)));
*     Definition of the price index
P_(r)..
LOG(P(r))=E=((sum(xxt $ hconcal(r,xxt,"cons"),
((priconscal(r,xxt)* hconcal(r,xxt,"cons"))/GDP(r)))* LOG(PM(r))));
*     Definition of the meat price index
PM_(r)..
LOG(PM(r))=E=((sum(xxt $ hconcal(r,xxt,"cons"),
((priconscal(r,xxt)* hconcal(r,xxt,"cons"))/GDP(r))* LOG(pricons(r,xxt)))));
********************* BEHAVIOURAL FUNCTIONS *************************************************************
*      Human consumption
hcon_(r,xx,acto) $ (hconcal(r,xx,acto))..
hcon(r,xx,acto)=E=cd(r,xx,acto)+ gi(r,xx,acto)/g(r,acto) * (income(r) - f(r,acto));
*      Demand of the processing industry
procdem_(r,xx,acto) $  procdemcal(r,xx,acto)..
procdem(r,xx,acto)=E=
(cs(r,xx,"slau")+ sum(yy $ (inputtoactos(yy,acto)),
bs(r,xx,yy,"slau") * procmarg(r,yy,"slau")/prindex(r)))
$ (sameas(acto,"slau") AND inputtoactos(xx,acto))
xlii
+ (cs(r,xx,"freez") + sum(yy $ (inputtoactos(yy,acto)),
bs(r,xx,yy,"freez") * procmarg(r,yy,"freez")/prindex(r)))
$ (sameas(acto,"freez") AND (inputtoactos(xx,acto)));
*     Definition of the processing margin
procmarg_(r,xx,acto) $ (procmargcal(r,xx,acto))..
procmarg(r,xx,acto) =E=(((sum(yy $ (outputtoactos(yy,acto)),
pri(r,yy,"slau") * leofact(r,xx,yy)))- pri(r,xx,"farm"))
$ (sameas(acto,"slau") AND (inputtoactos(xx,acto)))
+ (sum (yy $ (outputtoactos(yy,acto) and xxtocountries(r,yy)), pri(r,yy,"freez") * 1)-
sum(zz $ (outputtoactos(zz,"farm") AND xxtocountries(r,zz) AND
(sameas (zz, "other_ali_eu")OR
sameas (zz, "other_ali_arg")OR
sameas (zz, "other_ali_bra")OR
sameas (zz, "other_ali_uru")OR
sameas (zz, "other_ali_row")))
,
pri(r,zz,"farm"))- fcost(r))
$ (sameas(acto,"freez")and inputtoactos(xx,acto)));
*      Supply function for famers, slaughterhouses and freezing units
prodt_(r,xx,acto) $ (prodtcal(r,xx,acto))..
prodt(r,xx,acto) =E=(cs(r,xx,acto) + sum (yy $ (outputtoactos(yy,acto) AND prodtcal(r,yy,acto)),
bs(r,xx,yy,acto) * (pri(r,yy,acto))/prindex(r)))
$ (sameas (acto, "farm") AND outputtoactos(xx,acto))
+ sum(yy $ (inputtoactos(yy,acto)),
procdem(r,yy, "slau") * leofact(r,yy,xx ))
$ (sameas (acto,"slau") AND (outputtoactos(xx,acto)))
+ (procdem("arg","high_fre_arg",acto)) $ (sameas (acto,"freez")
AND sameas(xx,"other_fro_arg")
AND sameas(r,"arg"))
xliii
+ (procdem("arg","other_fre_arg",acto)) $ (sameas (acto,"freez")
AND sameas(xx,"other_fro_arg")
AND sameas(r,"arg"))
+ (procdem("bra","high_fre_bra",acto)) $ (sameas (acto,"freez")
AND sameas(xx,"other_fro_bra")
AND sameas(r,"bra"))
+ (procdem("bra","other_fre_bra",acto)) $ (sameas (acto,"freez")
AND sameas(xx,"other_fro_bra")
AND sameas(r,"bra"))
+ (procdem("uru","high_fre_uru",acto)) $ (sameas (acto,"freez")
AND sameas(xx,"other_fro_uru")
AND sameas(r,"uru"))
+ (procdem("uru","other_fre_uru",acto)) $ (sameas (acto,"freez")
AND sameas(xx,"other_fro_uru")
AND sameas(r,"uru"))
+ (procdem("row","high_fre_row",acto)) $ (sameas (acto,"freez")
AND sameas(xx,"other_fro_row")
AND sameas(r,"row"))
+ (procdem("row","other_fre_row",acto)) $ (sameas (acto,"freez")
AND sameas(xx,"other_fro_row")
AND sameas(r,"row"))
+ (procdem("eu","high_fre_eu",acto)) $ (sameas (acto,"freez")
AND sameas(xx,"other_fro_eu")
AND sameas(r,"eu"))
+ (procdem("eu","other_fre_eu",acto)) $ (sameas (acto,"freez")
AND sameas(xx,"other_fro_eu")
AND sameas(r,"eu")) ;
xliv
************************** Other equations ****************************************************************
*     Spatial arbitrage condition
sa_(r,r1,xxt,ql)  $  (tradecal(r,r1,xxt,ql)) ..
(sum(acto $ outputtoactos(xxt,acto), pri(r1,xxt,acto) + tcu_cat(r,r1,xxt))*(1+tarv(r,xxt,ql)))
+ tars(r,xxt,ql) + qr(r,r1,xxt,ql) =G= sum(acto $ outputtoactos(xxt,acto), pri(r,xxt,acto));
*     Fix trade within a country to zero
trade.fx(r,r,xxt,ql)=0;
*     Market balance
m_(r,xx,acto) $ ((outputtoactos(xx,acto) AND sameas (acto,"farm") AND (prodtcal(r,xx,"farm")
or hconcal(r,xx,"cons")))
or (outputtoactos(xx,acto) AND sameas (acto,"slau") AND (hconcal(r,xx,"cons")
OR prodtcal(r,xx,"slau")))
or (outputtoactos(xx,acto) AND sameas (acto,"freez") AND  (hconcal(r,xx,"cons" )
OR prodtcal(r,xx,"freez"))))..
0 =E= 0+
prodt(r,xx,"farm") $ (sameas (acto,"farm") AND outputtoactos(xx,acto) and xxtocountries(r,xx))
+ prodt(r,xx,"slau") $ (sameas (acto,"slau") AND outputtoactos(xx,acto)and xxtocountries(r,xx))
+ prodt(r,xx,"freez")$ (sameas (acto,"freez") AND outputtoactos(xx,acto) and xxtocountries(r,xx))
- hcon(r,xx,"cons") $ (inputtoactos(xx,"cons"))
- procdem(r,xx,"slau") $ (sameas(acto,"farm") AND outputtoactos(xx,acto) and xxtocountries(r,xx)
and procdemcal(r,xx,"slau"))
- procdem(r,xx,"freez")$ (sameas(acto,"slau")AND outputtoactos(xx,acto) and xxtocountries(r,xx)
and procdemcal(r,xx,"freez"))
*      + total imports
+ (sum((r1,ql)$ (xxtocountries(r1,xx) ), trade(r,r1,xx,ql))) $ (hconcal(r,xx,"cons"))
*      - total exports
xlv
- (sum((r1,ql), trade(r1,r,xx,ql))) $ (xxtocountries (r,xx));
*     Price transmission to consumer
pritrans_(r,xxt) $ hconcal(r,xxt,"cons") ..
pricons(r,xxt) =E=
*                   from slaughterhouse
sum(acto $ (sameas(acto,"slau") AND  outputtoactos(xxt,"slau")),
(pri(r,xxt,acto)* pritrans(r,xxt)))
*                       from freezing unit
+sum(acto $ (sameas(acto,"freez") AND outputtoactos(xxt,"freez")),
(pri(r,xxt,acto)* pritrans(r,xxt)))
*                       from farmer
+ (pri(r,xxt,"farm")* pritrans(r,xxt)) $ sum(omea $ xxtoomea(xxt, omea), 1);
*       Quota rent
quota_(r,r1,xxt,ql) $ (sameas(ql, "q1") AND tradecal(r,r1,xxt,"q1") AND qr_cal(r,r1,xxt,"q1")
and not sum(omea $ xxtoomea(xxt, omea), 1) AND SAMEAS(r, "EU"))..
trqnt(r,r1,xxt,ql) =G= trade(r,r1,xxt,ql);
*       Definition of the equation f
f_(r,acto) $ (sameas (acto,"cons"))..
f(r,acto) =E= sum(xx $ (hconcal(r,xx,"cons") AND inputtoactos(xx,acto)), cd(r,xx,acto) * 
pricons(r,xx));
*       Definition of g
g_(r,acto) $ (sameas(acto,"cons"))..
g(r,acto)=E=sum((xx,yy) $ (hconcal(r,xx,acto) AND hconcal(r,yy,acto)),
(bd(r,xx,yy,acto) $ (ORD(XX) LE ORD(YY))
+  bd(r,yy,xx,acto) $ (ORD(XX) GT ORD(YY)))*SQRT(pricons(r,xx)*pricons(r,yy)));
*      Definition of gi
gi_(r,xx,acto) $ (sameas (acto,"cons") AND priconscal(r,xx) AND  hconcal(r,xx,acto))..
xlvi
gi(r,xx,acto)=E=sum(yy $ (hconcal(r,yy,acto) and priconscal(r,yy)),
( bd(r,xx,yy,acto) $ (ORD(XX) LE ORD(YY))
+  bd(r,yy,xx,acto) $ (ORD(XX) GT ORD(YY)))* SQRT(pricons(r,yy)/pricons(r,xx)));
*********************** Model definition **************************************************************
* Full model (with income allocation system)
Model MULTCOM / sa_.trade,m_.pri,pritrans_.pricons, quota_.qr,prodt_.prodt,
procdem_.procdem, hcon_.hcon,procmarg_.procmarg,f_.f, g_.g,
gi_.gi,income_.income,is_.is,p_.p,PM_.pm  /;
* Restricted model(without income allocation system)
Model MULTCOM1 / sa_.trade,m_.pri,pritrans_.pricons,quota_.qr,prodt_.prodt,
procdem_.procdem,hcon_.hcon, procmarg_.procmarg, f_.f,g_.g,gi_.gi/;
********************************* Start baseline simulations ******************************************
* start loop
LOOP (i,
*   set parameter values to stochastic one (i=1 is still the deterministic value)
bd(r,xx,yy,acto) $ (hconcal(r,xx,acto) AND hconcal(r,yy,acto))=bd_sens(r,xx,yy,acto,i);
cd(r,xx,acto) $ (hconcal(r,xx,"cons"))= cd_sens(r,xx,acto,i);
bs(r,xx,yy,acto)=bs_sens(r,xx,yy,acto,i);
cs(r,xx,acto)$ (procdemcal(r,xx,acto) OR prodtcal(r,xx,acto)) = cs_sens(r,xx,acto,i);
ai(r)=ai_sens(r,i);
bi(r)=bi_sens(r,i);
ci(r)=ci_sens(r,i);
*   set bounds and start values
trade.lo(r,r1,xx,"q1") $ tradecal(r,r1,xx,"q1") = tradecal(r,r1,xx,"q1")/10000;
trade.up(r,r1,xx,ql)   = +inf;
xlvii
pri.lo(r,xx,acto)      =  EPS;
pri.up(r,xx,acto)      = +inf;
pricons.lo(r,xx) $ priconscal(r,xx)=1;
pricons.up(r,xx)       = +inf;
qr.lo(r,r1,xx,ql)      = 0;
qr.up(r,r1,xx,ql)      = +inf;
prodt.lo(r,xx,acto)    = 0;
prodt.up(r,xx,acto)    = +inf;
procdem.lo(r,xx,acto)  = 0;
procdem.up(r,xx,acto)  = +inf;
hcon.lo (r,xx,acto)    = 0;
hcon.up (r,xx,acto)    = +inf;
procmarg.lo(r,xx,acto) = -inf;
procmarg.up(r,xx,acto) = +inf;
P.l(r)= Pcal(r);
income.l(r)=incomecal(r);
g.lo(r, "cons")=1;
*   some variables have to be fixed to zero for the MCP solver
trade.fx(r,r1,xx,ql) $ (not hconcal(r,xx,"cons") )=0;
*   fix trade under q2 to zero where no quota exists
trade.fx(r,r1,xx,"q2") $ (not qr_cal(r,r1,xx,"q1"))=0;
*   fix quota rent of intra trade to zero
qr.fx(r,r,xx,ql)=0;
qr.fx(r,r1,xx,ql) $ (not qr_cal(r,r1,xx,ql))=0;
xlviii
*   Fix the quota rent to zero, where nothing was trade in base year
qr.fx(r,r1,xx,"q1") $ (not sum(ql,tradecal(r,r1,xx,ql)))=0;
*   Fix the quota rent to zero for omea
qr.fx(r,r1,xx,ql) $ sum(omea $ xxtoomea(xx, omea), 1)=0;
pri.fx(r,xx,acto) $ (not outputtoactos(xx,acto)) = 0;
*   Fix prices for other meat products that are not consumed in the base year
pri.fx("URU","omea_eu","farm") = 0;
pri.fx("URU","omea_arg","farm")= 0;
pri.fx("ARG","omea_eu","farm") = 0;
pri.fx("BRA","omea_row","farm")= 0;
pri.fx("BRA","omea_eu","farm") = 0;
*   Some variables that need to be fixed
prodt.fx(r,xx,acto)   $ (not prodtcal(r,xx,acto))=0;
hcon.fx(r,xx,acto)    $ (not hconcal(r,xx,acto))=0;
trade.up(r,r1,xx,ql)  $ (not tradecal(r,r1,xx,"q1"))=0;
procdem.fx(r,xx,acto) $ (not procdemcal(r,xx,acto))= 0;
pri.fx(r,xx,acto)     $ (not prical(r,xx,acto))=0;
pricons.fx(r,xx)      $ (not priconscal(r,xx))=0;
procmarg.fx(r,xx,acto)$ (not procmargcal(r,xx,acto))=0;
qr.fx(r,r1,xxt,ql)    $ (not sameas(r,"EU"))=0;
qr.fx(r,r1,xxt,"q2")=0;
*   Set start values
prodt.l(r,xx,acto)   $ prodtcal(r,xx,acto)=prodtcal(r,xx,acto);
hcon.l(r,xx,acto)    $ hconcal(r,xx,acto)=hconcal(r,xx,acto);
procdem.l(r,xx,acto) $ procdemcal(r,xx,acto)=procdemcal(r,xx,acto);
xlix
procmarg.l(r,xx,acto)$ procmargcal(r,xx,acto) = procmargcal(r,xx,acto);
trade.l(r,r1,xx,ql)  $ tradecal(r,r1,xx,ql)=tradecal(r,r1,xx,ql);
pri.l(r,xx,acto)     $ prical(r,xx,acto)= prical(r,xx,acto);
pricons.l(r,xx)      $ priconscal(r,xx)= priconscal(r,xx);
qr.l(r,r1,xxt,ql)    $ qr_cal(r,r1,xxt,ql)=qr_cal(r,r1,xxt,ql);
g.l(r,acto) $ (sameas(acto,"cons") )=  sum((xx,yy) $  (hconcal(r,xx,acto) AND hconcal(r,yy,acto)),
(bd(r,xx,yy,acto) $ (ORD(XX) LE ORD(YY))
+  bd(r,yy,xx,acto) $ (ORD(XX) GT ORD(YY)))* SQRT(priconscal(r,xx)*priconscal(r,yy)));
gi.l(r,xx,acto) $ (sameas (acto,"cons")AND priconscal(r,xx) AND  hconcal(r,xx,acto))
= sum(yy $ (hconcal(r,yy,acto) and priconscal(r,yy)),
(bd(r,xx,yy,acto) $ (ORD(XX) LE ORD(YY))
+  bd(r,yy,xx,acto) $ (ORD(XX) GT ORD(YY)))* SQRT(priconscal(r,yy)/priconscal(r,xx)));
f.l(r,acto) $ sameas (acto,"cons") = sum (xx $ (hconcal(r,xx,"cons") AND inputtoactos(xx,acto)),
cd(r,xx,acto) * priconscal(r,xx));
pm.l(r)=pmcal(r);
is.l(r)= ai(r)+ bi(r)*LOG(PM.l(r)) +ci(r)* LOG(GDP(r)/P.l(r));
is.up(r)=1;
*   Set model options and solve
MULTCOM.limcol     = 0;
MULTCOM1.limcol    = 0;
MULTCOM.limrow     = 0;
MULTCOM1.limrow    = 0;
MULTCOM.solprint   = 1;
MULTCOM1.solprint  = 1;
MULTCOM.Holdfixed  = 0;
lMULTCOM1.Holdfixed = 0;
MULTCOM.OPTFILE    = 2;
MULTCOM1.OPTFILE   = 2;
*   Solve model
SOLVE MULTCOM Using MCP;
*   Count 1 successful model solutions
dummy(i,"solv","bas") $ (multcom.modelstat=1) =1;
putclose con "*** BASELINE Loop i done= " i.tl ;
*   check if baseline reproduces base data
$include check baseline.gms
*    Close loop
);
* Count successful model solutions
parameter solutions(scen);
solutions("BAS") =sum(i, dummy(i,"solv","bas"));
* Store baseline data in  GDX file
execute_unload  "Baseline.GDX"tradeflow, price, quotarent, production, processingdem,
consumption, processingmar, tottrade;
************************ Scenario analysis ************************************************************
* Create some dummy parameters (are used for setting start values later on)
parameter tradeflowoutdummy(r,r1,xxt,ql,gen,scen);
parameter priceoutdummy (r,xx,acto,priit, gen,scen);
parameter quotarentoutdummy(r,r1,xx,ql,qrit,gen,scen);
parameter productionoutdummy   (r,xx,acto,gen,scen);
parameter processingdemoutdummy(r,xx,acto,gen,scen);
parameter consumptionoutdummy  (r,xx,acto,gen,scen);
parameter processingmaroutdummy(r,xx,acto,gen,scen);
li
parameter incomeoutdummy(r, gen, scen);
parameter isoutdummy(r,gen,scen);
parameter poutdummy(r, gen, scen);
parameter pmoutdummy(r, gen, scen);
* Get startvalues from database
execute_load  "Startvalues.GDX" processingmaroutdummy, processingdemoutdummy, priceoutdummy,
consumptionoutdummy,quotarentoutdummy,processingmaroutdummy,productionoutdummy ,
tradeflowoutdummy,incomeoutdummy, isoutdummy,poutdummy,pmoutdummy,incomeoutdummy  ;
* Save expenditure allocated to meat in the base line on a special parameter
parameter incomesave;
incomesave(r,"VAL", "BAS", i)= incomeout(r, "VAL", "BAS", i) ;
*** first scenario *********************************************************************************
* Include new policy parameters and rerun model
$include scenario1.gms
* Set model options
MULTCOM.holdfixed = 0;
MULTCOM.OPTFILE   = 2;
MULTCOM.limrow    = 0;
* Define convergence parameter
parameter dev(i,scen);
* Start loop
LOOP(i $ dummy(i,"solv","bas"),
display " FIRST SCENARIO";
*    Set parameters to stochastic values (note: i=1 is calibrated to values from literature)
bd(r,xx,yy,acto) $ (hconcal(r,xx,acto) AND hconcal(r,yy,acto))=bd_sens(r,xx,yy,acto,i);
cd(r,xx,acto)    $ (hconcal(r,xx,"cons"))= cd_sens(r,xx,acto,i);
bs(r,xx,yy,acto) $ (procdemcal(r,xx,acto) OR prodtcal(r,xx,acto)) = bs_sens(r,xx,yy,acto,i);
lii
cs(r,xx,acto)    $ (procdemcal(r,xx,acto) OR prodtcal(r,xx,acto)) = cs_sens(r,xx,acto,i);
ai(r)=ai_sens(r,i);
bi(r)=bi_sens(r,i);
ci(r)=ci_sens(r,i);
*    Set convergence parameter to 1 and zero
dev(i,"scen1")=1;
dev(i,"scen2")=0;
*    Start loop to solve income module
LOOP(j $ dev(i,"scen1"),
*        Set start values and bounds
prodt.l(r,xx,acto)   = productionoutdummy (r,xx,acto,"VAL", "SCEN1");
hcon.l(r,xx,acto)    = consumptionoutdummy (r,xx,acto,"VAL", "SCEN1");
procdem.l(r,xx,acto) = processingdemoutdummy (r,xx,acto,"VAL", "SCEN1");
procmarg.l(r,xx,acto)= processingmaroutdummy (r,xx,acto,"VAL", "SCEN1");
trade.l(r,r1,xxt,ql) $ tradecal(r,r1,xxt, ql)=tradeflowoutdummy  (r,r1,xxt,ql,"VAL", "SCEN1");
trade.lo("EU","URU",xx,"q1")  = tradecal("EU","URU",xx,"q1")/100;
hcon.lo("EU","high_fre_uru","cons")  = hconcal("EU","high_fre_uru","cons")/100;
trade.fx("URU","BRA","high_fre_bra","q1")  = tradecal("URU","BRA","high_fre_bra","q1");
hcon.fx("URU","high_fre_bra","cons")  = hconcal("URU","high_fre_bra","cons");
pri.fx("URU","high_fre_bra","slau")= prical("URU","high_fre_bra","slau");
pricons.fx("URU","high_fre_bra")= priconscal("URU","high_fre_bra");
g.l(r,acto) $ (sameas(acto,"cons") )= sum((xx,yy) $  (hconcal(r,xx,acto) AND hconcal(r,yy,acto)),
(bd(r,xx,yy,acto) $ (ORD(XX) LE ORD(YY))
+  bd(r,yy,xx,acto) $ (ORD(XX) GT ORD(YY)))*
SQRT(priceoutdummy(r,xx,"cons","pricons","VAL", "SCEN1")*
priceoutdummy(r,yy,"cons","pricons","VAL", "SCEN1")));
liii
gi.l(r,xx,acto) $ (sameas (acto,"cons")AND priconscal(r,xx) AND  hconcal(r,xx,acto))
=sum(yy $ (hconcal(r,yy,acto) and priconscal(r,yy)),
(bd(r,xx,yy,acto) $ (ORD(XX) LE ORD(YY))
+  bd(r,yy,xx,acto) $ (ORD(XX) GT ORD(YY)))* 
SQRT(priceoutdummy(r,yy,"cons","pricons","VAL", "SCEN1")/
priceoutdummy(r,xx,"cons","pricons","VAL", "SCEN1")));
f.l(r,acto) $ sameas (acto,"cons") = sum (xx $ (hconcal(r,xx,"cons") AND inputtoactos(xx,acto)),
cd(r,xx,acto) * priceoutdummy(r,xx,"cons","pricons","VAL", "SCEN1"));
pri.l(r,xx,acto) = priceoutdummy  (r,xx,acto,"pri","VAL", "SCEN1");
pricons.l(r,xx)=   priceoutdummy  (r,xx,"cons","pricons","VAL", "SCEN1");
qr.l(r,r1,xxt,ql) =quotarentoutdummy  (r,r1,xxt,ql,"qr","VAL", "SCEN1");
is.l(r)=          isoutdummy  (r,"VAL", "BAS");
pm.l(r)=pmoutdummy  (r,"VAL", "BAS");
pm.lo(r)=0.00000001;
p.lo(r) =0.00000001;
*        Fix expenditure on meat to value from earlier runs to get started if income.GDX is empty 
(is later overwritten)
income.fx("EU")=  966660072007 ;
income.fx("URU")= 5484818960 ;
income.fx("ARG")= 76261595074  ;
income.fx("BRA")= 178215534773  ;
income.fx("ROW")= 4099913715690  ;
*        Take value for meat expenditue from GDX data base and fix income varibale to this value
execute_load  "income.GDX"  incomeout;
income.fx(r) $ incomeout(r, "VAL", "SCEN1",i) = incomeout(r, "VAL", "SCEN1",i);
*        Overwrite incomeout with value from baseline
incomeout(r, "VAL", "BAS", i)= incomesave(r,"VAL", "BAS", i) ;
liv
*        Solve restricted model
SOLVE MULTCOM Using MCP;
*        Compute the share of income spent on meat in the model solution
isout(r, "VAL", "SCEN1",i)= ai(r)+ bi(r)* LOG(PM.l(r)) + ci(r)* LOG(GDP(r)/P.l(r));
*        Compute and check deviation from fixed income
convergeSCEN1(r,i)= income.l(r)- is.l(r)* GDP(r);
DEV(i,"scen1") $ (SMAX((r), ABS(convergeSCEN1(r,i)) ) LT 10) = 0;
*        Compute income allocated to meat in the model solution and store on parameter
incomeout(r,"VAL", "SCEN1",i)   = is.l(r)* GDP(r);
incomeoutj(r,"VAL", "SCEN1",i,j)= is.l(r)* GDP(r);
*        Unload data into GDX file
execute_unload "income.GDX"
incomeoutj, incomeout,dev,incomeout, convergescen1;
putclose con "*** First scenario Loop i in progress= " i.tl ;
putclose con "*** First scenario Loop j done= "  j.tl ;
*        Close loop
);
*    Fix income to value from last iteration
income.fx(r)= incomeout(r,"VAL", "SCEN1",i);
*    Solve model again with income allocated to meat from last iteration
SOLVE MULTCOM1 Using MCP;
*    Count 1 successful model solutions
dummy(i,"solv","scen1") $ (multcom.modelstat=1) =1;
lv
CON.lw = 0;
CON.nw = 0;
putclose con "*** First scenario Loop i done= " i.tl ;
*    Create output
$batinclude Create_output.gms SCEN1
*    Close loop
);
* Count successful model solutions
solutions("SCEN1")=sum(i, dummy(i,"solv","scen1"));
CON.lw = 0;
CON.nw = 0;
* Loosen bounds
trade.lo("URU","BRA","high_fre_bra","q1")  = EPS;
trade.up("URU","BRA","high_fre_bra","q1")  = inf;
hcon.lo("URU","high_fre_bra","cons")  = EPS;
hcon.up("URU","high_fre_bra","cons")  = inf;
pri.lo("URU","high_fre_bra","slau")= EPS;
pri.up("URU","high_fre_bra","slau")= inf;
pricons.lo("URU","high_fre_bra")= EPS;
pricons.up("URU","high_fre_bra")= inf;
*** second scenario ********************************************************************************
* Reset policy varaibles to base values
$include reset_policies.gms
* Include new policy parameters and rerun model
$include scenario2.gms
lvi
MULTCOM.limcol    = 0;
MULTCOM.limrow    = 0;
MULTCOM.Holdfixed = 0;
MULTCOM.OPTFILE   = 2;
* Start loop
LOOP(i  $ dummy(i,"solv","bas"),
display "SECOND SCENARIO" ;
*    set parameters to stochastic values
bd(r,xx,yy,acto) $ (hconcal(r,xx,acto) AND hconcal(r,yy,acto))=bd_sens(r,xx,yy,acto,i);
cd(r,xx,acto) $ (hconcal(r,xx,"cons"))= cd_sens(r,xx,acto,i);
bs(r,xx,yy,acto)=bs_sens(r,xx,yy,acto,i);
cs(r,xx,acto)$ (procdemcal(r,xx,acto) OR prodtcal(r,xx,acto)) = cs_sens(r,xx,acto,i);
ai(r)=ai_sens(r,i);
bi(r)=bi_sens(r,i);
ci(r)=ci_sens(r,i);
*    Set convergence parameter to 1
dev(i,"scen2")=1;
*    Start loop to solve income module
LOOP(j $ dev(i,"scen2"),
*         Set start values and bounds
prodt.l(r,xx,acto) = productionoutdummy(r,xx,acto,"VAL", "SCEN2");
hcon.l(r,xx,acto) = consumptionoutdummy(r,xx,acto,"VAL", "SCEN2");
procdem.l(r,xx,acto) =processingdemoutdummy(r,xx,acto,"VAL", "SCEN2");
procmarg.l(r,xx,acto)  = processingmaroutdummy(r,xx,acto,"VAL", "SCEN2");
trade.l(r,r1,xxt,ql) = tradeflowoutdummy(r,r1,xxt,ql,"VAL", "SCEN2");
trade.lo(r,r1,xxt,ql) =0;
trade.lo("EU","URU",xx,"q1")  = tradecal("EU","URU",xx,"q1")/100;
hcon.lo("EU","high_fre_uru","cons")  = hconcal("EU","high_fre_uru","cons")/100;
lvii
pri.l(r,xx,acto) = priceoutdummy(r,xx,acto,"pri","VAL", "SCEN2");
pricons.l(r,xx)=  priceoutdummy(r,xx,"cons","pricons","VAL", "SCEN2");
qr.l(r,r1,xxt,ql) =quotarentoutdummy(r,r1,xxt,ql,"qr","VAL", "SCEN2");
is.l(r)=          isoutdummy(r,"VAL", "BAS");
is.lo(r)=          0.00001;
is.up(r)=          1;
g.l(r,acto) $ (sameas(acto,"cons") )= sum((xx,yy) $  (hconcal(r,xx,acto) AND hconcal(r,yy,acto)),
(bd(r,xx,yy,acto) $ (ORD(XX) LE ORD(YY))
+  bd(r,yy,xx,acto) $ (ORD(XX) GT ORD(YY)))*
SQRT( priceoutdummy(r,xx,"cons","pricons","VAL", "SCEN2")
* priceoutdummy(r,yy,"cons","pricons","VAL", "SCEN2")));
gi.l(r,xx,acto) $ (sameas (acto,"cons")AND priconscal(r,xx) AND  hconcal(r,xx,acto))
=sum(yy $ (hconcal(r,yy,acto) and priconscal(r,yy)),
( bd(r,xx,yy,acto) $ (ORD(XX) LE ORD(YY))
+  bd(r,yy,xx,acto) $ (ORD(XX) GT ORD(YY)))*
SQRT(priceoutdummy(r,yy,"cons","pricons","VAL", "SCEN2")/
priceoutdummy(r,xx,"cons","pricons","VAL", "SCEN2")));
f.l(r,acto) $ sameas (acto,"cons") = sum (xx $ (hconcal(r,xx,"cons") AND inputtoactos(xx,acto)),
cd(r,xx,acto) * priceoutdummy(r,xx,"cons","pricons","VAL", "SCEN2"));
p.l(r)=poutdummy (r,"VAL", "BAS");
pm.l(r)=pmoutdummy(r,"VAL", "BAS");
pm.lo(r)=0.00000001;
p.lo(r) =0.00000001;
lviii
*       Fix expenditure on meat to value from earlier runs to get started if income.GDX is empty 
(is later overwritten)
income.fx("EU")=  964788232092;
income.fx("URU")= 5493094925;
income.fx("ARG")= 76467569918 ;
income.fx("BRA")= 178671170223 ;
income.fx("ROW")= 4099879455985 ;
*       Take value for meat expenditue from GDX data base and fix income varibale to this value
execute_load  "income.GDX" incomeout;
income.fx(r) $ incomeout(r, "VAL", "SCEN2",i) =incomeout(r, "VAL", "SCEN2",i);
*       Overwrite incomeout with value from baseline
incomeout(r, "VAL", "BAS", i)= incomesave(r,"VAL", "BAS", i) ;
MULTCOM.limcol   = 0;
MULTCOM.limrow   = 0;
MULTCOM.Holdfixed= 0;
MULTCOM.OPTFILE =  2;
*        Solve restricted model
SOLVE MULTCOM Using MCP;
*        Compute the share of income spent on meat in the model solution
isout(r, "VAL", "SCEN2",i)= ai(r)+ bi(r)* LOG(PM.l(r)) + ci(r)* LOG(GDP(r)/P.l(r));
*        Compute and check deviation from fixed income
convergeSCEN2(r,i)= income.l(r)- is.l(r)* GDP(r);
DEV(i,"scen2") $ (SMAX((r), ABS(convergeSCEN2(r,i)) ) LT 10)= 0;
*        Compute income allocated to meat in the model solution and store on parameter
incomeout(r,"VAL", "SCEN2",i)= is.l(r)* GDP(r);
incomeoutj(r,"VAL", "SCEN2",i, j)=is.l(r)* GDP(r);
*        Unload data into GDX file
lix
execute_unload "income.GDX"
convergescen1, convergescen2,  incomeoutj, incomeout, dev;
putclose con "*** second scenario Loop i in progress= " i.tl ;
putclose con "*** second scenario Loop j done:= "  j.tl ;
*        Close loop
);
*    Fix income to value from last iteration
income.fx(r)= incomeout(r,"VAL", "SCEN2",i);
*    Solve model again with income allocated to meat from last iteration
SOLVE MULTCOM1 Using MCP;
*    Count 1 successful model solutions
dummy(i,"solv","scen2") $ (multcom.modelstat=1) =1;
CON.lw = 0;
CON.nw = 0;
putclose con "*** second scenario Loop i done:= " i.tl ;
*    Create output
$batinclude Create_output.gms SCEN2
*    Close loop
);
* Count successful model solutions
solutions("SCEN2")=sum(i, dummy(i,"solv","scen2"));
CON.lw = 0;
CON.nw = 0;
putclose con "*** solutions ABC ";
* Unload data into GDX file
execute_unload  "Results.GDX" processingmarout,tarvout, tarsout, trqntout, tottradeout, totrent,
lx
devpri, devquant, processingdemout,procmargout, tarrev,quotarentout,
procrentout,prodrentout,equivalout,welfare, priceout,consumptionout,
productionout,tradeflowout, incomeout,  isout, pout, pmout ;
* Write data in XLS file
execute "GDXXRW i=Results.GDX o=RESULTS par=processingdemout RNG=PROCDEM!A1 rdim=5 cdim=1";
execute "GDXXRW i=Results.GDX o=RESULTS par=processingmarout RNG=PROCMAR!A1 rdim=5 cdim=1";
execute "GDXXRW i=Results.GDX o=RESULTS par=tarrev RNG=TARREV!A1 rdim=5 cdim=1";
execute "GDXXRW i=Results.GDX o=RESULTS par=welfare RNG=WELF!A1 rdim=4 cdim=1";
execute "GDXXRW i=Results.GDXX o=RESULTS par=quotarentout RNG=QUOTARENT!A1 rdim=7 cdim=1";
execute "GDXXRW i=Results.GDX o=RESULTS par=totrent RNG=totrent!A1 rdim=6 cdim=1";
execute "GDXXRW i=Results.GDX o=RESULTS par=procrentout RNG=PROCRENT!A1 rdim=5 cdim=1";
execute "GDXXRW i=Results.GDX o=RESULTS par=prodrentout RNG=PRODRENT!A1 rdim=5 cdim=1";
execute "GDXXRW i=Results.GDX o=RESULTS par=equivalout RNG=EQUIVAL!A1 rdim=5 cdim=1";
execute "GDXXRW i=Results.GDX o=RESULTS par=priceout RNG=PRICE!A1 rdim=6 cdim=1";
execute "GDXXRW i=Results.GDX o=RESULTS par=consumptionout RNG=HCON!A1 rdim=5 cdim=1";
execute "GDXXRW i=Results.GDX o=RESULTS par=productionout RNG=PRODUCTION!A1 rdim=5 cdim=1";
execute "GDXXRW i=Results.GDX o=RESULTS par=tradeflowout RNG=TRADE!A1 rdim=6 cdim=1";
execute "GDXXRW i=Results.GDX o=RESULTS par=tarvout RNG=TARV!A1 rdim=4 cdim=1";
execute "GDXXRW i=Results.GDX o=RESULTS par=tarsout RNG=TARS!A1 rdim=4 cdim=1";
execute "GDXXRW i=Results.GDX o=RESULTS par=trqntout RNG=TRQNT!A1 rdim=5 cdim=1";
*************************** End of programme ***************************************************************
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ANNEX III MODEL CALIBRATION
*************************************************************************************************************
* *
*      Parameter generation process *
* *
*************************************************************************************************************
$offlisting
$include sets.gms
FILE  CON / CON /;
CON.lw = 0;
CON.nw = 0;
* Definition of auxiliary parameters
$include auxiliaryparameters.gms
* Definition of parameters
parameter selad_sens(r,xx,yy,acto,i) elasticiy of demand from literature;
parameter elad_sens(r,xx,yy,acto,i)  elasticiy of demand after calibration;
parameter bd_sens(r,xx,yy,acto,i)    slope parameter of demand function after calibration;
parameter cd_sens(r,xx,acto,i)       constant of demand function after calibration ;
parameter selas_sens(r,xx,yy,acto,i) elasticiy of supply from literature;  
parameter elas_sens(r,xx,yy,acto,i)  elasticiy of supply after calibration;
parameter bs_sens(r,xx,yy,acto,i)    slope parameter of supply function after calibration ;
parameter cs_sens(r,xx,acto,i)       constant of supply function after calibration ;
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parameter seladm(r)                 group demand elasticity of income allocation system taken from literature;
parameter selaym(r)           group income elasticity of income allocation system taken from literature;
parameter bi_sens(r,i)               parameter of income allocation system after calibration;
parameter ci_sens(r,i)               parameter of income allocation system after calibration;
parameter ai_sens(r,i)               parameter of income allocation system after calibration;
parameter eladm_sens(r,i)            group demand elasticity of income allocation system after calibration;
parameter elaym_sens(r,i)            group income elasticity of income allocation system after calibration;
parameter adapt(r,xx,yy,acto)        parameter defining standard deviation of normal distribution 
of demand elasticity;
parameter adapty(r,xx,acto)          parameter defining standard deviation of normal distribution 
of income elasticity;
parameter  GDP(r)                    Gross Domestic Product;
parameter  income(r)                 income allocated to meat products;
* Definition of variables
variable ai(r)                       constant term of income allocation system;
variable bi(r)                       slope parameter of income allocation system;
variable ci(r)                       slope parameter of income allocation system ;
variable pm(r)                       meat price index;
variable p(r)                        price index;
* Load data
execute_load "Startvalues.gdx",  bd_cal, bs_cal, cd_cal, cs_cal;
execute_load "Incomeparameters.gdx" GDP,  Pcal, PMcal,iscal;
execute_load "Basedata.gdx"  prodtcal, procdemcal, hconcal, prical,income, priconscal, procmargcal,leofact;
* Read elasticities from literature
$include elasticities.gms
*************************************************************************************************************
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equations
*       behavioural functions
prodt_(r,xx,acto)        production of farmers and slaughterhouses and freezers
procdem_(r,xx,acto)      demand of processors for beef_ah and beef_ao
hcon_(r,xx,acto)         demand by consumers
procmarg_(r,xx, acto)    processing margin of the  slaughterhouse
*       equations needed for the calibration procedure
*       supply
hess_(r,xx,yy,acto)       calculation of the slope parameter for supply
chol_(r,xx,yy,acto)       test whether b can be decomposed by means of the cholesky decomposition
homs_(r,xx,acto)          equation imposing something, maybe adding up?
penaltys_                 penalty function to achieve least squared deviation from given elasticities
symms_ equation imposing symmetry on bs matrix
DET1_(r,acto)             first principal minor
DET2_(r,acto)             second principal minor
control2_(r,xx,acto)      equation controling for relation of elasticities
control1_(r,xx,yy)        equation controling for sign of the intercept
*       demand
f_(r,acto)                 part of the generalized leontief expenditure system
g_(r,acto)                 part of the generalized leontief expenditure system
gi_(r,xx,acto)             first derivative of g versus own prices
gij_(r,xx,yy,acto)         second derivative of g versus  prices
elad_(r,xx,yy,acto)        price elasticiy of demand
elado_(r,xx,yy,acto)      cross price elasticity of demand
elay_(r,xx,acto)           income elasticity of demand
penaltyd_                  penalty function to achieve least squared deviation from given elasticities
symmd_                     equation imposing symmetry on bd matrix
*       income allocation system
is_                        equation determining share of  income allocated to meat
elaym_                     equation defining group income elasticity
eladm_            equation defining group price elasticity
lxiv
penaltym_                  squared deviation from given elasticities
homm_                      equation assuring homogeneity
income_                    equation determining income spent on meat
;
lxv
Variables
pri(r,xx,acto)          producer price
pricons(r,xx)           consumer price
prodt(r,xx,acto)        production of each of the actors
procdem (r,xx,acto)     demand of processors for beef_ah and beef_ao
hcon (r,xx,acto)        demand by consumers
procmarg(r,xx,acto)     processing margin of the processing sector
*       variables needed for the calibration procedure
*       supply and demand of the processing industry
elas(r,xx,yy,acto)      supply elasticities that give parameters in line with micro economic theory
bs(r,xx,yy,acto)        matrix of slope parameters for SUPPLY ( hessian matrix of objective function)
cs(r,xx,acto)           constant term of the supply function
penaltys                squared deviation from given elasticities for supply and for demand of the 
processing industry
DET1(r,acto)            first principal minor
DET2(r,acto)       second principal minor
priq0(r,xx,acto)
*       human consumption
elad(r,xx,yy,acto)     price elasticities of demand in line with microeconomic theory
elay(r,xx,acto)        income elasticites of demand in line with microeconomic theory
bd(r,xx,yy,acto)       matrix of slope parameters for DEMAND (hessian matrix of objective function)
cd(r,xx,acto)          constant term of demand function
g(r,acto)              part of the generalized leontief expenditure system
gi(r,xx,acto)          first derivative of g versus own prices
gij(r,xx,yy,acto)      second derivative of g versus own and cross prices
f(r,acto)              part of the generalized leontief expenditure system
penaltyd               squared deviation from given elasticities for demand
lxvi
*       income allocation system
is(r)                  share of  income allocated to meat
elaym(r)               group income elasticity
eladm(r)        group price elasticity
penaltym               squared deviation from given elasticities
;
positive variable DET1;
positive variable DET2;
parameter prindex(r);
prindex(r)=1;
************************** Model equations *******************************************************************
*     Income  allocated to meat
income_(r) ..
income(r)=E=is(r)* GDP(r);
*     Equation determining the share of income spent on meat
is_(r) ..
is(r)=E= (ai(r)+ bi(r)* LOG(PM(r)) + ci(r)* LOG(GDP(r)/P(r)));
*     Price elasticity of meat consumption
eladm_(r)..
eladm(r)=E=-1+bi(r)/is(r)-ci(r);
*     Income elasticiy of meat
elaym_(r)..
elaym(r)=E= 1+ci(r)/is(r);
*     Penalty function
*     Human consumption
hcon_(r,xx,acto) $ (hconcal(r,xx,acto) and sameas(acto,"cons"))..
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HCon(r,xx,acto)=E=cd(r,xx,acto)  + gi(r,xx,acto)/g(r,acto) *  (income(r) - f(r,acto));
*     Demand of the processing
procdem_(runr,xx,acto) $ procdemcal(runr,xx,acto)..
procdem(runr,xx,acto) =E= (cs(runr,xx,"slau") + sum(yy $ (inputtoactos(yy,acto)),
bs(runr,xx,yy,"slau") * procmarg(runr, yy,"slau")/prindex(runr))) $ (sameas(acto,"slau")
AND inputtoactos(xx,acto))
+ (cs(runr,xx,"freez") + sum(yy $ (inputtoactos(yy,acto)),
bs(runr,xx,yy,"freez") * procmarg(runr,yy,"freez")/prindex(runr))) $ (sameas(acto,"freez")
AND (inputtoactos(xx,acto)));
*    Supply function for famers, slaughterhouses and freezing units
prodt_(runr,xx,acto) $ ( prodtcal(runr,xx,acto) AND xxtocountries(runr,xx) AND
(sameas (acto, "farm")))..
prodt(runr,xx,acto) =E= (cs(runr,xx,acto) + sum (yy $ (outputtoactos(yy,acto) 
AND prodtcal(runr,yy,acto)),
bs(runr,xx,yy,acto) * (pri(runr,yy,acto))/prindex(runr)))
$ (sameas (acto, "farm")
AND outputtoactos(xx,acto))
+ sum(yy $ (inputtoactos(yy,acto)),procdem(runr,yy, "slau") * leofact(runr,yy,xx )) 
$ (sameas (acto,"slau")AND (outputtoactos(xx,acto)))
+ (procdem("arg","high_fre_arg",acto)) $ (sameas (acto,"freez")
AND sameas(xx,"other_fro_arg")
AND sameas(runr,"arg"))
+ (procdem("arg","other_fre_arg",acto)) $ (sameas (acto,"freez")
AND sameas(xx,"other_fro_arg")
AND sameas(runr,"arg"))
+ (procdem("bra","high_fre_bra",acto)) $ (sameas (acto,"freez")
AND sameas(xx,"other_fro_bra")
AND sameas(runr,"bra"))
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+ (procdem("bra","other_fre_bra",acto)) $ (sameas (acto,"freez")
AND sameas(xx,"other_fro_bra")
AND sameas(runr,"bra"))
+ (procdem("uru","high_fre_uru",acto)) $ (sameas (acto,"freez")
AND sameas(xx,"other_fro_uru")
AND sameas(runr,"uru"))
+ (procdem("uru","other_fre_uru",acto)) $ (sameas (acto,"freez")
AND sameas(xx,"other_fro_uru")
AND sameas(runr,"uru"))
+ (procdem("row","high_fre_row",acto)) $ (sameas (acto,"freez")
AND sameas(xx,"other_fro_row")
AND sameas(runr,"row"))
+ (procdem("row","other_fre_row",acto)) $ (sameas (acto,"freez")
AND sameas(xx,"other_fro_row")
AND sameas(runr,"row"))
+ (procdem("eu","high_fre_eu",acto)) $ (sameas (acto,"freez")
AND sameas(xx,"other_fro_eu")
AND sameas(runr,"eu"))
+ (procdem("eu","other_fre_eu",acto)) $ (sameas (acto,"freez")
AND sameas(xx,"other_fro_eu")
AND sameas(runr,"eu"));
*   Definition of the hessian matrix
hess_(runr,xx,yy,acto) $ (((prodtcal(runr,xx,acto) AND prodtcal(runr,yy,acto)and sameas(acto,"farm"))
OR (procdemcal(runr,xx,acto) AND procdemcal(runr,yy,acto)))
AND xxtocountries(runr,xx) and xxtocountries(runr,yy))..
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*          for farmers
bs(runr,xx,yy,acto) =E= elas(runr,xx,yy,acto) *  ((prodt(runr,xx,acto)/pri(runr,yy,acto)) $
(sameas(acto,"farm") AND prodtcal(runr,xx,acto)
and outputtoactos(xx,acto)
and outputtoactos(yy,acto))
*      for the meat industry
+  ((procdem(runr,xx,acto)/procmarg(runr,yy,acto))
$ (procdemcal(runr,xx,acto)
AND (sameas (acto,"slau")
OR sameas (acto,"freez")))));
*    Equation ensuring homogeneity
homs_(runr,xx,acto) $ (NOT sameas (acto,"freez") AND xxchol(xx,acto) and xxtocountries(runr,xx))..
sum(yy $ (xxchol(yy,acto) and xxtocountries(runr,yy)), elas(runr,xx,yy,acto))=G= 0;
*     Equation ensuring symmetry
symms_(runr,xx,yy,acto) $ (not sameas(acto, "cons") and not sameas(acto,"freez")
AND xxchol(xx,acto) AND xxchol(yy,acto)
AND ((procdemcal(runr,xx,acto) AND procdemcal(runr,yy,acto))
OR  (prodtcal(runr,xx,acto) AND prodtcal(runr,yy,acto))))..
bs(runr,xx,yy,acto) =E= bs(runr,yy,xx,acto);
*    Equation ensuring correct sign of intercept
control2_(r,xx,acto) $ (sameas(acto,"farm")and prodtcal(r,xx,"farm"))..
priq0(r,xx,"farm") =E= (-cs(r,xx,"farm")-sum(yy $ (not sameas(xx,yy)),
bs(r,xx,yy,"farm") * prical(r,yy,"farm") ))/
bs(r,xx,xx,"farm");
*     Definition of determinants for both farmers and slaughterhouses
DET1_(runr,acto) $ (not sameas(acto, "freez"))..
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DET1(runr,acto)=E=
*             a11*a22
PROD(xx $ (ORD(XX) LT 3), bs(runr,xx,xx,acto))-
*            - a12*a21
PROD((xx,yy) $ ((ORD(XX) LT 3) AND (ORD(YY) LT 3) AND (NOT SAMEAS(xx,yy))),
bs(runr,xx,yy,acto));
*      Definition of determinant for farmers
DET2_(runr,acto) $ (sameas(acto,"farm"))..
DET2(runr,acto)=E=
*             a11*a22*a33
PROD(xx, bs(runr,xx,xx,"farm"))
*            + a12*a23*a31
+ PROD((xx,yy) $ (
((ORD(XX) EQ 1) AND (ORD(YY) EQ 2))
OR   ((ORD(XX) EQ 2) AND (ORD(YY) EQ 3))
OR   ((ORD(XX) EQ 3) AND (ORD(YY) EQ 1))
), bs(runr,xx,yy,"farm"))
*            +a13*a21*a32
+ PROD((xx,yy) $ (
((ORD(XX) EQ 1) AND (ORD(YY) EQ 3))
OR   ((ORD(XX) EQ 2) AND (ORD(YY) EQ 1))
OR   ((ORD(XX) EQ 3) AND (ORD(YY) EQ 2))
), bs(runr,xx,yy,"farm"))
*            -a31*a22*a13
- PROD((xx,yy) $ (
((ORD(XX) EQ 3) AND (ORD(YY) EQ 1))
OR   ((ORD(XX) EQ 2) AND (ORD(YY) EQ 2))
OR   ((ORD(XX) EQ 1) AND (ORD(YY) EQ 3))
), bs(runr,xx,yy,"farm"))
*            -a32*a23*a11
- PROD((xx,yy) $ (
((ORD(XX) EQ 3) AND (ORD(YY) EQ 2))
OR   ((ORD(XX) EQ 2) AND (ORD(YY) EQ 3))
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OR   ((ORD(XX) EQ 1) AND (ORD(YY) EQ 1))
), bs(runr,xx,yy,"farm"))
*            -a33*a21*a12
- PROD((xx,yy) $ (
((ORD(XX) EQ 3) AND (ORD(YY) EQ 3))
OR   ((ORD(XX) EQ 2) AND (ORD(YY) EQ 1))
OR   ((ORD(XX) EQ 1) AND (ORD(YY) EQ 2))
), bs(runr,xx,yy,"farm"));
*     Definition of the penalty function
penaltys_..
penaltys =E= sum((runr,xx,yy,acto) $ (selas(runr,xx,yy,acto)),
SQR(elas(runr,xx,yy,acto) - selas(runr,xx,yy,acto)));
penaltym_.. penaltym =E=SUM(r, SQR(selaym(r)-selaym(r)) + SQR (seladm(r)-eladm(r)));
*     Homogeneity condition for income module
homm_(r).. elaym(r)+eladm(r)=E=0;
*    Definition of the equation f
f_(r,acto) $ sameas (acto,"cons")..
f(r,acto) =E= sum (xx $ (hconcal(r,xx,"cons") AND inputtoactos(xx,acto)), cd(r,xx,acto) * pricons(r,xx));
*    Definition of g
g_(r,acto) $ (sameas(acto,"cons"))..
g(r,acto)=E=sum((xx,yy) $  (hconcal(r,xx,acto) AND hconcal(r,yy,acto)),
(bd(r,xx,yy,acto) $ (ORD(XX) LE ORD(YY))
+  bd(r,yy,xx,acto) $ (ORD(XX) GT ORD(YY)))*SQRT(pricons(r,xx)*pricons(r,yy)));
*    Definition of gi
gi_(r,xx,acto) $ (sameas (acto,"cons")AND priconscal(r,xx) and  hconcal(r,xx,acto))..
gi(r,xx,acto)=E=sum(yy $ (hconcal(r,yy,acto) and priconscal(r,yy)),
(bd(r,xx,yy,acto) $ (ORD(XX) LE ORD(YY))
+ bd(r,yy,xx,acto) $ (ORD(XX) GT ORD(YY)))* SQRT(pricons(r,yy) /pricons(r,xx)));
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*     Definition of Gij
gij_(r,xx,yy,acto)$(sameas(acto,"cons")and hconcal (r,xx,acto)and hconcal(r,yy,acto) and not  sameas(xx,yy))..
gij(r,xx,yy,acto) =E= (( bd(r,xx,yy,acto) $ (ORD(xx) LE ORD(yy))+  bd(r,yy,xx,acto) 
$ (ORD(xx) GT ORD(yy)))
* 0.5/ SQRT(pricons(r,yy) * pricons(r,xx)))
+(sum(zz $ (not sameas (xx,zz)and hconcal(r,zz,acto)), bd(r,xx,zz,acto)
*(-0.5)*(pricons(r,xx)**(-1.5))*(pricons(r,zz)**0.5))) $ (sameas(xx,yy));
*    Definition of price elasticities
elad_(r,xx,yy,acto) $  (hconcal(r,xx,acto) AND hconcal(r,yy,acto) AND sameas (acto,"cons")
AND not sameas (xx,yy))..
elad(r,xx,yy,acto)=E=((gij(r,xx,yy,acto) / g(r,acto)- gi(r,xx,acto) * gi(r,yy,acto) / SQR(g(r,acto))) * 
(income(r)-f(r,acto))
- gi(r,xx,acto)/g(r,acto) * cd(r,yy,acto))* pricons(r,yy)/prindex(r)/hcon(r,xx,acto);
elado_(r,xx,xx,acto) $ (hconcal(r,xx,acto) AND hconcal(r,xx,acto) AND sameas(acto,"cons") ) ..
elad(r,xx,xx,acto) =E= (((gij(r,xx,xx,acto)*g(r,acto)-SQR(gi(r,xx,acto)))/SQR(g(r,acto))  )
* (income(r)-sum(yy $ priconscal(r,yy), pricons(r,yy)* cd(r,yy,acto)))
+ cd(r,xx,acto)* (gi(r,xx,acto)/g(r,acto)))*
(pricons(r,xx)/prindex(r)/hcon(r,xx,"cons"));
*    Definition of the income elasticity
elay_(r,xx,acto) $ (hconcal(r,xx,acto) AND sameas (acto,"cons"))..
elay(r,xx,acto) =E= gi(r,xx,acto) / g(r,acto) * (income(r)/ hcon(r,xx,acto));
*    Ensuring symmetry
symmd_(r,xx,yy,acto) $ (hconcal(r,xx,acto) and hconcal(r,yy,acto)AND sameas (acto, "cons")
AND inputtoactos(xx,acto) AND inputtoactos(yy,acto) and (not sameas(XX,YY)))..
bd(r,xx,yy,acto)=E=bd(r,yy,xx,acto);
*    Ensure that elasticity of slaughterhouses is higher than farmers (arbitrary value: 5 percent)
control1_ (runr,xx, xx) $ (prodtcal(runr,xx,"farm")) ..
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elas(runr,xx, xx,"slau") =G=  elas(runr,xx, xx,"farm")*1.05;
*    Definition of the penalty function
penaltyd_ .. penaltyd =E=  SUM((r,xxt,yyt) $ (hconcal(r,xxt,"cons") AND hconcal(r,yyt,"cons")),
SQR(elad(r,xxt,yyt,"cons")- selad(r,xxt,yyt,"cons")))
+  SUM((r, xxt) $ (inputtoactos(xxt,"cons") and hconcal(r,xxt,"cons")),
SQR(elay(r,xxt,"cons") - selay(r,xxt,"cons")));
*********  Preparations for optimisation process *******************************************************
*    Supply side
*    Fix some variables to their base year values
prodt.fx(r,xx,acto)     = prodtcal(r,xx,acto);
procdem.fx(r,xx,acto)   = procdemcal(r,xx,acto);
hcon.fx (r,xx,acto)     = hconcal(r,xx,acto);
pri.fx(r,xx,acto)       = prical(r,xx,acto);
pricons.fx(r,xx)        = priconscal(r,xx);
procmarg.fx(r,xx,acto)  = procmargcal(r,xx,acto);
*   Set start values
elas.l(runr,xx,yy,acto) $ selas(runr,xx,yy,acto) = selas(runr,xx,yy,acto);
elas.l(r,xx,xx,"freez") $ procdemcal(r,xx,"freez")=0.3;
elas.l(r,xx,yy,acto) $ (NOT xxchol(xx,acto))= 0;
*    Fix supply elasticities for products that cannot be produced to zero
elas.fx(r,xx,yy,acto) $ (not sameas(xx,yy) AND not prodtcal(r,yy,acto) )=0 ;
*    Set some bounds
elas.lo(r,xx,xx,"farm") $ selas(r,xx,xx,"farm")= selas(r,xx,xx,"farm")/50;
bs.lo(r,xx,xx,"farm") $ prodtcal(r,xx,"farm")= 1;
elas.lo("uru",xx,yy,"farm") $ (prodtcal("uru",xx,"farm") and prodtcal("uru",yy,"farm"))= -5;
elas.up(r,xx,yy,"farm") $ (not sameas(xx,yy)) = 0;
elas.lo(r,xx,xx,"slau") = 0.009;
elas.lo(r,xx,yy,"slau") $ (not sameas(xx,yy)) = -2;
elas.lo("EU",xx,yy,"slau") $ (not sameas(xx,yy)) = -0.5;
lxxiv
elas.up(r,xx,yy,"slau") $ (not sameas(xx,yy)) = 0;
elas.up(r,xx,yy,"slau") $ (not sameas(xx,yy) and not sameas(r, "URU")and 
not sum(omea $ sameas(xx,omea),1)and not sum(omea $ sameas(yy,omea),1) ) = -0.1;
elas.up(r,xx,yy,"farm") $ (not sameas(xx,yy)and not sameas(r, "URU")and  
not sum(omea $ sameas(xx,omea),1)and not sum(omea $ sameas(yy,omea),1)) = -0.1;
elas.lo(r,xx,xx,"freez") = 0;
elas.lo(r,xx,yy,"freez") $ (not sameas(xx,yy)) =-0.8;
elas.up(r,xx,yy,"freez") $ (not sameas(xx,yy)) = 0;
*    Put start value (from earlier run) on values of the hessian matrix and on constant
bs.l(r,xx,yy,acto) $ prical(r,xx,acto) = bs_cal(r,xx,yy,acto);
cs.l(r,xx,acto)=cs_cal(r,xx,acto);
*    Impose sign on the constant terms
cs.lo(r,xx,"farm")=0;
cs.lo(r,xx,"slau")=0;
cs.lo(r,xx,"freez")=0;
*    Demand side
*    Put bounds and start values (from earlier runs)
cd.lo(r,xx,acto)=0;
cd.l(r,xx,acto) = cd_cal(r,xx,acto);
f.lo (r, acto)=0;
f.l(r,acto) $ sameas (acto,"cons") = sum ((xx) $  (hconcal(r,xx,"cons")),cd.l(r,xx,acto) 
* pricons.l(r,xx));
bd.lo(r,xx,yy,acto) $ (NOT sameas(xx,yy) and hconcal(r,xx,acto) and 
hconcal(r,yy,acto)) = bd_cal(r,xx,yy,acto)*0.5;
bd.l (r,xx,xx,"cons") $ (hconcal(r,xx,"cons"))=bd_cal(r,xx,xx,"cons")*0.8;
bd.lo (r,xx,xx,"cons") $ (hconcal(r,xx,"cons"))=bd_cal(r,xx,xx,"cons")*1.5;
bd.up(r,xx,xx,"cons")=0;
bd.up("BRA","other_fre_bra", "other_fre_bra", "cons")=-0.0000001;
bd.l (r,xx,yy,acto) $ ( sameas(acto,"cons") AND NOT bd.l (r,xx,yy,acto) AND inputtoactos(xx,acto) 
AND inputtoactos(yy,acto)) = bd_cal(r,xx,yy,acto);
g.l(r,acto)   $ sameas (acto,"cons") = sum((xx,yy) $ (hconcal(r,xx,acto) AND hconcal(r,yy,acto)),
bd.l(r,xx,yy,acto) * SQRT(pricons.l(r,xx) * pricons.l(r,yy)));
g.lo(r,acto) = 0.000005;
lxxv
gi.l(r,xx,acto)   $ (sameas (acto,"cons") AND priconscal(r,xx) AND hconcal(r,xx,acto))
= sum((yy) $ (hconcal(r,yy,acto)), bd.l(r,xx,yy,acto) * 
SQRT(pricons.l(r,yy)/pricons.l(r,xx)));
gij.l(r,xx,yy,acto) $ (sameas (acto,"cons")AND hconcal(r,xx,acto)AND 
hconcal(r,yy,acto)AND (not sameas (xx,yy)))
= (bd.l(r,xx,yy,acto)  * 0.5/SQRT(pricons.l(r,xx) * pricons.l(r,yy)))
$ (hconcal(r,xx,acto) and hconcal(r,yy,acto)AND(not sameas (xx,yy)));
elay.lo(r,xx,acto)$ hconcal(r,xx,acto) =0.01;
elay.l(r,xx,acto) $ (hconcal(r,xx,acto) AND sameas (acto,"cons"))= gi.l(r,xx,acto) / g.l(r,acto) 
* (income(r)/ hcon.l(r,xx,acto));
elay.up(r,xx,acto)$ hconcal(r,xx,acto)=10;
elad.l(r,xx,yy,acto) = 0;
elad.l(r,xx,yy,acto) $ (hconcal(r,xx,acto) and hconcal(r,yy,acto) AND sameas (acto,"cons")AND 
not sameas (xx,yy))
= ((gij.l(r,xx,yy,acto) / g.l(r,acto)
- ((gi.l(r,xx,acto) * gi.l(r,yy,acto)) / SQR(g.l(r,acto)))) * (income(r)-f.l(r,acto))
- (gi.l(r,xx,acto)/g.l(r,acto)) * cd.l(r,yy,acto))
* pricons.l(r,yy)/prindex(r)/hcon.l(r,xx,acto);
elad.l(r,xx,xx,acto) $ (hconcal(r,xx,acto))= - sum(yy $ hconcal(r,yy,acto), 
elad.l(r,xx,yy,acto)) - elay.l(r,xx,acto);
elad.lo(r,xx,yy,acto) $ (hconcal(r,xx,acto) AND hconcal(r,yy,acto) AND not sameas(yy,xx))
= 0.000001;
*    Put lower limit on cross price elasticities within meat of high quality
elad.lo(r,bfh, bfh1,"cons") $ (sameas(r, "EU") and hconcal(r,bfh,"cons") and hconcal(r,bfh1,"cons")
and (not sameas(bfh, bfh1)))=0.001;
elad.up(r,xx,yy,acto) $ (hconcal(r,xx,acto) AND hconcal(r,yy,acto) AND not sameas(yy,xx)) = 2;
*    Limit the range of the own price elasticites
elad.up (r,xx,xx,acto) $ hconcal(r,xx,acto)=-0.01;
elad.lo (r,xx,xx,acto) $ hconcal(r,xx,acto)=-2;
lxxvi
*    Limit cross price elasticities between different quality to small values
elad.up("EU", bfh, bfo, "cons") $ (hconcal("EU",bfh,"cons") and hconcal("EU",bfo,"cons")) = 0.05;
elad.up("EU", bfo, bfh, "cons") $ (hconcal("EU",bfh,"cons") and hconcal("EU",bfo,"cons")) = 0.05;
elad.up("EU", bfh, bff, "cons") $ (hconcal("EU",bfh,"cons") and hconcal("EU",bff,"cons")) = 0.05;
elad.up("EU", bff, bfh, "cons") $ (hconcal("EU",bfh,"cons") and hconcal("EU",bff,"cons")) = 0.05;
****** Define and solve models *****************************************************************************
*     Supply
MODEL TrimElas /homs_,penaltys_, prodt_,procdem_, hess_,control1_, DET1_, DET2_, symms_,  control2_ /;
TrimElas.limcol    = 0;
TrimElas.limrow    = 5;
TrimElas.limrow    = 0;
TrimElas.solprint  = 1;
TrimElas.Holdfixed = 1;
TrimElas.Holdfixed = 0;
Solve TrimElas USING NLP Minimizing Penaltys;
*    Demand
MODEL TrimElad / g_, gi_, f_, gij_,elad_,elado_,elay_,hcon_, symmd_, penaltyd_ /;
TrimElad.limcol    = 0;
TrimElad.limrow    = 0;
TrimElad.solprint  = 1;
TrimElad.Holdfixed = 0;
TrimElad.optfile   = 2;
Solve TrimElad USING NLP Minimizing Penaltyd;
******** Calibration of the parameters of the income module**********************
*   Fix variables to their base year values
lxxvii
is.fx(r)    = iscal(r);
P.fx(r)     = pcal(r);
PM.fx(r)    = pmcal(r);
*   Read elasticities for group expenditure
$include groupelas.gms
*   Set bounds
ai.lo(r)=0;
eladm.up(r)=0;
elaym.up(r)=selaym(r)*5;
elaym.lo(r)=selaym(r)/2;
eladm.l(r)=seladm(r);
elaym.l(r)=selaym(r);
*   Define and solve model
MODEL TRIMEXP/is_,elaym_,eladm_,penaltym_, homm_ /;
TrimExp.limcol    = 0;
TrimExp.limrow    = 0;
Trimexp.solprint  = 1;
SOLVE TRIMEXP Using NLP minimizing Penaltym;
*   Store results
eladm_cal(r)=eladm.l(r);
elaym_cal(r)=elaym.l(r);
incomecal(r)=income(r);
elay_cal(r,xx,acto)=elay.l(r,xx,acto);
elas_cal(r,xx,yy,acto)= elas.l(r,xx,yy,acto);
elad_cal(r,xx,yy,"cons")= elad.l(r,xx,yy,"cons");
bs_cal(r,xx,yy,acto)= bs.l(r,xx,yy,acto);
cs_cal(r,xx,acto)= cs.l(r,xx,acto);
lxxviii
bd_cal(r,xx,yy,acto)= bd.l(r,xx,yy,acto);
cd_cal(r,xx,acto)=  cd.l(r,xx,acto);
****** Start random generation of elasticities *******************************************************
* Store elasticities from first calibration on parameter
selaym_ori(r)=selaym(r);
seladm_ori(r)=seladm(r);
selad_ori(r,xx,yy,acto)=selad(r,xx,yy,acto);
selas_ori(r,xx,yy,acto)=selas(r,xx,yy,acto);
* Load factors derived from the standard error
execute_load "STNDERROR.gdx",ADAPT, ADAPTY;
* Set the factor arbitrarily to 0.5 where no value from literature exists
ADAPT(r,xx,yy,acto) $ (not ADAPT(r,xx,yy,acto) AND ((hconcal(r,xx,acto) AND hconcal(r,yy,acto)) OR
(prodtcal(r,xx,acto) AND prodtcal(r,yy,acto)) OR (procdemcal(r,xx,acto) 
AND procdem_cal(r,yy,acto))))=0.5;
ADAPTY(r,xx,"cons") $ (not ADAPTY(r,xx,"cons") AND hconcal(r,xx,"cons"))=0.5;
lxxix
* Demand
* Start loop
LOOP(i,
*      Create random elasticities
selad(r,xx,yy,acto) =NORMAL(selad(r,xx,yy,acto), ABS(selad(r,xx,yy,acto))* ADAPT(r,xx,yy,acto));
*      For the first iteration, set elasticity back to original value
selad(r,xx,yy,acto) $ sameas(i,"1")= selad_ori(r,xx,yy,acto);
*      Solve model
Solve TrimElad USING NLP Minimizing Penaltyd;
*      Store results
bd_sens(r,xx,yy,acto,i)  $ (trimelad.modelstat=2 OR trimelad.modelstat = 7)= bd.l(r,xx,yy,acto);
cd_sens(r,xx,acto,i)     $ (trimelad.modelstat=2 OR trimelad.modelstat = 7)= cd.l(r,xx,acto);
elad_sens(r,xx,yy,acto,i)$ (trimelad.modelstat=2 OR trimelad.modelstat = 7)= elad.l(r,xx,yy,acto);
*      reset selad to original elasticities
selad(r,xx,yy,acto)= selad_ori(r,xx,yy,acto);
putclose con "*** TRIMELAD Loop i done= " i.tl ;
CON.lw = 0;
CON.nw = 0;
* Close loop
);
* Supply
* Start loop
LOOP(i,
lxxx
*      Create random elasticities
selas(r,xx,yy,acto) = NORMAL(selas(r,xx,yy,acto), ABS(selas(r,xx,yy,acto))* ADAPT(r,xx,yy,acto));
*      For the first iteration, set elasticity back to original value
selas(r,xx,yy,acto) $ sameas(i,"1")= selas_ori(r,xx,yy,acto);
*      Solve model
TrimElas.limcol    = 0;
TrimElas.limrow    = 0;
TrimElas.solprint  = 1;
TrimElas.Holdfixed = 1;
Solve TrimElas USING NLP Minimizing Penaltys;
*      Store results
bs_sens(r,xx,yy,acto,i) $ (trimelas.modelstat=2 OR trimelas.modelstat = 7)= bs.l(r,xx,yy,acto);
cs_sens(r,xx,acto,i)    $ (trimelas.modelstat=2 OR trimelas.modelstat = 7)= cs.l(r,xx,acto);
elas_sens(r,xx,yy,acto,i)=elas.l(r,xx,yy,acto);
*      Reset selas to original elasticities
selas(r,xx,yy,acto)= selas_ori(r,xx,yy,acto);
* Close loop
);
* Income allocation module
* Read elasticities for groups
$include groupelas.gms
lxxxi
* Start loop
LOOP(i,
*   Set bounds and start values
ai.lo(r)=0;
eladm.up(r)=-EPS;
elaym.lo(r)= EPS;
eladm.l(r)=seladm(r);
elaym.l(r)=selaym(r);
*   Create random elasticities
seladm(r) $ (not sameas(i, "1")) = NORMAL(seladm(r), ABS(seladm(r))*0.5);
selaym(r) $ (not sameas(i, "1"))=  NORMAL(selaym(r), ABS(selaym(r))*0.5);
*   Solve model
SOLVE TRIMEXP Using NLP minimizing Penaltym;
*   Store results
ai_sens(r,i)$ (trimexp.modelstat=2 OR trimexp.modelstat = 7)=ai.l(r);
bi_sens(r,i)$ (trimexp.modelstat=2 OR trimexp.modelstat = 7)=bi.l(r);
ci_sens(r,i)$ (trimexp.modelstat=2 OR trimexp.modelstat = 7)=ci.l(r);
eladm_sens(r,i)$(trimexp.modelstat=2 OR trimexp.modelstat = 7)=eladm.l(r);
elaym_sens(r,i)$(trimexp.modelstat=2 OR trimexp.modelstat = 7)=elaym.l(r);
*   Reset to original elasticities
seladm(r)=seladm_ori(r);
selaym(r)=selaym_ori(r);
* Close loop
);
* Store parameters
execute_unload "Parameters.gdx"  bd_sens, cd_sens, elad_sens, ai_sens, bi_sens, ci_sens, eladm_sens,
bs_sens, income,cs_sens elas_sens, elaym_sens;
************************************** End of programme *******************************************************
